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ABSTRACT 
 
Between 1982 and 2003, as part of an ambitious programme of market reforms, the 
total number of state-owned enterprises in Mexico was cut from 1,155 to 210. 
Despite this, the country’s energy sector, including the electricity industry, has largely 
remained in state hands. Presidents Ernesto Zedillo and Vicente Fox presented their 
projects to privatise the Mexican electricity industry (MEI). However, they were 
unable to reach agreements with key political players to carry out this strategy. This 
thesis explores the underlying reasons for this “non-privatisation” by applying the 
most important behavioural theory of choice under risk, Prospect Theory (PT).  
 
The thesis hypotheses that privatisation of the Mexican electricity industry was not 
implemented because there were specific conditions that led decision-makers to 
behave in a risk-averse way. For instance, the privatisation of the MEI is more likely 
to occur in conditions of a severe crisis in that sector, and that these conditions have 
yet to occur. This hypothesis draws on psychological arguments derived from PT, 
which explore behaviour in terms of risk aversion in the domain of gains and risk-
seeking in the domain of losses. According to PT, people tend to opt for risky choices 
when they are experiencing losses. On the other hand, people behave in a very 
cautious way when they see themselves in the domain of gains. The research offers 
evidence that the decision-makers involved in the debate of the electricity 
privatisation projects were in the domain of gains and therefore they did not 
implement the privatisation.  
 
In this way, the thesis offers a new perspective for understanding the political 
dynamics of the privatisation proposals. The thesis also makes important contribution 
to empirical knowledge, offering original insights that cannot be provided by other 
theoretical frameworks such as rational choice theories. Moreover, the thesis offers 
an interesting analysis of different economic, social and political factors. This 
provides key information that is used in a context that supports our PT application. 
For instance, we study the partial participation of the private sector in the MEI and 
reviewed historical events that strongly influenced the country’s economic and social 
development. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Why were the privatisation projects for the Mexican electricity industry (MEI) not 
implemented? What were the factors that influenced politicians’ decision-making 
processes when defining whether to privatise this industry or not? This thesis explores 
the underlying reasons for this “non-privatisation” by using the most influential 
behavioural theory of choice, Prospect Theory (PT). The thesis demonstrates that PT 
provides an alternative perspective, offering original insights that cannot be provided by 
other theoretical frameworks. In particular, we analyse how Mexico’s main political 
actors behaved during the debates about the MEI’s privatisation proposals. The study 
also makes an important contribution to empirical knowledge by setting PT alongside 
more traditional theories of choice applied to political science. 
This study seeks an explanation for the incomprehensible behaviour of decision-
makers. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the National Action Party (PAN) 
have supported each other’s economic policies many times. Moreover, they share the 
same economic platform, so privatisations are part of their economic agenda. However, 
these political parties were unable to reach agreement to implement this economic 
measure. Privatisations are policies that involve risky situations, and therefore 
politicians have to make the right decision. In other words, governments have to 
adequately analyse whether to privatise or not. A wrong decision could generate very 
high costs for the economy. In this way, we consider that PT can be a very useful 
methodology to explore the decision-making processes of this political phenomenon. 
PT provides a descriptive, empirical and systematic way to both explain and predict 
political decisions made under uncertain situations.  
The logic of our theory of choice is straightforward. PT predicts that people tend to 
make cautious decisions when they are in positive conditions (gains), whereas tend to 
make risky decisions when they are in bad positions (losses). To determine this risk 
propensity, we have to know how people frame their choices. In particular, PT requires 
information related to people’s behaviour. This information can be obtained from 
archival material, newspaper articles, etc. Interviews, speeches or words offer the best 
evidence to define individuals’ risk tendency. Psychological models do not require 
political researchers to pretend that individuals will or should behave in a specific way 
that is counterintuitive. Psychological models are based on empirical testing of how 
people really make decisions in any situation.   
Behavioural economics has been accepted in economic science and it has been 
recently used to design public policies. For instance, the Obama administration’s White 
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House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs carries out research based on 
psychological insights. Similarly, the governments of Denmark, France and the United 
Kingdom have started using behavioural economics to design their public policies. The 
Cameron administration established the Behavioural Insights Team, nicknamed the 
Nudge Unit, which applies this sub-branch of economics to public policy. This unit has 
designed policies that prevent public sector fraud, error and debt cost (Cabinet Office 
2012).  
However, the application of behavioural economics to political science is very limited. 
During the 1997 American Political Science Association meeting, Elinor Ostrom (2009 
Nobel Prize Laureate in Economics) stated that traditional political economy models 
have failed to incorporate the important findings of human behaviour. Consequently, 
they generate “out-of-equilibrium predictions” (Ostrom 1998). She recommended that 
economists use such findings to improve the theoretical models. Although Ostrom 
recognised that these models have important limitations, she indicated that they are 
valuable and offer important insight. It is considered that the reason behind the lack of 
interest in PT is related to researchers’ opposition to using theories based on 
psychology. There are no theoretical and technical reasons why the theory cannot be 
used beyond the prediction of economic phenomena.  
Before we apply PT, the thesis offers a review and analysis of the important key 
political, economic and social events of Mexico. This provides key information that is 
used in a context that supports our PT application. For instance, we reviewed historical 
events that strongly influenced the country’s economic and social development. In 
particular, the thesis discusses how the energy policy became an important factor for 
the political regime to start the industrialisation process. Moreover, we selected two of 
the most important privatisation cases to show that that they were not adequately 
implemented. In terms of the electricity sector, the thesis analyses the partial 
participation of private investors in electricity generation. The role of the political regime 
and its structure is also analysed.  
The research project is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2 offers a discussion of 
the theoretical perspectives on privatisation. It analyses the advantages and 
disadvantages of public and private ownership. Chapter 2 shows the factors that trigger 
privatisations, such as weak public finances, and the British privatisation case. 
Moreover, it examines the important role of regulation in the privatisation process. 
Chapter 3 provides a review of PT, which starts with an analysis of the inconsistencies 
of expected utility theory (EUT). We analyse how PT is structured by paying special 
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attention to its principles: editing, the value function and the weighting function. We 
then discuss the key characteristics of PT and the solutions to the problems of PT 
argued by its critics. More specifically, the chapter discusses the empirical application 
problem and the aggregation problem. A discussion of different applications of PT to 
political science follows.   
Chapter 4 offers a discussion of the different reasons that led developing and 
developed economies to carry out the liberalisation and privatisation of their electricity 
sectors. More specifically, we review the cases of the United Kingdom (England and 
Wales), Norway, the European Union, the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Colombia. Moreover, the chapter reviews the key characteristics of the electricity 
models implemented by these countries. We then discuss the Ley del Servicio Público 
de Energía Eléctrica (LSPEE) – Electricity Act – and the two electricity privatisation 
projects proposed by the Mexican government.  
Chapter 5 presents a review of the privatisation agenda in Mexico. The chapter starts 
by discussing key historical events that influenced the country’s economic development. 
In particular, we discuss the different economic measures carried out under President 
Cárdenas’ administration in the energy industry. The chapter discusses the 
development of the hegemonic political structure of the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI). We analyse two privatisation cases, in the telecommunications and banking 
sectors. We then explore the participation of the independent power producers (IPPs) 
in the MEI.  
Chapter 6 offers our PT application to understand why the two privatisation proposals 
presented by Presidents Ernesto Zedillo and Vicente Fox were not implemented. The 
chapter develops two PT models that determine how the decision-makers from the 
country’s three main political parties saw themselves in the domain of gains of PT’s 
value function. Our research focuses mainly on analysing the decision-making process 
during the debate about the privatisation project presented by President Vicente Fox. 
Chapter 7 analyses other alternative explanations behind the delay of the MEI’s 
privatisation programme. Specifically, these approaches offer robust reasons that 
contrast well with our PT model. Chapter 8 draws the conclusions of the thesis. 
Moreover, it offers an analysis of the possible factors that can lead to a change in the 
MEI’s SQ and a discussion of the application of prospect theory to group behaviour. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PRIVATISATION 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Privatisation can be defined as the transfer of ownership rights of State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) to private investors. This policy has been on the economic 
agendas of all countries since the late 1970s. According to the OECD (2002), from 
1990 to 2001, the average annual value of divested assets in the world reached a sum 
of US$ 54 billion, and from 1999 to 2001 the amount generated from the sales of SOEs 
in accession countries reached $60 billion.  
 
What are the theoretical bases that support public and private ownership? What 
motivates governments to divest ownership and how is it implemented? Can 
privatisation only be studied under economic criteria? What does the political economy 
establish about privatisation? What is the future of privatisation? In this chapter, we 
offer a conceptual framework that attempts to answer these questions, drawing on 
literature from important scholars. Essentially, it provides a theoretical background of 
privatisation for our main analyses in the following chapters. 
 
This chapter is divided into four main sections. Section 2.2 provides a discussion of the 
main theoretical elements that sustain public and private ownership. It indicates that a 
structure of public ownership promotes social welfare, as it regulates market failures, 
avoids incomplete contracts and prevents worker exploitation. Furthermore, this section 
describes government failures in terms of private ownership. For instance, it specifies 
that public enterprises are more prone to X-inefficiency. We find that the theoretical 
bases developed to sustain the two kinds of ownership do not provide enough 
evidence to establish which form represents the best organisational structure. 
 
Section 2.3 offers an analysis of the main variables that have triggered privatisations 
around the world. In particular, it describes that indebted economies tend to privatise 
SOEs, since the resources from the sales can be used to square their public finances. 
In this sense, the British case illustrates that SOE inefficiency and adverse economic 
conditions can be very good reasons for divesting ownership. Here, special attention is 
given to the way in which the programme was implemented and its mechanisms, such 
as the RPI-X regulatory control for pricing. The last part of this section describes the 
stages and methods for conducting the reform. Then, it discusses the regulation’s key 
role in guaranteeing the benefits of privatisation. 
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Section 2.4 presents the political economy of privatisation. It is the critical part of the 
chapter and is organised in the same way as section 2.2. It discusses that under purely 
economic grounds it is difficult to decide which of the two kinds of ownership is the 
most adequate to run SOEs. Moreover, this section discusses the fact that existing 
economic theories do not provide enough arguments to solve this dichotomy.  
 
It then presents different positions about the circumstances that have pushed 
governments to divest their assets, such as the analysis by the 2001 Nobel Prize-
winner in economics Joseph Stiglitz. Finally, this section discusses the lessons from 
privatisation and the agenda for the next 20 years, during which Megginson (2005) 
anticipates that there will be three mega-trends: 1) oil-producing countries, mainly 
OPEC economies, will privatise; 2) the economic boost of Arab countries in the Middle 
East will lead to the reform of Arab SOEs; and 3) countries will increase their 
privatisation programmes in the public transport sector.  
 
2.2. THEORETICAL BASES OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 
2.2.1. Introduction 
What are the main theoretical bases that sustain the two kinds of organisation? In this 
section we present different arguments that provide the framework for the theoretical 
analysis of privatisation.  
 
Public and private ownership have different objectives. In the case of public firms, one 
of the main goals is to maximise social welfare and promote economic growth. For 
instance, a state-owned enterprise can be used to generate employment and yield high 
output at lower prices in order to achieve macroeconomic targets such as low inflation. 
However, SOEs are increasingly considered to be inefficient due to government 
failures; thus, private ownership is conceived as an optimal solution to this problem 
(Che 2003, Shleifer 1998, and World Bank 1995). 
 
This section is divided into two parts. Section 2.2.2 discusses the theoretical elements 
of public ownership. It pays special attention to the benefits of public ownership, such 
as lower prices, monopolistic control and the prevention of incomplete contracts. 
Section 2.2.3 discusses the problems facing SOEs. Particularly, it illustrates how these 
organisations are an obstacle for the countries’ public finances and how they carry out 
non-economic objectives. 
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2.2.2. Public Ownership 
(i) Public enterprises are structures that promote social welfare 
SOEs are considered to be important for various reasons. According to Conolly and 
Munro (1999), public ownership is preferred because it is an engine of growth and a 
political buffer, gives power to people and political patronage, provides equity and 
redistribution, and offers control over monopoly power. 
 
Similarly, Yarrow (1986) and Vickers and Yarrow (1988) consider well-defined 
justifications for public ownership in democratic societies. Both studies point out that 
benevolent governments tend to act under an efficient democratic organisation. 
Particularly, Yarrow (1986) indicates that public ownership has advantages over private 
ownership in terms of monitoring SOEs’ social targets for two main reasons: it leads to 
an equilibrated distribution of public goods; and it can take rapid corrective action when 
there are deviations between private and public returns in goods. Moreover, he states 
that the discontent with SOE performance is attributed to the political dynamics or 
“political market imperfections” instead of the public ownership’s intrinsic limitations 
(e.g. economic constraints). Finally, he considers that the problem with SOEs is more 
related to the lack of competition instead of considering which of the two kinds of 
ownership is the most appropriate1.  
 
Vickers and Yarrow (1988) state that governments with efficient political markets are 
able to maximise social welfare. In this sense, if there is fair competition between 
political players, policies can be effectively implemented. Also, Shapiro and Willig 
(1990) reach the same opinion when they develop a public manager’s utility function as 
a combination of private and social welfare. They conclude that when the political 
dynamics work under normal conditions, state managers are obligated to achieve 
social instead of private welfare. 
 
(ii) Public ownership is a mechanism that regulates market failures 
Another motive to maintain social ownership is to prevent monopolistic behaviour. 
Public firms are natural monopolies, which means that they are organisations that 
exhibit economies of scale. Consequently, they are the only suppliers in the market and 
can set prices at a social optimum level at which people are able to acquire determined 
commodities2. 
                                                          
1
 For more information about this argument see Kay and Thompson (1986), Cook and Kirkpatrick (1988) 
and Shapiro and Willig (1990). 
2
 Natural monopolies are mainly network industries such as telephone, water, gas and electricity. 
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One of the main criticisms by SOE supporters of private ownership is that its production 
level is less than the social optimum. If natural monopolies become private, they could 
be able to manipulate prices and set them at a level above the social optimum. When 
prices are set above the social optimum and, more specifically, at a monopolistic level, 
the quantity supplied by the private monopoly is less than the level offered by SOEs. 
Moreover, since natural monopolies produce with lower costs, they can eliminate 
competitors from the market and then set prices above production costs.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Differences in prices and quantities between public and private firms 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the difference in prices and quantities between a natural monopoly 
under private and public ownership. When prices are determined at a monopolistic 
level, where the marginal cost (MgC) is equal to the marginal revenue (MgR), the price 
and quantity obtained is (pm) and (qm) respectively.  
 
Conversely, when SOEs set prices at the social optimum level, at the MgC level, the 
price obtained is (ps). It is evident that when the monopolistic condition (MgR=MgC) is 
satisfied, prices are higher (pm) and output is lower (qm), whereas public firms offer 
lower prices (ps) and provide more output (e.g. water, electricity, etc.) to the economy. 
The quantity that the economy does not receive under private ownership is (qs- qm) at a 
price increase of (pm- ps).  
 
 
(iii) Public ownership is a mechanism that prevents asymmetric information and 
problems with incomplete contracts 
Price, 
Costs 
Quantity 
qm 
  pm 
MgC 
MgR 
ps 
qs 
Net consumer surplus 
Welfare loss 
Demand 
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Problems with incomplete contracts and asymmetric information can be avoided with 
public ownership. Governments and firms carry out transactions under contracts in 
which the terms and conditions of exchange are defined. However, when contracts are 
incomplete (e.g. contracts to generate electricity), they can lead to opportunistic action 
which benefits only one party. This situation is called the holdup problem3. 
 
According to Shapiro and Willig (1990), holdup problems can be effectively faced by 
SOEs for three reasons. Firstly, governments can interfere to correct contract 
irregularities. Secondly, policy makers and public managers can access privileged 
information from private firms (e.g. costs), whereas private enterprises tend to have 
difficulty obtaining it from their competitors. In other words, since SOEs are supported 
by state power, they can force private organisations to give them information. Finally, 
the organisational plans of SOE managers can be monitored by an adequate political 
system. 
 
In the same way, Laffont and Tirole (1991) establish that agency problems can be 
avoided under social ownership. In other words, the chain of command, or the 
delegation process, is more effective under public ownership, because SOEs have to 
serve only one level of command (the government), whereas private firms have to 
serve two levels: investors and regulators. 
 
(iv) Public ownership as a structure to prevent the exploitation of workers 
Although there is no agreement about a Marxist theory of the state 4 , Marxist 
economists have considered that under a capitalist mode of production, national 
structures such as SOEs and state constitutions can be instruments to prevent the 
exploitation of workers. Marxism divides an economy into two social groups: the 
proletarian and the bourgeoisie or capitalists. On one hand, proletarians are considered 
to be the people who do not have the means of production (e.g. financial resources), or 
are not the owners of firms and receive remuneration for their work. On the other, the 
                                                          
3
 For an extensive discussion about the holdup problem, see Church and Ware (2000), Cabral (2000) and 
Tirole (2001). 
4
 According to Barrow (2000), the Marxist theory does not explicitly present a theory of the state. 
However, it indicates that there are theories such as instrumentalism, structuralism, derivationism, 
systems analysis and organisational realism that try to discuss the role of the state under a Marxist 
framework. 
The reason that the Marxist theory does not provide a theory of the sate is because it considers that a 
capitalist state’s main function is to assist the process of capital accumulation (Ham and Hill 1984). In 
other words, it considers that the state sets up the bases in which firms are able to generate profits. Some 
reasons that the state is considered to be a mechanism that facilitates firms’ profit maximization are 
described in Miliband (1969). 
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bourgeoisie is the part of society that owns those means and pays for the work (labour-
power) it receives from the proletarians.  
 
Under this structure, the theory indicates that capitalists will always try to get the 
workers’ surplus-value. In other words, capitalists are not willing to pay workers an 
exact amount of money according to the number of hours they work. So, capitalists 
keep the surplus-value and continually reinvest it in the production process5. 
 
In this sense, it can be understood that under public ownership, workers are better off. 
It means that workers’ minimum standards can be protected and therefore avoid 
capitalists’ exploitative actions. 
 
2.2.3. Private Ownership 
(i) SOEs are more prone to X-inefficiency 
X-inefficiency (X-I) is one of the main problems facing firms6. X-I occurs when firms 
have higher costs due to a weak internal structure or a lack of competition. In the case 
of private firms in a competitive market, firms with X-I are unprofitable and may not be 
able to remain in business. However, when firms are monopolies, they can remain 
profitably in business (Carlton and Perloff 2000)7. 
 
Public monopolies are more liable to X-I. This is because of agency problems, which 
refer to the fragile interaction between a principal and an agent. In SOEs, agency 
problems are more complex due to the chain of command between principals and 
agents (see Table 2.1). Under private ownership, the chain is shorter and therefore 
agency problems are easier to regulate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 See Marx (2004). 
6
 X-inefficiency theory was developed by Leibenstein (1966). Frantz (1988) gives an introduction to and 
a complete analysis of X-inefficiency. 
7
 In monopolistic conditions, an X-I firm without competitors will remain in the market. However, since it 
is the only firm, it cannot compare its economic efficiency with other firms in order to know whether it is 
working efficiently or not. See Carlton and Perloff (2000) for a detailed discussion. 
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       Table 2.1: Flow of public and private information from principals to agents 
Private Ownership Public Ownership 
Principals: 
Shareholders 
Agents: 
 
 
Directors 
 
 
Employees 
 
 
Principals:   
Public 
Agents:  
Elected Representatives 
 
Government 
 
Ministries 
 
SOE’s Management 
 
Employees 
               
            Source: Conolly and Munro (1999) 
 
Agency problems occur when principals (e.g. public managers) are not able to monitor 
the actions of agents (e.g. workers), leading to divergent objectives. This implies three 
aspects: asymmetric information, different aims, and no costless observation (Munro 
2003). 
 
Under the first aspect, it is established that agents’ actions cannot be perfectly 
monitored due to asymmetric information. In other words, it is difficult for public 
managers in large organisations (e.g. SOEs) to monitor employee actions, such as 
employee productivity. This situation minimises the principal’s objectives (e.g. cost 
control) and at the same time modifies a firm’s economic performance. In addition, it is 
considered that asymmetric information protects public managers from political actions 
and gives them a good position in terms of key information about firms’ performance 
(Vickers and Yarrow 1988, 1991a). For example, when managers have information 
about firm costs or understand how firms operate, they get a privileged position over 
politicians who do not know such variables. Similarly, since they have this information, 
they have little reason to fear punishment for inefficiency (Megginson 2005).  
 
The second aspect states that divergent goals between principals and agents lead to 
higher X–I levels. Here, employee objectives contradict public manager targets. For 
example, an employee goal may be to gain political power within the enterprise or the 
union. So, workers’ attention is deviated to other unproductive activities. Haskel and 
Sanchis (1995) proved this by modelling worker effort under a bargaining approach. On 
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one hand, it indicates that since the private sector is only concerned with profit, it 
insists on higher effort. On the other, it considers that SOEs provide lower effort 
because they have broader social goals in mind, including the welfare of union 
members. Also, Dixit (1997) points out that numerous principals lead to different 
objectives and low incentives for managers to promote efficiency in SOEs. 
 
In the same way, a combination of asymmetric information and divergent goals can 
occur. In a model based on the incomplete contract theory, Schmidt (1996) establishes 
that principals that cannot perfectly observe a firm’s economic performance will provide 
more financial resources (e.g. subsidies) so that companies produce at an efficient 
level. So, public managers are less interested in maximising a firm’s economic 
performance, as there are additional economic resources available in the company’s 
budget. Consequently, private ownership is a better option, because governments 
would not have to subsidise SOEs.  
 
Finally, the third aspect implies that the cost of monitoring the agent is not viable8. For 
instance, politicians who wish to regulate manager actions will desist from doing so 
because the costs of reasonably improving firm performance will be higher and political 
compensation will be lower (Megginson and Netter 2001) 
 
(ii) SOEs represent an obstacle to public finances 
SOEs have presented an increasingly serious problem for governments to square 
public finances (La Porta et al. 1999). First, since SOEs are inefficient, governments 
have to provide subsidies and transfers, which increase the primary deficit9. In other 
words, if the primary deficit does not change or keeps increasing, the total deficit will 
continue to increase due to the domestic debt which the government has to employ to 
reduce the deficit. This means that the government could contract more debt to reduce 
the costs of inefficiency caused by SOEs.  
 
Secondly, SOEs constitute a potential factor to trigger debt crisis. This situation is 
related to the above argument. According to Ramamurti (1992), fragile economies are 
more prone to debt crises due to the excessive external borrowing needed to maintain 
SOEs. The origin of this government failure is found in what is called the foreign-
                                                          
8
 Mas-Colell et al. (1995) and Varian (1992) indicate that monitoring agent behaviour is costly and almost 
impossible due to the involved parties’ interests. In fact, they state that it is complicated for a firm to 
determine how productive its workers are. 
9
 The primary deficit constitutes the fiscal deficit minus interest payments. The fiscal deficit is defined as 
the difference between the revenue receipts and total expenditure. 
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exchange problem, which is caused by the banking system’s willingness to provide a 
high quantity of financial resources and the government’s irrational behaviour to obtain 
them. 
 
For the banking system, lending to SOEs represents an opportunity to provide safer 
loans. It is understood that financial contracts with governments are guaranteed by the 
governments themselves. This means that banks can be sure that the capital will be 
returned to them. So, they are willing to lend to governments and, at the same time, it 
represents a convenient financial source for SOEs.  
  
SOEs overestimate the banking system’s willingness to borrow, leading to a loss of 
balance in public finances. It has been established that in order to put less pressure on 
fiscal revenues, external financing can be adequately used. However, SOEs tend 
irrationally to use more than the needed funds to undertake their programmes10. In 
addition, the resources are not channelled to the planned activities but diverted to other 
causes11. Consequently, the debt increases, damaging the country’s public finances. 
 
(iii) SOEs are inefficient because they are used to carry out non-economic goals 
Since SOEs respond to political targets rather than the market, they are forced to carry 
out different objectives that make their economic structure vulnerable. Shirley and 
Walsh (2000) and Shleifer and Vishny (1994) note that politicians use public 
enterprises as a mean to obtain benefits and to modify the political market.  
 
The first anomaly caused by the political way in which SOEs are managed is the 
deviation of economic resources to interest groups. According to Shirley and Walsh 
(2000) and Shleifer and Vishny (1994), political actors find it easier to transfer funds 
from SOEs to influential groups due to the non-transparent operations within these 
organisations. Using resources directly from the budget can constitute a risky operation 
for politicians12. So, they persuade SOE managers to perform determined objectives 
such as providing high subsidies or concessions to well-connected groups.  
In addition, the resources of SOEs can be subtracted to finance political campaigns. In 
return, public managers receive, among other elements, high budgets, protection and a 
                                                          
10
 The excess of funds is used to cover the costs of SOEs’ inefficiencies. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Although it is risky for politicians to directly employ resources from the budget, it has been proved that 
some governments use the fiscal policy for political purposes. See, for example, Gonzalez (2002); 
Loockwood et al. (2001); Cameron and Crosby (2000); Treisman and Gimpelson (1999). These studies 
analyse this behaviour under the political business cycle approach. 
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flourishing political career. Clarke and Xu (2004) establish that managers (bribe takers) 
are more prone to illegal actions in countries with larger constraints on utility capacity, 
lower competition levels in the utility sector and where utilities are state-owned. 
Different implications of corruption within the public sector are illustrated in Friedman et 
al. (2000) and Johnson et al. (2000). 
 
A second irregularity is the use of SOEs as electoral vehicles. In other words, under 
public ownership, utilities are employed to attract more electorate to remain in power. 
For instance, white elephants represent projects in which SOEs over-invest to relatively 
increase the quality or availability of infrastructure services (Henisz and Zelner 2001). 
By increasing investment, it is intended to provide visible and immediate benefits, such 
as increased employment to determined groups of individuals who perceive this as 
economic improvement from the incumbent party. White elephants are built based on 
political rather than economic considerations. As a result, SOEs tend to operate 
inefficiently13. 
 
Finally, it has been strongly established that public ownership leads to corrupt 
behaviour among SOE junior staff as well. Under the relationship principal-agent-client, 
corrupt deals are performed between the last two parties. On one hand, agents’ 
financial constraints and the lack of monitoring lead agents to force customers to pay 
an additional amount of money for the services they require. Also, this situation is 
motivated when customers fail to fulfil the terms of the service’s contract. On the other 
hand, when customers wish for special consideration of their needs, such as new 
electricity connections, quick attention, falsification, etc., agents accept bribes from 
customers (Davis 2004). As a consequence, corrupt agent behaviour affects enterprise 
efficiency, which is reflected in the loss of economic resources when bribes are 
accepted instead of charging fees. 
 
2.2.4. Summary and Conclusions 
In this section we discussed the theoretical arguments behind public and private 
ownership. SOEs are considered to be important because they represent an engine of 
growth and a political buffer, give power to people and political patronage, provide 
equity and redistribution, and offer control over monopoly power. Similarly, it was 
established that public ownership could prevent worker exploitation.  
 
                                                          
13
 Ibid. 
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The main criticism of public firms is X-inefficiency. X-I occurs when firms have higher 
costs due to a weak internal structure or a lack of competition. Public monopolies are 
more liable to X-I due to agency problems. Moreover, it was illustrated that SOEs are 
inefficient because of the non-economic targets set up by politicians. 
 
In conclusion, it has been shown that in terms of theoretical bases, both kinds of 
organisation can be located in the same position. In other words, there are enough 
elements that influence the choice for either public or private ownership. However, it is 
important to point out that in the case of the private ownership analysis presented in 
section 2.2.3, the attention was focused on why the state fails to allocate resources 
efficiently rather than focusing on the theoretical arguments that support private 
ownership. The reason that this happens is developed in section 2.4.  
 
2.3. FORCES DRIVING PRIVATISATION 
2.3.1. Introduction 
What has motivated governments to divest ownership and how is it implemented? This 
section provides the main elements that have triggered the implementation of this 
structural reform and the different stages involved in it. 
 
The section is divided into four parts. Section 2.3.2 explains why privatisation is 
recommended for public finances. Section 2.3.3 pays special attention to the UK 
privatisation programme as the guiding model for other governments. It illustrates its 
principal features, such as the methods in which British SOEs were sold. Section 2.3.4 
focuses on how privatisation is conducted and the regulation’s key role in guaranteeing 
the benefits of any divestiture programme. 
 
2.3.2. Structural Adjustment 
Although governments have had different reasons to divest SOEs, the common factor 
is the achievement of economic efficiencies under a policy of structural adjustment. As 
was shown in section 2.2, there are different elements that explain public enterprise 
inefficiency. In this context, privatisation emerges as the cure for such government 
failures.  
 
Selling public utilities provides a means to bring balance to public finances. Firstly, 
when SOEs are divested, governments no longer need to invest in inefficient 
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organisations14. Secondly, the resources that were once used for their operations can 
be reallocated to other activities. For example, by selling SOEs, the reduction of 
outstanding public debt and determined taxes can be achieved without cutting public 
expenditure. Third, government’s debt instruments, such as debt-equity swaps, have 
been admitted in payment of privatised companies, particularly in indebted economies 
like Mexico and the Philippines (Bortolotti et al. 2003). 
 
In addition, privatisations have indirect effects on public finances. Divestiture 
programmes send positive signals to financial markets. They can lower the political risk 
over time leading to an increase in the economy’s credibility, which is reflected in a 
better credit rating for government bonds. Moreover, it produces lower interest 
payments and easy entrance to capital markets to finance budget deficits 15 . 
Governments with financial difficulties have more reasons to privatise. 
 
2.3.3. The British Privatisation Case 
Governments have been strongly motivated to sell SOEs due to the successful and 
pioneering divestiture programme carried out in the UK. It started in the late 1970s 
during the Thatcher administration and ended in 1997. The reasons that motivated it 
were diverse, including ideological and political reasons, but economic efficiency 
seemed to be the principal motive. 
 
The causes of this inefficiency were varied. According to Conolly and Munro (1999), 
during the 1960s and 1970s, SOE objectives were set under a series of White Papers 
which defined how these firms were to be managed. For instance, these documents 
originally stated that public services had to be provided at marginal cost levels, which 
did not allow SOEs to obtain a reasonable return on investment. Moreover, the White 
Papers did not establish the firms’ social objectives, nor tried to limit ministerial or 
political interference. This situation was then modified and the White Papers 
incorporated financial goals and rates of return that allowed companies to obtain 
financial resources16.  
 
However, the panorama did not change and other difficulties arose such as the 
government’s incapacity to monitor, evaluate and implement those targets. In this 
                                                          
14
 Jones et al. (1990) provides a cost-benefit methodology to analyse potential privatisations. According 
to the study, governments should sell SOEs when welfare under public ownership is less than that under 
private ownership plus a sale premium.  
15
 Ibid. 
16
 In 1967, the initial rate of return was 8% and by 1978 it was reduced to 5%.  
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sense, since SOEs were seen as highly ineffective institutions, privatisation was 
regarded as a means to break with the financial burden of loss-making activities 
(Arbomeit 1986). 
 
Another variable that triggered the implementation of the divestiture programme in the 
United Kingdom was the economic conditions at that time. When the shift from public to 
private ownership was initiated, the economy was heading towards a deep recession 
with a high unemployment level and a tight government budget (Galal and Shirley 
1994). Such depression was attributed, among other elements, to the oil price shock, 
the overblown public sector and, more particularly, to SOEs that were intrinsically 
inefficient (Sanderson 1997 and Foster 1994). For Letza et al. (2004), these elements 
challenged Keynesian economics and the ideology of nationalisation. 
 
Table 2.2: Comparisons of British industries before and after the Thatcher administration 
Activities Employment         Output per Head           Total Factor Productivity     
(thousands)      % per annum                        % per annum 
  1978-9 1968-78    1978-85                1968-78      1978-85 
British Rail 
British Steel 
Post Office 
British Telecomm 
British Coal 
Electricity 
British Gas 
National Bus 
British Airways 
UK Manufacturing 
    243   0.8            3.9   -                2.8 
    190  -0.2          12.6                       -2.5              2.9 
    411                    -1.3            2.3                           -               1.9 
      -                        8.2            5.8                        5.2              0.5 
    300                    -0.7            4.4                       -1.4                 0      
    160                     5.3            3.9                        0.7              1.4 
    102                     8.5            3.8  -                1.2 
      64                    -0.5            2.1                       -1.4              0.1 
      58                     6.4            6.6                        5.5              4.8 
       -                       2.7            3.0                        1.7                - 
 
 
- Not available. 
Source: Conolly and Munro (1999). 
 
Table 2.2 shows the industries’ performance before and after Thatcher’s government. It 
can be seen that SOE productivity and output were low under public ownership. 
However, these variables increased in the following years after she was elected by the 
Conservative Party to be Prime Minister. 
 
The structure of privatisation was considered a very ambitious and innovative strategy 
(Galal and Shirley 1994). First, it divested a large number of firms that employed more 
than one million people, accounted for 10% of gross domestic product, 17% of the 
industrial capital stock and 15% of gross investment (Yarrow 1993). And second, it was 
developed and rapidly implemented with determined obstacles (e.g. political pressure, 
administrative complexity, profitability and social influence) that were effectively faced 
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by the UK Government17. Consequently, by 1992 only three companies were still under 
public control (see Table 2.3). 
 
 
Table 2.3: Major privatisations in the United Kingdom 
Companies Date      Proceeds     Expenses 
             (₤million)     (₤million) 
BP 
British Aerospace 
Cable and Wireless 
Amersham International 
Britoil 
Associated British Ports 
BP 
Cable and Wireless  
Enterprise Oil 
Associated British Ports 
Jaguar 
British Telecomm 
British Aerospace 
Britoil 
Cable and Wireless 
TSB 
British Gas 
British Airways 
Rolls-Royce 
BAA 
BP 
British Steel 
10 Water Authorities 
12 Electricity Companies 
National Power/Powergen 
Scottish Power 
Trust Ports 
Coal Industry 
Railways 
Nuclear Energy 
1979          290                 - 
1981          149                 6 
1981          224                 7 
1982            63                 3 
1982          548               17 
1983            22                 2 
1983          565                  - 
1983          224                  - 
1984          393                11 
1984            52                  - 
1984          294                  - 
1984       3,920              263 
1985          550                  - 
1985          450                  - 
1985          600                  - 
1986       1,360                  - 
1986       5,600              360 
1987          900                42 
1987       1,360                29 
1987       1,280                43 
1987       7,200                   - 
1988       2,500                46 
1989       5,400               131 
1990       5,180               191 
1991       2,100                 79 
1991       2,900                 98 
1992              -                    - 
1995              -                    - 
1995-7           -                    - 
1996              -                    - 
 
                              
                  - Not available. 
                  Source: Connolly and Munro (1999). 
 
               
Table 2.3 shows the major privatisations in the UK. Since the divestiture programme 
was mainly implemented under a general flotation, the firms’ shares were sold in 
different years18. On the other hand, the programme was innovative for determined 
reasons; one of these elements was a new form of arm’s-length regulation based on a 
price cap (Galal and Shirley 1994). According to Martin and Parker (1997), this 
structure considered a RPI - X system, which is the retail price index (RPI), or the rate 
of inflation minus an efficiency factor “X”. 
                                                          
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Flotation refers to the action of selling shares in a company. 
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The X factor is set occasionally for each industry in order to reproduce the scope for 
cost savings in that industry. For example, if the X factor were set at 2%, then overall 
prices in the sector would be authorised to increase by the RPI - 2% each year until the 
next price evaluation. The purpose of the RPI - X regulatory control for pricing 
established in the UK was mainly to agree a reasonable profit level between the firm 
and the regulator. In other words, at the moment of privatisation, the X factor can 
guarantee an adequate flotation and can be used to regulate firms’ market power post-
divestiture19. 
 
The other original characteristic of the programme is related to the financial method in 
which SOEs were sold. In this sense, there were three major privatisation options: 
general flotation, the golden share, and franchising and contracting out (Connolly and 
Munro 1999). The first mechanism consisted of offering bids for the number of shares 
under a declared price. Here, the purpose was to promote broader share ownership by 
giving preference to smaller bids and employees. However, since there was no 
previous experience of selling monopolies, it was difficult to establish share prices. 
Consequently, prices were underestimated, leading to controversial discussions 
(Jackson and Price 1994). 
 
The second mechanism was designed to give a political or ideological base to the 
assets. In other words, by retaining a considerable fraction of the privatised firms’ 
shares, the UK government could preserve part of the companies’ national identity. 
Similarly, this policy could be used to control some agency problems or the problem of 
asymmetric information between the principal (shareholders) and the agent 
(managers). At present, the government keeps golden shares in eighteen of the 
privatised firms. 
 
Finally, franchising and contracting out were instrumented to give the private sector the 
right to supply determined services. The former system consisted of giving the 
responsibility to private firms to provide services under a regulatory framework. For 
example, the government has been selling the rights to independent television 
producers to manage commercial stations. In the latter system, mainly used by local 
governments, services such as catering and cleaning are provided by external 
companies and paid for by the authorities. For example, in NHS hospitals, the areas of 
cleaning, security and catering are run by determined companies such as Serco, a 
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 To guarantee a successful flotation, the X factor had to be set at a low level. 
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private company that hires and trains its own employees in partnership with Manpower. 
Moreover, it plans the whole organisation of such services. 
 
2.3.4. Privatisation and Regulation 
How do governments divest SOEs? Divesting public firms is considered to be a difficult 
task that does not have to be thought of as a single situation, the sale of an asset, but 
as a complete process that has to be applied for each company. 
 
(i) Privatisation 
According to Megginson (2005), the privatisation process has three main stages: 
preparation; method of sale and the offering price; and finally, the sale of SOEs to 
private buyers. The first stage involves preparation of the firm and the sequence in 
which companies have to be sold. Bornstein (1999) provides a good classification that 
illustrates how these actions can be carried out 20 . It is based on the observable 
characteristics of different sectors in developing economies such as Poland, Hungary 
and the Czech Republic (see Table 2.4). 
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 According to Megginson (2005), such classification can be applied to any country that wishes to know 
how and in what sequence public assets can be privatised. 
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Table 2.4: Sector/branch characteristics affecting the scope and sequence 
of the divestiture of public assets 
 
 
 
 
Branch 
Characteristic 
                                                  Foreign                         Special 
Already  Small    Substantial     Direct          Possibly    Regulatory 
Partly    Capital   Restructuring  Investment  Deemed    Framework 
Private Required Needed          Crucial        Strategic    Essential 
Retail trade 
Consumer services 
Housing 
Agriculture 
Light industry 
Heavy industry 
Banking 
Electricity 
Telecommunications 
 
    x             x                     
    x             x 
    x             x 
    x             x           x                     
                               x                     x 
                               x                     x                  x 
                               x                     x                  x                x 
                               x                     x                  x                x 
                               x                     x                  x                x 
 
Source: Bornstein (1999). 
Note: an “x” means that the characteristic affects the divestiture of the SOE considerably in the 
branch. 
 
 
Table 2.4 shows the divestiture procedure and sector characteristics. It indicates that 
the retail trade, consumer services and housing can be the first activities to be 
privatised due to their already private participation. Consequently, the programmes can 
be easily performed without any controversial debate. Moreover, little public capital is 
required to prepare and make them competitive. However, the agriculture sector will 
need to be capitalised if it belongs to a developing country. 
 
The other remaining activities require special attention. For instance, light industry21 in 
developing economies is fully state-owned and consequently requires capital for 
infrastructure and needs an adequate restructuring programme and some foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to be economically attractive. In developed countries, this industry 
only requires a low level of restructuring and some additional investment to improve its 
operations. Similarly, heavy industry requires the same levels of restructuring and 
investment, but paying particular attention to the country’s strategic objectives. Limits to 
FDI can be used to maintain such strategic goals. 
 
Finally, the banking, electricity and telecommunications industries require all the 
variables needed by the heavy industry plus all the elements that involve an adequate 
regulatory framework, such as staff, laws, etc. Regulation is needed before and after 
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 This industry is more consumer-oriented than business-oriented. In other words, it produces goods for 
end users rather than intermediates for other industries. 
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divestiture to protect consumers and other firms from monopoly pricing and 
anticompetitive behaviour. In other words, these sectors will be the last activities to be 
privatised by governments because they are more complex. In developing countries, 
designing and implementing regulatory frameworks represent a big challenge due to 
different variables such as weak legal systems, lack of trained staff in industrial 
organisation issues, strong interest groups (stakeholders) and corruption (Megginson 
and Netter 2001). 
 
The second stage is concerned with the best method of divesting ownership and the 
price at which the enterprises should be sold. Megginson (2005) establishes that there 
are three ways to conduct the transaction. Firstly, it is based on the sale of the 
companies by distributing vouchers to the public. This system allows people to make 
offers for the companies to be sold. Although the scheme was considered a popular 
measure, it proved to have failings, since it did not attract new investment or 
management to the privatised firms22, nor did it generate efficient ownership structures 
for the enterprises. 
 
The second and third methods are related to the sale of SOEs to private investors for 
cash payments. The former option is based on an asset sale scheme, which has the 
following characteristics23: a) governments can divest ownership by selling all of their 
holdings or the controlling stakes to single buyers; b) the buyer can be either a 
multinational company or a group of investors; and c) transactions are carried out 
under auctions in which governments obligate investors to meet determined conditions 
after the sale, including quality standards. This option is commonly used in the sale of 
smaller public firms24. 
 
The latter option is based on the sale of SOEs by using a series of public offerings well 
known as share issue privatisations (SIPs). SIPs are considered to be a complex and 
expensive mechanism, employed to divest the largest SOEs. They are carried out over 
several years in order to guarantee transparency and to attract more cash. Additionally, 
governments use SIPs to develop their domestic stock markets. 
 
(ii) Regulation  
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 Ibid. 
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 Also, an asset sale is called a trade sale or a private sale. 
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 Ibid. 
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Credible, stable regulation is required to achieve the benefits of privatisation (World 
Bank 2004). Regulation is defined as government intervention to modify the way in 
which markets behave. In other words, the objective of regulation is to protect 
consumers from market power (when prices are considerably higher than costs) and to 
protect competitors from monopolistic behaviour. 
 
When network industries such as electricity, telecommunications, water and 
hydrocarbon pipelines are privatised, governments need to put in place instruments to 
regulate decisions about pricing, investment, advertising, product quality and the entry 
and exit of competitors that can affect consumers and producers (Church and Ware 
2000)25. According to the Littlechild Report (1983), a regulatory system must achieve 
the following targets: defend consumers from monopoly abuse; promote efficiency; 
reduce the costs of regulation; encourage competition; and maintain the integrity of the 
privatised enterprise. These instruments have to be established to operate before and 
after the divestiture. 
 
Regulators use different instruments to control privatised industries. For example, to 
regulate prices, authorities use the RPI-X system, as described in section 2.3.3, to limit 
the market power of enterprises. Price increases are determined by the percentage rise 
of the RPI-X. Regulators set the “X” factor, which represents the reduction in price 
required for the company. In other words, X constitutes the efficiency gains related to 
managerial efficiency, internal efficiency and technological advances (Connolly and 
Munro 1999). For example, from 1997 to 2000, this scheme was RPI- 4.5% for British 
Telecom (BT), which means that if inflation was 7%, BT could increase prices by 7% - 
4.5% = 2.5%. Conversely, if inflation was 2%, BT would have to decrease prices by -
2.5%. 
 
The price-cap system has advantages and disadvantages. 
Advantages: 
a) Flexibility. If the value of X is not fixed, it can be changed in any situation. For 
example, by the late 1980s, the UK’s Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL) 
realised that it had underestimated the impact of fibre optics on the cost of 
telecom services. In consequence, it modified (increased) the value of X in the 
following revisions, changing the X factor from 4.5 in 1989 to 6.25% in 1991 and 
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from 6.25 to 7.5% in 1993. The purpose of this action was to guarantee that 
customers also benefited from these cost savings. 
b) It triggers efficiency. Since the X factor is a measure of efficiency, privatised 
utilities always have incentives to increase efficiency above the X factor. So, if 
cost savings are greater than X it means that they are making profits. 
 
Disadvantages: 
a) Wrong X factor. Company strategies can be affected if regulators set an 
inaccurate X factor. 
b) Regulatory capture. This occurs when the “gamekeeper turns poacher or, at 
least, helps the poacher” (The Economist: Research Tools)26. In other words, 
since the regulator works closely with the regulated firms, there is a risk that 
regulators will analyse things from the private firm’s perspective. It can also 
happen when regulators protect the companies’ illegal actions or become part 
of their administrative board. 
 
As a consequence of these failures, competition has been introduced wherever 
possible to replace regulatory mechanisms. 
 
If regulation is not correctly designed, privatisation can severely damage an economy. 
The well-known case of the California’s electricity crisis provides a good example of 
when regulation is not well developed (Joskow 2001). During this crisis, wholesale 
prices increased by 500% between the second half of 1999 and 2000. Customers were 
required to reduce their electricity consumption and California’s two largest electricity 
utilities, Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) and Southern California Edison (SCE), had to 
pay higher prices for wholesale power. By 2001, PG&E stopped paying its bills and 
other financial instruments, ending the crisis with a declaration of bankruptcy. 
 
The lessons learned from California reinforced the regulation’s key role in any 
divestiture programme. Joskow (2001) establishes that market reform programmes 
should consider the following elements: effective market design requires considerable 
technical expertise; market institutions and regulatory instruments need to be 
developed to be robust; and regulators must have the capability to recognise serious 
market performance difficulties and to develop and apply reforms to repair them. 
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Setting up the basis of an efficient regulatory framework is a complex process27. Under 
this process, each “particular” privatised industry must have a regulator and its own 
legal framework. For instance, a specific official body must control the activities 
performed by the electricity supply industry28. The regulatory framework and other 
mechanisms developed by the specialists, such as RPI-X, have to be designed under 
different negotiations with public managers and the management of the newly 
privatised companies.  
 
The negotiations between the authorities and the companies’ representatives have to 
be carried out under a bargaining process in which both parties reach determined 
agreements about the industry’s operations (one of the topics that both parties can 
discuss is the contract’s terms in order to avoid the holdup problem; see section 2.2). In 
addition to the industry-specific regulatory bodies, governments must have competition 
authorities which can protect the consumers’ interests and promote fair competition 
between companies in the whole economy29. 
 
However, in order to guarantee the efficient operation of regulatory bodies, countries 
must satisfy important prerequisites. These are mainly applied to developing countries. 
According to the World Bank (2004), these preconditions are: a) separation of powers 
(executive and judiciary); b) credible political and economic institutions; c) transparent 
administrative procedures; c) strong contract laws; and d) enough trained staff. In this 
sense, designing effective regulation in developing economies is a difficult task, but is 
important to make privatisation work. 
 
2.3.5. Summary and Conclusions 
This section illustrated the main institutional motives behind privatisation and how it is 
conducted. Particularly, it pointed out that governments sell public utilities because it 
brings balance to public finances, which is an international economic condition for 
countries in order to achieve stability in financial markets. Another element that has 
motivated governments to divest ownership of SOEs is the successful and pioneering 
divestiture programme carried out in the UK. Also, this section showed that 
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privatisation is a complex process that does not have to be thought of as a single 
situation but as a complete process that must be tailored to each company. 
 
In conclusion, it has been shown that the privatisation agenda has emerged from well-
determined variables. The financial burden generated from the inefficiency of SOEs 
seems to be the main economic trigger that has led international governments to sell 
their assets. Moreover, the UK case has exemplified how privatisation can be used as 
a cure in the presence of economic shocks, such as an oil crisis, and how the 
resources from the sales can be channelled to other targets, including the payment of 
the outstanding public debt. 
 
Another important aspect is how this reform must be carried out. It has been 
established that industries such as telecommunications, electricity and banking have to 
be the last sectors to be divested, since they are natural monopolies. In this sense, 
international institutions, such as the World Bank, strongly recommend that 
governments set up regulatory mechanisms before and after the reform. Moreover, it 
states that before privatisations are performed in developing economies they must 
satisfy determined prerequisites, otherwise benefits cannot be guaranteed. 
 
2.4. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PRIVATISATION 
2.4.1. Introduction 
Since the debate about privatisation not only lies on purely economic grounds or a 
theoretical sphere, a discussion of political economy is provided in this section. This 
section is divided into four parts. Section 2.4.2 provides a discussion about ownership. 
Section 2.4.3 offers a discussion about the forces that have motivated governments to 
privatise under the perspective of political economy. In particular, it pays attention to 
reasons of political economy such as the role of international financial institutions, 
countries’ political structures and the Washington Consensus. Section 2.4.4 presents 
the lessons from privatisation and its future.   
 
2.4.2. Is Private Ownership a Better Option? 
It is difficult to establish on purely economic grounds which of the two kinds of 
ownership is the adequate choice or to establish that private ownership constitutes the 
best option (Rowthorn and Chang 1993). In fact, the existing economic-based 
ownership theories do not provide enough arguments to give a definitive answer. This 
argument is supported by two facts. First, since the 1980s, economists (e.g. Milton 
Friedman and John Stigler) have focused their attention on why states fail to allocate 
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resources efficiently rather than explaining why states increase their economic 
involvement over time (Clarke and Pitelis 1993). This situation can be clearly seen in 
section 2.3.2, where the attention is centred only on government failures.  
 
Secondly, purely rigid economic bases cannot explain this dichotomy because it is a 
matter of politics or political economy (Rowthorn and Chang 1993). In other words, if 
states are isolated from conservative or institutional pressures, the ownership problem 
simply disappears. For instance, the problem of soft budget constraints or high 
subsidisation can be easily fixed by limiting subsidies. This policy is more efficient than 
shifting to private ownership. However, it affects other interests that benefit from higher 
subsidies such as customers, public managers and firms that previously obtained 
services at subsidised prices. So, SOEs are forced to continue requesting higher 
subsidies, forcing policymakers to opt for privatisation. 
 
According to Rowthorn and Chang, it is obvious that under these conditions 
privatisation is superior to public ownership. They state that the problem has nothing to 
do with the “inherent” dominance of private over social ownership; it is a matter of state 
intervention in a determined situation. Instruments can be designed to improve 
efficiency in SOEs at a higher level than in private enterprises30. The difficulties arise 
when there are political pressures that block any attempt to improve SOEs’ efficiency 
or when the enterprises are captured by conservative interests that see divestiture as 
the best way to make them efficient31.   
 
Letza et al. (2004) provide a similar perspective of the ownership problem. They 
establish that the traditional concept of ownership and its boundaries lies exclusively on 
physical assets. Since financial markets are more flexible in terms of capital provision 
for firms and technology is easy to obtain and makes productive processes cheaper, 
firms’ organisational structure can be instantly modified. So, ownership is no longer a 
matter for discussion. 
 
However, the problem is that the traditional concept of ownership does not consider 
variables such as human capital, ideas, opinions, or control as part of the definition. In 
other words, there is a separation between ownership (assets) and control. The 
concern is not about ownership but is a problem of control or how corporate 
governance is carried out in the industry. If there is a division between these elements 
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or there are no clear definitions of the boundaries of ownership, then there is a 
discussion about which of the two structures is the most adequate. 
 
2.4.3. Forces Driving Privatisation 
(i) International financial institutions 
The reason behind privatisation is more complex, and more political, than pure market 
versus planning considerations might suggest (Clarke and Pitelis 1993). First, 
according to Branston et al. (2001), the role of the international financial institutions 
(IFIs) has been considered as a key variable to accelerate the sale of public assets to 
private investors. They establish that the economic policies designed by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and employed by less developed countries force 
them to rapidly employ structural adjustment mechanisms, giving little room to 
manoeuvre policy in different ways. For example, Nochteff and Abeles (2000) state that 
the Argentinean government was desperate to divest and deregulate, since it was 
looking for private investors and the confidence of financial institutions (World Bank 
and IMF). Similarly, Michie and Padayachee (1998) point out that a similar situation 
was experienced in South Africa with extra pressures from the country’s influential 
business elite.  
 
Stiglitz (2002) severely criticises the IFIs’ role, mainly the IMF, in pressing less 
developed economies (LDE) to divest. He states that the IMF has designed policies or 
economic remedies without discussing them with the countries involved. So, countries 
are forced to implement these mechanisms without knowing their potential impacts. For 
example, he considers that the 1990s East Asian crisis was caused and worsened by 
IMF policies32. Similarly, Stiglitz considers that the Russian privatisation programme 
promoted by the IMF was badly run, affecting the already damaged economy by the 
crisis in the late 1990s.  
 
The Russian programme was implemented under a situation in which corruption and 
the business mafia were not controlled, and the IMF knew it. Once the SOEs were 
sold, they were looted by their new owners; their interest was not to make them 
efficient. He states: “it is easy to privatise quickly if one does not pay any attention to 
how one privatises: essentially give away valuable state property to one’s friend”. 
Moreover, he considers that if SOEs are sold by employing cut prices, governments 
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are practically giving a gift to investors. Finally, Stiglitz states that efficiency, the well-
known objective of privatisation, is not always achieved, primarily owing to a country’s 
inadequate environment, including a lack of regulatory frameworks.33. 
 
(ii) The Washington Consensus 
Another driving force of privatisation under the political economy’s perspective is what 
is called the Washington Consensus (W-Co). According to Basu (2003), the job of IFIs 
such as the IMF and the World Bank is to help nations with economic problems. So, 
they provide solutions under what seems to be a consensus or package 34 . This 
package considers that countries must privatise, eliminate trade barriers, allow the free 
flow of foreign capital, cut fiscal deficit and limit subsidies. 
 
Similarly, Stiglitz (2004) establishes that the W-Co has a determined purpose: to 
provide development strategies focusing on privatisation, liberalisation and macro-
stability (price stability) for developing countries35. In addition, he states that the reason 
that the IMF promotes these policies is based on ideological problems. In other words, 
since policymakers are highly dogmatic, they predicate such policies with strong faith36. 
However, he recognises that the W-Co is a response to the failures of the state in 
attempting to fix those of the market. 
 
It is important to emphasise that the W-Co’s policies had an abrupt impact on the Latin 
American economies. In particular, Mexico experienced a radical change because its 
economy was structured under a system which depended mainly on the role of the 
private sector in productive activities. The import-substitution industrialisation strategy 
(ISI) and the stable development period triggered the development of many SOEs. 
Additionally, during the 1970s and early 1980s, the governments took over different 
private companies that were financially distressed, so the SOE sector increased 
impressively. When the W-Co was put into operation, it constituted a “cleaning up” 
programme that dramatically decreased the number of SOEs in the country (Chong 
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and López-De-Silanes 2004). Most of the W-Co’s market reforms were carried out 
during Carlos Salinas’ administration (1988-1994).  
 
(iii) Political objectives 
Although the IFIs recommend privatisation as a precondition for economic 
development, governments seem to be motivated to do it for political objectives. This 
means that government goals can have interests other than improving economic 
efficiency. Börn (2004) questions why governments want to privatise if efficiency is not 
always achievable. He considers that government behaviour is confused because they 
could imitate private investors and therefore improve efficiency. Thus, Börn establishes 
that governments privatise since they are vote maximisers.  
 
If politicians want to maintain power they will need to convince voters. Börn points out 
that incumbent governments can either opt for privatisation or restructuring to obtain 
political benefits. In the case of restructuring, governments can manipulate the level of 
employment and therefore get some political support. By doing this, people will think 
that the incumbent government is maximising social welfare. On the other hand, when 
it is decided to privatise, employment levels cannot be controlled. Under this situation, 
governments will divest a large number of enterprises to get a stronger effect on the 
economy, since they cannot influence employment. Moreover, they will divest by selling 
under-priced shares, which can be easily acquired by the median voter. With this 
strategy, politicians make the median voters averse to other parties’ proposals and 
more prone to vote for the incumbent government. The resources from the sales and 
the under-priced shares help them to keep power. 
 
Finally, countries’ political structures can also determine why and how governments 
privatise (Bortolotti and Pinotti 2004). Particularly, Bortololli et al. (2003) state that there 
are two key factors that influence the privatisation process: a) political fragmentation 
affects the timing and the extent of privatisation; and b) privatisation is highly affected 
by partisan politics. For example, right-wing governments with re-election interests 
attempt to spread share ownership among voters (Chapter 3 offers a more detailed 
analysis of this). 
 
2.4.4. Lessons From Privatisation and What is Next? 
Beware of extremes! What is required is a correct balance: between freedom and 
order; between improvement and continuity; and between the private and public sector 
(Von Weizäcker et al. 2005). Privatisations have provided different results and lessons 
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that need to be reconsidered in the international agenda. Von Weizäcker et al. (2005) 
establish that when these structural programmes work, firms can obtain more benefits, 
taxpayers’ money can be secured and well used in public services, better quality 
services can be offered, innovation can be employed to increase social welfare and 
regulation can protect consumers and firms. 
 
Conversely, when structural programmes are not well instrumented, or economies do 
not have adequate conditions to perform them, the outcomes can seriously damage 
countries. The following elements are normally connected with disappointing results37: 
a. Inadequate rules governing investments. This occurs when governments do not 
have adequate political institutions or the experience to deal with multinational 
enterprises. So when authorities design legal frameworks for private investors, 
they can make mistakes leading to gaps that can be opportunistically used by 
private firms. 
b. Inefficient competition. It has been commonly thought that privatisation 
promotes competition, which in turn increases efficiency. However, this does 
not always happen, because an oligopoly can emerge, limiting entrance by 
other competitors. Consequently, it is important to set up competition and 
regulatory rules before the divestitures. 
c. Marginalisation of the poor. Privatisation might lead to a remarkable division 
between poor and rich people. Since people with stable income levels 
guarantee firms an adequate flow of economic resources, they tend to focus 
most of their services on them. As a result, people with lower income levels can 
be isolated from important services. For these cases, a poverty-oriented 
regulatory policy needs to be established.  
d. Deficient contracts. People’s interests can be affected when contracts are 
incomplete, such as the case of California’s power blackouts. Similarly, firms 
attempt to avoid unfavourable situations, such as environmental regulations, by 
using political connections to modify contracts affecting citizens’ interests. 
e. Fraudulent practices and corruption. If there are no transparent rules, the 
privatisation can be affected by illicit and fraudulent behaviour. 
f. Weakened democracy and reduced participation. For some countries, mainly 
developing economies, SOEs are considered as part of their national identity, or 
considered as part of the country’s democratic process. So people tend to 
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fiercely protect these institutions. The problem increases when the potential 
owner of the utility is a multinational company. 
g. Weak position of indebted states. Public indebtedness has been considered to 
be one of the main reasons to privatise. By selling SOEs, governments try to fix 
this problem. However, some countries with high debt rates have had mixed 
results with determined reforms. For instance, Latin American economies with 
severe debt problems such as Mexico and Uruguay have been successful in 
their telecommunication sectors. In the case of Mexico, the government 
privatised, whereas Uruguay has had good results with this sector since it 
avoided privatisation. Conversely, Argentina, a country also with debt problems, 
privatised it but did not obtain satisfactory results38.  
 
(i) Is privatisation a panacea? 
It works, but is no panacea; do not raise unrealistic expectations (Megginson 2005). 
Evidence around the world has shown us that there are mixed results. Indeed, 
privatisation can generate benefits to societies. It can be the best decision in some 
circumstances, but restructuring the state, instead, may be the better option in other 
cases (Von Weizäcker et al. 2005). 
 
(ii) A third way? 
From theoretical arguments to political economy analyses, the discussion has been 
focused on a dichotomy. Von Weizacker et al. (2005) and Megginson (2005) state that 
there is a third option that can merge the best characteristics of capitalism and 
socialism. Such an option reflects how difficult it is for societies to recognise that 
economic processes generate winners and losers. 
 
Although hybrid options or third alternatives can be seen as a mechanism to bring 
balance, they are subject to the same problems as binary relationships. In other words, 
there can be good hybrids, bad hybrids, or mixed results. There are no bases which 
can tell us that they provide a general solution to the problem of balancing the social 
and private aspects39. However, this can be an object of study in the future. 
 
(iii) The future of privatisation 
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According to Megginson (2005), in the next 20 years there will be three main mega-
trends40. The first and the most important is that oil-producing states will decide to 
privatise their national oil companies (NOCs), particularly OPEC countries. Few NOCs 
have performed well, so the potential revenues that can be generated from the sales 
are huge. Megginson estimates that the lowest amount that could be obtained from the 
sale of 17 NOCs is USD $1.45 trillion and a maximum of $3.21 trillion. These quantities 
do not include the value of the Iraqi National Oil Company. If the new Iraqi government 
decides to privatise it, the figures will increase remarkably. 
 
The second trend is the economic boost of Arab countries in the Middle East. 
According to a report from the United Nations (2002), important investments will be 
needed to improve the adverse economic and social conditions of these economies. In 
particular, it will be required that Arab SOEs (not from the oil industry) be reformed to 
make them internationally competitive. Such SOEs are considered to be in a large 
number and very valuable. 
 
The third trend is related to the privatisation of public transport. Although public 
transport has been partially or fully privatised in some countries, much of the public 
transportation networks are still in the hands of the state. So the world’s seaports, 
airports, subways and passenger rail networks could be sold. Finally, Stiglitz (2004) 
proposes a different perspective: the Post-Washington Consensus (PW-Co). He states 
that in the short run, a PW-Co must be reached which will have to consider the nature 
of the failures of the W-Co. Stiglitz considers that the PW-Co must recognise two main 
things: 1) there was excessive belief in markets; and 2) the Washington institutions 
have failed to promote development. 
 
In particular, he highlights the following elements: 1) a development strategy cannot be 
designed by only one institution. It has to consider the opinions of developing countries; 
2) an economic cure cannot be used for all countries. In other words, policies that have 
been successful in one country may not work in others; and 3) some areas of economic 
science have not yet provided enough elements that can tell what countries should do. 
In this sense, countries must be given the possibility to experiment, to employ their own 
criteria and to discover what may be the best options for them. 
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2.4.5. Summary and Conclusions 
This section has presented a political economy analysis of privatisation. 
 
1. It pointed out that it is difficult to establish on purely economic grounds which of 
the two kinds of ownership is the adequate choice or to establish that private 
ownership constitutes the best option. 
2. It highlighted that the reasons behind privatisation are more complex, and more 
political, than pure market versus planning considerations might suggest. For 
example, under the political economy’s perspective, it has been considered that 
the role of international financial institutions and the countries’ political 
structures are the main forces behind privatisation. Also, it illustrated the 
possible context of this market reform for the next years. 
 
In conclusion, it has been established that under the political economy perspective, 
privatisation is not only a matter of efficiency or a discussion between two kinds of 
organisational structures. In other words, privatisation has to be seen under a global 
perspective, where institutionalism and politics play a fundamental role. Another 
important feature is that privatisation has generated good and bad outcomes. However, 
people tend to pay more attention to the failures rather than in the potential benefits it 
can deliver. It seems that the problem is found in how privatisation has been carried 
out. In particular, failing to address the following questions: does the country really 
need to privatise determined sectors? If the answer is yes, has it fulfilled the basic 
preconditions (e.g. governance, a strong regulation framework, credible political and 
economic institutions, etc.)?41 Privatisation is a good instrument for improving people’s 
welfare, but it needs to be implemented in the correct way and under adequate 
conditions. 
 
2.5. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has attempted to explore different discussions about privatisation. It 
demonstrated that there are theoretical arguments that sustain a binary relationship, 
but none is strong enough to declare a winner. It provided an analysis of political 
economy, which established that politics and institutions have a key role in explaining 
such a dual relationship. 
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Also, it showed the different stages, mechanisms and prerequisites that countries must 
fulfil before and after privatisation to guarantee its successful operation. For instance, 
credible and stable regulation is required to protect consumers from market power and 
to protect competitors from monopolistic behaviour. 
 
The mixed outcomes from privatisation reveal that it is important to pay special 
attention to how it must be carried out. In particular, each industry and each country 
has different characteristics, so it is wrong to think that all cases will have the same 
results. In the following chapter we present some key approaches that explain the 
decision-making process behind the implementation of privatisation programmes. 
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CHAPTER 3: PROSPECT THEORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a review of prospect theory (PT), which is an alternative theory of 
decision-making under risk in the social sciences. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
found experimental and empirical anomalies in the expected utility theory (EUT), which 
led them to propose PT as a different approach to understand how people make 
decisions. They developed this theory by considering insights from psychology and 
using more realistic behavioural principles that people use in their decision-making 
processes. PT has been successfully employed in different research areas such as 
economics and finance and offers a different theoretical and methodological framework 
from traditional theory of choice mainly based on expected utility theory. 
 
In political science, PT has been used to analyse events related to decisions under risk 
and uncertainty. For example, how political actors define their choices on important 
economic policies such as market reforms can be analysed using PT. It can also help 
to predict actors’ risk tendency. Despite the advantages, the application of PT in 
political science is still limited except in the subfield of international relations. Critics of 
PT consider that there are specific theoretical problems that limit its applicability in 
politics. As a result, these limitations have been used as justifications for not applying 
PT.  
 
In this way, the present analysis attempts to answer the following questions on the 
application of PT to political science: how was prospect theory developed and what are 
its theoretical characteristics; what are the key findings of prospect theory; what are the 
problems in prospect theory and can they be solved; and what are the contributions of 
key PT applications to political science?  
 
The chapter is divided into three main sections. Section 3.2 provides a brief review of 
expected utility theory (EUT). It discusses EUT principles and the problems of such a 
theory. In particular, we analyse how such principles or axioms are violated by people’s 
behaviour. Consequently, EUT fails to capture how individuals really make decisions. 
For instance, we discuss the Allais Paradox, the problem with the EUT maximisation 
principle and other inconsistencies that show how people’s irrational actions do not 
correspond to what EUT states. These irregularities led to the development of prospect 
theory. 
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Section 3.3 studies prospect theory and its application in political science. We firstly 
analyse the theoretical structure of PT, which is based on two phases: 1) editing and 2) 
evaluation. The editing phase is about how people’s choices are affected by the way 
such options are presented to them. The evaluation phase is very important in PT 
because it states that people will make risky decisions if they are in the domain of 
losses. On the other hand, if people are in the domain of gains, they will be risk averse. 
Section 3.3.2 offers an analysis of the key PT findings, which show how the theory is 
robust in explaining and predicting choices in political science. One of the main 
features of PT is the endowment effect, which is the tendency for people to be 
emotionally attached to their possessions.  
 
Section 3.3.3 studies the problems of PT and their solutions. We analyse two 
situations: the empirical application of PT and the aggregation problem, or collective 
decision-making problem. We find that these theoretical limitations of PT are not 
greater than the limitations of rational choice models. As a result, PT can be applied to 
political phenomena without any difficulty. Finally, section 3.3.4 offers a discussion of 
key PT applications to political science. We selected three research studies that apply 
PT to different political cases, which show how our behavioural theory of decision-
making is much better in capturing actors’ decision-making processes than other 
political models. For example, Vis (2010) found that deteriorating socio-economic 
situations led some European countries to carry out benefit cutbacks. Similarly, 
Weyland (2002) reveals that declining economic conditions in some Latin American 
countries led political leaders to implement risky and costly structural policies. 
Moreover, these studies demonstrate how researchers can use different methods to 
determine people’s domains.  
   
3.2. EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY: A BRIEF REVIEW 
3.2.1. Theoretical Foundations of Expected Utility Theory 
Expected utility theory (EUT) is a decision-making theory under risk which states that 
“rational” individuals make decisions according to determined premises. It establishes 
that people expect outcomes of their behaviours depending on specific conditions. 
Moreover, it considers that people know the probabilities of such outcomes. After 
knowing the probabilities, people combine them with their utility levels, analyse each 
alternative and then select the option with the highest expected utility.         
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The above reasoning has been a strong component in models that are employed to 
explain decision-making processes under risk in economics and political science42. 
EUT was first proposed in 1738 by Daniel Bernoulli, who analysed how people make 
decisions. In particular, the EUT was developed as a solution to the problem regarding 
the price a rational person should be prepared to pay to enter into a gamble (Starmer 
2000). By solving the St Petersburg game, he considered that people are willing to pay 
a small amount to enter into it.  
 
The St Petersburg game is played by continually flipping a coin until tails first appears, 
ending the game. The game’s structure is as follows: 1) you have to pay a fee to enter; 
2) suppose you receive an initial payoff of £
n2 ; and 3) every time a head appears the 
payoff increases. “n” is the number of flips until tails comes up tails. So, if , tails 
appear the second time the coin is flipped. Bernoulli’s theory has important properties. 
It considers that people give subjective values or utilities to monetary outcomes. So the 
expected value of the gamble is the expectation of these utilities. In this sense, 
Bernoulli established that the price of a gamble to a person is not the same as its 
expected monetary value.  
 
Although Bernoulli’s EUT explained the St Petersburg game, it was not supported by 
economists until the 1950s due to the way in which the solution was illustrated. 
According to Starmer (2000), the problem was partially attributed to the use of a 
cardinal utility scale, which was not well understood during the first half of the twentieth 
century. 
 
In Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), the theory was the object of study once again. 
They established that determined axioms on preference could lead to the EUT 
hypothesis. This hypothesis states that an individual’s utility facing uncertainty is 
obtained by considering utility in every possible state and by determining a weighted 
average. The weights are the person’s estimations of each state’s probability. The 
axioms are the principles in which, according to EUT’s perspective, people carry out 
their decisions. Since then, different axioms have been developed43. In order for people 
to make decisions under an EUT framework, three main axioms must hold (Starmer 
2000): 1) Ordering; 2) Continuity; and 3) Independence.  
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The EUT axioms have the following notation and assumptions: the symbol  means 
weakly preferred, the symbol ~ means indifferent, and the letter p represents 
probabilities (it always lies in the interval [0, 1]). Lower case letters in bold represent 
prospects (a list of consequences with associated probabilities). Assumptions: 1) the 
individual knows all the consequences and probabilities. Consequently, when the 
individual chooses among prospects she faces a risky situation (conversely, under 
situations of uncertainty at least some of the outcomes or probabilities are unknown). 
  
The ordering axiom involves completeness and transitivity. Completeness requires that 
for all a, b , or , or both. Transitivity requires that for all a, b and c, if
 then . Continuity requires that for all prospects a, b and c, 
where   there exists some p such that (a, p; c, 1-p) ~ b. (a, p; c, 1-p) 
is a compound prospect, where a has a probability p and c has a probability 1-p. The 
independence axiom considers that for all prospects a, b and c, if  then (a, p; c, 
1-p)  (b, p; c, 1-p) for all p. These axioms represent the basic structure of any 
rational decision-making model. 
 
3.2.2. Problems of Expected Utility Theory 
Although the expected utility theory has given good results in explaining how people 
define their choices, strong empirical evidence has shown inconsistencies in such 
theory. One of the main discontents about EUT is related to the distinction between 
uncertainty and risk (McCarty and Meirowitz 2007). In particular, EUT focuses its 
attention on risk rather than uncertainty (Knight 1921). Knight considers that 
uncertainty exists when people do not have enough statistical information to define the 
probabilities of the outcomes. In other words, subjects do not know the true set of 
lotteries (L) in a game.  
 
Savage (1954) considers that, contrary to what EUT considers, people form a 
“subjective belief” about L which can be employed to determine probability distribution 
over outcomes. For instance, consider Ellsberg’s (1961) experiment in which he asked 
individuals to choose between two urns containing red and black balls. The first urn 
contained 100 balls of both kinds, but the proportion of each was unknown. The second 
urn contained 50 red balls and 50 black balls randomly mixed. Individuals were asked 
to choose an urn and a ball. Subjects then had to draw a ball from the chosen urn. If 
they got the ball they wanted, they got a prize.  
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The experiment strongly showed that people preferred to draw red and black balls from 
the second urn. These results violate the EUT’s axioms. According to EUT, if a 
decision-maker prefers to draw a black ball from the second urn rather than from the 
first urn, this means that the subjective probability of drawing a black ball from the first 
urn is less than 0.5. But it also means that the subjective probability of drawing a red 
ball from the first urn is greater than 0.5 and the subject should therefore prefer to draw 
a black ball from the second urn, which has 0.5 probability of winning. According to 
Ellsberg’s analysis, people tend to maximise expected utility in situations involving risk 
(second urn), whereas they tend to maximise minimum utility in cases involving 
uncertainty (first urn). For that reason, EUT focuses more on situations involving risk 
rather than uncertainty (Knight 1921). 
 
Another important critique to EUT is found in the Allais Paradox. According to Allais 
(1953), people tend to violate EUT’s independence axiom. His experiment consisted of 
asking people to choose between two prospects, a = ($10 million; 100%) or b= ($50 
million: 10%; $10 million: 89%; $0: 1%). What option did people choose? Then, they 
had to choose between other two lotteries, c = ($10 million: 11%; $0: 89%) or d = ($50 
million: 10%; $0:90%). What lottery did people prefer?  
 
According to EUT, people are supposed to choose the prospects which provide the 
highest probabilities. So, under this assumption, people had to choose a over b and c 
over d. Allais’ analysis proved that in the case of the first experiment, people chose a 
because they were certain they were going to get the $10 million for sure. However, in 
the second experiment he found that people chose d over c. In this situation there is an 
inconsistency, because people opted for the prospect which gave them more value (50 
million) instead of opting for the choice with the higher probability (11%). In a similar 
experiment, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found that 82% of people opted for 
prospect a and 83% chose d. 
 
Other key inconsistencies in the EUT have been found in other more applied cases. 
For instance, Camerer (1998) provides an interesting example of a EUT’s failure. He 
studies how New York taxi drivers violate the EUT maximisation principle, which infers 
that people will always seek the highest expected utility. His analysis shows how many 
taxi drivers tend to work fewer hours on busy days, whereas on quiet days they tend to 
set a fixed income target. Once they reach it they stop working. This leads to the 
conclusion that the rational labour-market theory (RLMT) is useless in explaining this 
behaviour, because the RLMT indicates that they will do the opposite. In other words, 
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taxi drivers are supposed to work harder on a busy day in order to maximise their 
income function and work less on a quiet day when their income rate is lower. 
 
3.3. PROSPECT THEORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
3.3.1. Theoretical Foundations of Prospect Theory 
The observed violations of expected utility theory led key scholars to develop an 
alternative theory of decision-making under risk. In particular, Prospect Theory (PT) 
emerged as an option that attempts to explain what EUT fails to. PT was developed by 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in 197944. They demonstrated that hundreds of 
experiments, in which people had to decide between different gambles, were 
inconsistent with EUT. The evidence of the anomalies in EUT were found in 
experimental analyses that have been strengthened by field studies in different areas 
of study such as finance, consumer economics, insurance and other areas (Kahneman 
and Tversky 2000).  
 
Contrary to the EUT axioms, Kahneman and Tversky consider that the decision-making 
process is mainly divided into two phases: 1) Editing or Framing and 2) Evaluation. In 
the editing phase the individual recognises the reference point, the available choices, 
the possible consequences or outcomes, and the value and probability of each of these 
outcomes (Levy 2003). In the evaluation phase, the actor’s edited prospects are 
evaluated and the desired prospect is chosen45. These two phases are based on 
psychological principles which capture the way the human brain structures decisions 
(McDermott 1998).   
 
1) Editing 
Editing or framing is the first phase of PT. This stage is about framing effects which 
describe how choices or options can be affected by the way they are ordered or 
presented to individuals. This phase can be the central part of the decision-making 
process because it is about how an individual structures the options that are available 
to her. How can the order of choices affect individuals’ final decisions? Let us use one 
of the examples offered by McDermott (1998).  
 
In this experiment, people were told they were responsible for the country’s public 
policy-making. They were asked to choose between two policies that could stop the 
spread of a strong flu virus. Policy A offered to save 200 out of 600 people. Policy B 
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had a one-third chance that 600 people were going to survive and a two-thirds chance 
that everybody was going to die. The 72% of a first group of people opted for the first 
policy (A).  
 
In a second group of people, there were also two policy options. Policy A expected to 
cause 400 dead out of 600 people. Policy B had a one-third possibility that all people 
were not going to die and two-thirds possibility of causing 600 dead. In this second 
group, 78% chose policy B. As we clearly see, these two groups of people were offered 
the same “net outcome”. However, the only difference between them is how the options 
were framed or the way the problem was presented to people. The different results 
were caused by the framing effects, but the expected value between these options did 
not change (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). 
 
“What does framing consist of and how does it operate?” (McDermott 1998, p. 22) 
“Framing is controlled by the manner in which the choice problem is presented as well 
as by the norms, habits, and expectancies of the decision maker” (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1986, p. 257). In this way, McDermott states that such norms and habits 
can be very “idiosyncratic” to the specific decision-maker and cognitive biases can 
strongly influence her expectancies.    
 
The editing phase groups other processes: acceptance, segregation, coding, 
combination and cancellation. Acceptance states that people will not reformulate or 
recast a choice problem after it is presented to them. This means that people will 
accept the way the options are structured. Segregation refers to the fact that people 
tend to focus on the elements that are most evident and direct to the choice problem. 
Coding captures individuals’ tendency to conceive outcomes as gains and losses, 
instead of classifying them as final absolute states of wealth or welfare (McDermott 
1998). For example, our favourite football team’s results are irrelevant if we do not 
know if the score is higher or lower than the rival team’s results. The rivals’ score is 
used as a reference point to evaluate the development of our team.  
 
Combination is another framing process that states that people tend to add the 
probabilities of similar outcomes. For example, people who live in dangerous areas 
where there is a 10% chance of dying in an earthquake and a 10% possibility of dying 
in violent crimes sum these two probabilities, so the total chance of dying in this area is 
20%. If one person decides to move to another place with a 5% chance of dying from 
violent crimes, she compares it against the 20%.  
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Cancellation refers to the individuals’ tendency to discard choices with similar 
outcomes. For example, truck drivers usually face the choice problem of deciding 
which route they should take to reach their destination. Let us suppose that the first 
route has a 5% chance of being injured by an accident because of the bad road 
conditions and a 10% possibility of being assaulted and killed by gunmen. The second 
route has a 10% chance of being assaulted and killed by gunmen and a 30% chance of 
being mugged. The 10% chance of being assaulted and killed by gunmen is discarded, 
so now the decision is between a 5% chance of being injured by a road accident and 
30% chance of being mugged.  
 
2) Evaluation 
After people edit their prospects, they evaluate them and choose an option from a set 
of alternatives. This phase is structured by two key sections: a) the value function and 
b) the weighting function. 
 
a. The value function 
This function has three important characteristics (see Figure 3.1). Firstly, empirical 
evidence has shown that people conceive outcomes as gains and losses relative to a 
specific reference point. The value is obtained by the magnitude of the change from the 
reference point, whereas expected utility theory considers value as a result of final 
states. The reference point is set at the current asset position or SQ.  
 
Secondly, the value function for gains is concave, whereas it is convex for losses. In 
other words, it is an S-shaped function. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), 
the S-shaped value curve is attributed to the reflection effect: “the fact concavity of the 
utility function in the domain of gains is mirrored by convexity in the domain of losses” 
(Starmer 2000, p.352). The experiments in Kahneman and Tversky’s study concluded 
that positive prospects produced convex regions, which mean risk aversion. On the 
other hand, if outcome signs are modified in the same problems, the preference order 
is also modified. This means that prospect theory predicts risk aversion in the domain 
of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses; “this is the crux of PT” (McDermott 
1998, p. 29). 
 
Finally, the third characteristic of the value function is that changes in the value of 
losses are greater than the value of gains when absolute values of changes in money 
are the same. Tversky and Kahneman’s (1991) experimental evidence demonstrates 
that the value function in the domain of losses is steeper than in the domain of gains. 
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This situation reflects the phenomenon of loss aversion (Levy 1992) and that losses 
hurt more than comparable gains satisfy (McDermott 1998). For example, if an 
individual loses $20, her feeling of guilt will be stronger than the feeling of satisfaction 
generated by finding $20. All these features are illustrated in Figure 3.1.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 shows PT’s value function. It illustrates that people are risk averse in the 
domain of gains (concave curve) and risk seekers when they are in the domain of 
losses (convex curve). 
 
b. The Weighting Function 
The second structure of the evaluation stage is the weighting function (Figure 3.2). In 
PT, the value of each outcome is multiplied by a decision weight, whereas in expected 
utility theory it is multiplied by a probability. As such, decision weight measures an 
event’s impact on the prospects in order to establish how people underestimate 
outcomes when they are very likely to occur and how people overestimate outcomes 
that are less likely to occur.   
 
Gains Losses 
Value 
Figure 3.1: Prospect theory’s value function 
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The technical structure of the weighting function is the following: let x and y be two 
different monetary outcomes; (p) is the probability of x, and (q) is the probability of y. 
The weighting function is represented by  and is associated with each probability (p). 
So, is less than unity and  is not continuous near the end-points 
where (0) = 0 and (1) = 1. 
 
The prospect’s values are defined by one of the following bilinear forms: 
 
With probability 1-p-q, the payoff is 0. Prospects are strictly positive if x, y > 0 and p + q 
= 1, strictly negative if x, y < 0 and p+q=1, and regular in all other cases. In a regular 
prospect, subjects maximise: 
 
               
 
v(x) and v(y) are the values of the outcomes; and are weights based on 
the outcome probabilities. They consider that v(0) = 0,  and  
 
In the case of strictly positive or strictly negative prospects such as x > y > 0 and x < y 
< 0 where p + q = 1, subjects maximise:   

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Figure 3.2: A hypothetical weighting function 
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This function indicates that people evaluate such lotteries as a risk-free element v(y) 
plus a risky element v(x) - v(y). A prospect theory’s important assumption is that v(.) is 
asymmetric with respect to losses and gains. In this way, the structure of the weighting 
function has some key characteristics. One of the features is that people tend to treat 
very probable but uncertain situations as certain. On the other hand, people also tend 
to treat very improbable situations as impossible and therefore individuals ignore such 
events (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). For example, a very unlikely situation that 
actually happened was the disaster of the space shuttle Challenger (McDermott 1998). 
Another characteristic is that medium and high probabilities are underweighted and low 
probabilities are overweighted. In section 3.3.2.2, we analyse this and other 
characteristics of the weighting function.   
 
In summary, the editing phase is about how people make substantially different choices 
when their reference points change. The value function predicts risk aversion in the 
domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. These behaviours consider a 
reference point that can be expressed in terms of the individuals’ current assets or 
status quo (SQ). The weighting function shows that people tend to overweight events 
with small probabilities and underweight events with medium or high probabilities.  
 
3.3.2. Prospect Theory’s Key Findings  
3.3.2.1. Status Quo Effect and Endowment Effect 
Prospect theory has important features that make it different from other theories, 
particularly expected utility theory. One of the PT’s characteristics is that it predicts that 
people make very risky decisions when their prospects are negative, whereas 
individuals tend to be more cautious when their prospects are positive. This behaviour 
occurs when individuals use a “reference point” which determines their position in one 
of the domains of PT’s value function: the domain of gains and the domain of losses. In 
other words, people think in terms of gains and losses, so they define their options from 
a reference point which can initially be the “status quo” or an “aspiration level”46. This 
“reference dependence” (Levy 2003) constitutes the main feature of PT.  
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Another finding is the “loss aversion” argument. People experience this behaviour 
when they evaluate outcomes above and below their reference point47. In particular, 
people are loss averse when they overvalue losses with respect to equal gains. Such 
overvaluation occurs because “losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979, p. 279). This phenomenon was found by conducting different experiments in 
which individuals opted for certain outcomes with lower expected value rather than 
facing gambles with a 50/50 chance for negative and positive choices with similar 
absolute values (Levy 1992). According to Vis (2009a) and Levy (1992), one of the 
implications of loss aversion is that people’s SQ becomes their preferred position and 
therefore they refuse to choose negative choices. It means that individuals tend to stay 
at the SQ rather than experiencing the disadvantages or costs of leaving it (Kahneman, 
Knetsch and Thaler 1991).   
 
Loss aversion is closely connected to the “endowment effect” (Thaler 1980). It occurs 
when people value their current assets or SQ more than the comparable assets they 
do not have. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1984), it implies that people tend to 
be unwilling to part with their possessions because they get emotionally attached to 
such assets. Expected utility theory (EUT) states that people’s choices are independent 
of their endowments. In other words, an individual’s decision is not influenced by the 
current condition of her assets. However, the general theory of reference-dependent 
preferences in Kahneman and Tversky (1991), which is also included in prospect 
theory, establishes that people’s choices strongly depend on the state of their current 
endowments. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) call it the “status quo effect”. 
 
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990) carried out experiments that show how the 
endowment effect is found in people’s behaviour and how it influences their decision-
making processes. In one of the key experiments, students were given mugs and 
money. Half of the students received mugs (sellers) and the other half got the money 
(choosers). Students were asked to set price of the mugs and were motivated to sell 
them to choosers. The experiment results showed that sellers set the prices at double 
the value that the choosers were willing to pay.  
 
The retail value of the mug was around $5. In the first experiment, sellers set prices at 
$7.12, whereas choosers were willing to buy them at $3.12. In a second experiment, 
sellers and choosers set values at $7 and $3.50 respectively. Also, in both 
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experiments, sellers were told to opt for either maintaining their status quo (mugs) or 
giving it up in exchange for cash48. If trade was carried out, the mugs were considered 
to be a gain by the choosers and a loss by the sellers. The higher prices set by the 
sellers clearly demonstrate how individuals tend to be loss averse and therefore 
maintain their SQ. Only 15% of the mugs were traded49. 
 
The experiments on the commercial transactions of mugs can help us to understand 
some elements of the political dynamics of privatisation. In particular, we can see why 
policy change (e.g. privatisation programmes, benefit cutbacks, etc.) is difficult to carry 
out by policy-makers in developing countries (Mullainathan 2006). Under PT’s 
perspective, one of the reasons why these economic measures are difficult to 
implement is because they create winners and losers. For example, if a government 
plans to implement a drastic economic reform that affects the status quo of a specific 
social group, we can predict that such people will defend their socio-economic welfare 
(SQ) against the decision. People can use any available strategy (e.g. street 
demonstrations) to maintain their SQ and therefore block the government’s policy. 
“Because the status quo is imbued with special legitimacy, individuals” (Vis 2009a, p. 
3) ... “defend it more fiercely against threats of losses than they seek further 
improvements” (Weyland 2002, pp. 40-41). Since losses are felt more sharply in severe 
economic reforms (Mullainathan 2006), people’s reaction will be stronger.  
 
Under PT’s perspective, people conceive outcomes as gains and losses. If people feel 
satisfied with their SQ, they are in PT’s domain of gains, which means that they are risk 
averse. Similar to the mug experiment in Kahneman et al. (1990), people can express 
their loss aversion by setting a higher price to protect their SQ. We consider that the 
government’s policy may be successful only if the buying price (proposed by the 
government) is considerably higher than the selling price (proposed by the affected 
group). This is the only way people will be willing to accept a change in their SQ. 
 
If the affected people reach an agreement with the government and therefore accept a 
change in their SQ, the government can use this opportunity to implement parallel 
measures to make the policy less costly for this group of people. This is because 
“individuals adapt more rapidly to positive changes in their situation (such as a pay 
rise) than to negative ones (such as a pay cut)” (Vis 2009a, p. 3); “the recognition of 
loss aversion suggests that successful policies may require protecting the losses of 
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incumbents” (Mullainathan 2006, p. 20). This strategy can help to reduce the “feeling of 
loss” in the affected group. If the government adopts this parallel measure, people feel 
that their government cares about them and therefore easily accept and adapt 
themselves to their new SQ.  
     
Another implication of loss aversion and the endowment effect is that actual losses hurt 
more than foregone gains (Levy 2003). People experience this feeling when their 
possessions are taken away from them. The interesting element about this situation is 
that this feeling is stronger than the feeling of not obtaining expected gains. It also 
implies that “gaining something and then losing it does not leave people in the same 
place in terms of the psychological value of people’s assets” (Levy 2003, p. 217).  
 
Levy (2003) states that the reference dependence and the asymmetry between losses 
and gains also have important implications in terms of fairness and the law. He 
considers that people tend to believe that an unfair situation occurs when somebody 
else does not respect or abuses a determined agreement. People define fairness with 
respect to some “reference transaction”50 which can be expressed in prices, contracts, 
etc. So individuals can see an unfair situation when supermarkets respond to a sudden 
increase in the demand for bottled water by raising prices after a weather crisis. Such 
price increases can be legitimate if they are necessary to cover new costs for the 
company51.  
 
Similarly, Levy establishes that the endowment effect, the asymmetry between gains 
and losses and consequently between losses and foregone gains, are central to the 
law. He cites Atiya (1979) to show how losses are treated in a special way compared to 
the denial of gains. Atiya’s analysis of the history of contracts states that “to deprive 
somebody of something which he merely expects to receive is a less serious wrong, 
deserving of less protection, than to deprive somebody of the expectation of continuing 
to hold something he already possesses” (Levy 2003, p. 230).  
 
Levy considers that the endowment effect is also reflected in Holmes’ (1897) 
statement: “A thing that you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, 
whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn away 
without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself...” (cited in Cohen and 
Knetsch 2000, p. 432). In this way, and according to Levy, if an individual does not 
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respect a contract because she pretends to make gains, she will be held to the original 
terms and conditions of such an agreement.  
 
3.3.2.2. Strategic Framing, Sunk Costs, Overweighting and Underweighting of 
Probabilities  
Another implication is that PT’s findings can be subject to manipulation or “strategic 
framing” (Levy 2000). According to Levy (2003), McDermott et al. (2008), Lupia and 
Menning (2009) and Vis (2009a), it occurs when an individual influences other people’s 
reference points. For example, Vis (2009a) states that politicians can get people’s 
support for very risky policies by using fear as a convincing factor. This phenomenon is 
stronger when people do not have enough information about the possible threats that 
are promoted by politicians. Conversely, when people receive “feedback” on such 
threats, it is difficult for politicians to obtain gains by manipulating voters’ preferences52.  
 
“Sunk costs” are very important factors that are usually found in political players’ 
decision-making processes (Vis 2009a). Contrary to expected utility theory, which 
establishes that individuals consider sunk costs as irrelevant and make decisions on 
the margin (Levy 2003), prospect theory states that people take into consideration past 
costs when they make decisions. Thaler (1980) found experimental evidence that 
indicates that individuals are willing to drive through a snowstorm to go to a basketball 
game to recover the cost or price they paid for their tickets. This means that when 
individuals’ SQ changes from a good to an adverse situation, the new SQ (adverse 
situation) will be considered as a “loss” for them. Consequently, PT predicts that people 
will adopt risk-seeking behaviour in an attempt to eliminate such a loss. This behaviour 
can generate greater losses (Levy 2003).    
 
Finally, the “over-weighting” of probabilities is an important finding in PT. According to 
Allais (1979) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979), people tend to give a greater weight 
or a higher value to certain outcomes than to uncertain outcomes. This has been called 
the “certainty effect”. In other words, the certainty effect can be understood as people’s 
propensity for choosing the option that eliminates the risk rather than choosing the 
option that reduces it, even though both options have the same outcome. McDermott et 
al. (2008) state that PT’s weighting function indicates that individuals have a propensity 
for overweighting small probabilities and underweighting intermediate and high 
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probabilities. They consider that robust evidence confirms that people treat very likely 
situations as certain, whereas see highly improbable situations as impossible events.  
 
In the case of the “pseudocertainty effect”, Tversky and Kanehman (1986) state that it 
occurs when people treat or weight uncertain outcomes as certain outcomes. 
McDermott (1998) considers that this behaviour is commonly found in political actors’ 
decision-making processes when opting for worst-case scenario planning. She states 
that this phenomenon represents a problematic situation because political players tend 
to aggravate the weighting effects by employing representative analogies. For 
example, if a political leader views another politician as a ‘Hitler’, the following 
assessments will be based on such characterisation and therefore will lack accuracy53. 
Levy (1992) states that overestimation and overweighting of probabilities are different 
phenomena. The overestimation occurs when people subjectively evaluate probabilities 
of rare events. On the other hand, overweighting of probabilities is a property of the 
weighting function or decision weight (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).    
 
3.3.3. Problems in Prospect Theory 
This section analyses the problems of PT found in political science and their solutions. 
There are two main problems: the empirical application of PT and the aggregation 
problem. The solution for the first case is developed in Mercer’s (2005a) analysis, and 
Vis (2009a) solves the second problem. 
  
3.3.3.1. Problem 1: Empirical Application 
PT has been increasingly used for analysing different phenomena in the field of 
economics. In particular, it has contributed enormously to the sub-fields of behavioural 
economics and experimental economics. Other areas such as engineering, 
mathematics, sociology, health, finance and management have used PT with 
confidence (Mercer 2005a). However, political scientists have shown little interest in 
using PT as a methodological framework. For example, and according to Mercer, from 
1985 to 2003, Kahneman and Tversky’s article was cited only eight times in the 
American Political Science Review. PT is widely employed in the field of international 
relations, but the rest of political science excludes it from the analysis of political 
dynamics. This problem is not only found in political researchers; political economists 
are also reluctant to apply PT despite the fact this theory is no longer placed outside 
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the mainstream of economics (Thaler 2001). For some political scientists it is still 
considered a radical choice (Treisman 2004).  
 
Why is there little attention to PT in political science? Mercer (2005a) suggests two 
interesting reasons. Firstly, political scientists have not viewed PT favourably because 
they consider that it has theoretical and methodological constraints that block its 
applicability in political phenomena. Studies such as McDermott (2004a) consider that 
PT has the following limitations: 1) it lacks a specific framework that can fit reality with 
theory; and 2) it lacks applicability to group behaviour (we analyse this in section 
3.3.3.2).  
 
Mercer states that these limitations are not greater than the problems with rationalist 
models. However, he recognises that there are constraints that could cause the lack of 
interest in PT. For example, lab experiments are extremely different from complex 
political decisions in the field, where accurate measurement of domain, risk and effects 
of other variables is very difficult to get. To solve this situation, he agrees with Jervis 
(2004, p.172), who states that “ingenuity and careful research can reduce, but not 
completely eliminate these difficulties”. Under these conditions, Mercer proposes five 
techniques for addressing the problem of how to determine an actor’s domain, which is 
one of the main methodological and theoretical limitations considered by the opponents 
of PT. At the same time, these techniques respond to McDermott’s criticisms about the 
problem of PT’s application in political science. We discuss these techniques in the 
following section.  
 
The second reason, or what he considers the real reason behind PT’s problems in 
political science, is based on the political researchers’ opposition to employing 
psychological theories. According to him, the problem lies in the resistance to the field 
of psychology rather than to problems inherent with the theory. In other words, there is 
an “aggressive uncuriosity” (Rabin 1998, p. 41) which will decrease as economists and 
political scientists get used to psychology. Similarly, Thaler (2001) considers that one 
of the reasons that inhibit researchers from using PT is that it can be a “risky career 
path”. However, he states that economists who use psychological theories can now 
feel that their work is recognised. “If behavioural economists continue to prosper, a new 
generation of political economists is sure to follow” (Mercer 2005a, p.18.). “Economists 
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will routinely incorporate as much behaviour into their models as they observe in the 
real world. After all, to do otherwise would be irrational” (Thaler 1999)54. 
 
(i) Mercer’s five techniques for determining an actor’s domain   
Analysing decision-making processes under PT’s perspective in experimental 
laboratories gives research important advantages. For example, economists or 
psychologists can manipulate the variables of interest, and therefore experiments 
(intentionally created by researchers) can be successfully completed without any 
difficulty (Mercer 2005a). Conversely, in real and unpredictable situations people 
generate their own frames, which makes it difficult for researchers to adequately use 
PT to capture how politicians carry out their decisions.     
 
How can we know how people frame their choices if PT lacks a theory of frames? Levy 
(1997, p. 100) states “PT is a reference-dependent theory without a theory of reference 
point”. To know that people can take a risky decision or behave in a more cautious 
way, we need to see in which of the two domains (gains or losses) they are located. If 
PT has no theory of frames, it is impossible to know. To answer this question, Mercer 
proposes the following five techniques: 1) status quo as a reference point; 2) aspiration 
as a reference point; 3) heuristics; 4) analogies; and 5) emotions. According to him, 
such techniques can help to identify an actor’s domain. 
 
(i.i) Status quo as the reference point 
People use their status quo (SQ) as a reference point. When people are satisfied with 
it, they tend to be in the domain of gains. According to Mercer, the question is simple: 
is the SQ acceptable or not? If the answer is no it means that individuals see their SQ 
deteriorating and consequently they see themselves in a domain of losses, which leads 
them to take a risky action. 
 
However, there is no general theory of satisfaction, and satisfaction is a subjective 
feeling. To solve this problem we need to pay careful attention to elements such the 
situations, goals and motivations of decision-makers (Mercer 2005a). In terms of 
political dynamics, we can use economic incentives, domestic politics, government 
institutional structures, domestic organisations (e.g. congressional pressures or 
business group pressures), etc. to define the decision-makers’ domain. 
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For example, Weyland (2002) employed economic crises (PT/crisis argument) to 
determine political leaders’ domains. According to him, the deteriorating economic 
conditions in Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela throughout determined periods led 
political leaders to carry out drastic economic reforms (risky decisions), where the 
current SQ served as the reference point to return to the pre-crisis SQ55. Also, Fanis 
(2004) employed economic data to explain how Chilean President Salvador Allende’s 
economic policies hurt the interests of leading industrial sectors and how such groups 
framed Allende’s term (1970–1973) as a loss. In other words, they were dissatisfied 
with their SQ during that time.  
 
Mercer also states that there is a special case that occurs when dissatisfaction with SQ 
could be a result of an individual being in a domain of gains. For example, when 
President George W. Bush had an initial acceptable victory in Afghanistan, his 
popularity increased, which allowed him the luxury to see the Iraqi SQ as an 
unacceptable situation because he was in a domain of gains. According to Woodward 
(2004), President Bush was motivated by Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, who 
was in a very optimistic mood because the president had positive results in the polls. If 
the war in Afghanistan had initially gone bad, George Bush might have seen the Iraqi 
SQ as an acceptable situation (Mercer 2005a). In other words, dissatisfaction with the 
SQ could be a result of success rather than failure.  
 
(i.ii) Aspirations 
An individual can use an aspiration instead of the status quo as her reference point56. It 
is important to identify the difference between an aspiration and the status quo, a 
difference which can sometimes be irrelevant for the research (this is because PT only 
needs to know in which domain individuals are located and not the source of such 
domains). Mercer uses the case of North and South Korea to illustrate this technique. 
For example, if the reference point of Kim Jong-il is the poor economic situation in 
North Korea, then Kim Jon-il is in the domain of losses (Cha 2002). On the other hand, 
if Kim Jon-il aspires to control South Korea and use it as his reference point, then he 
will be deeper in the domain of losses. Mercer considers that knowing what’s inside 
Kim Jon-il’s Korea is a difficult task but can be very useful. However, if researchers or 
policy-makers only know that Jon-il is likely to be in the domain of losses, that is all the 
information they need to know to make a decision.    
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Mercer states that there are two ways to know whether people are using the status quo 
or an aspiration as their reference point. He agrees with Taliaferro (2004), who 
considers that a careful analysis of individuals’ “relative perceptions” can be very useful 
to know their domain. For example, he establishes that since countries care more 
about relative gains than absolute gains, it can lead us to determine the possible 
reference point that political leaders will choose. This option can be illustrated with the 
example of North and South Korea. In the hypothetical case, if North Korea’s 
conditions relative to South Korea get much better, the SQ is the reference point. If 
North Korea’s conditions are relatively deteriorating, a future aspiration is the reference 
point.  
 
However, Mercer indicates that the problem with this approach is that it can be difficult 
to structure a detailed and accurate analysis of how decision-makers choose their 
reference points. In the previous section, Mercer placed George W. Bush in the domain 
of gains. Conversely, by using Taliaferro’s method, Bush could possibly be in the 
domain of losses before he invaded Iraq in March 2003, and before his initial victory in 
Afghanistan. Clarke (2004) and Woodward (2004) state that President Bush was very 
enthusiastic to declare war on Iraq after the 9/11 terrorist attacks occurred in New York 
City, or even before such events (Suskind 2004). “He viewed anything less than 
crushing Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as a loss” (Mercer 2005a, p. 7). This aspiration 
located Bush in the domain of losses and led him to carry out a very risky and costly 
war. Mercer states that the validity of PT depends on the adequate assessment of an 
actor’s aspiration. 
 
The second option is the ideal method to determine people’s reference points. 
According to Mercer it is also a solution to the above problem and is based on the use 
of more objective data and information. Instead of relying on a subjective analysis of 
decision-makers’ relative perceptions, we can use information found in white papers, 
planning documents, strategies, public pronouncements, diplomatic communications, 
instructions to subordinates, etc. (Taliaferro 2004). Elms (2004) considers that the use 
of economic indices is an appropriate way to identify an actor’s reference point. For 
instance, “in trade disputes, losses and gains are measured in sales or market 
penetration in the target market” (Elms 2004, p. 249). This method makes actors’ 
reference points (aspirations or the status quo) easier to determine and we can know 
their domains.  
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(i.iii) Heuristics 
Heuristics can be employed to understand how actors assimilate their environment and 
how they locate themselves in the domain of gains or losses (Stein 1992; McDermott 
1998; Taliaferro 2004). According to Mercer (2005a), when we cannot solve complex 
problems by using normative models of decision, we employ heuristics or cognitive 
shortcuts that influence our choices. A good example occurs when people evaluate the 
quality of used cars by only looking at the odometer rather than evaluating the engine’s 
condition or other technical factors57. If a car’s odometer level is high, it negatively 
influences people’s perception of its quality. According to Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974), there are three main kinds of heuristics.  
 
The “representativeness heuristic” occurs when we consider that the probability that 
object or event X belongs to event or object Y by establishing how similar X looks to Y 
(Mercer 2005a). In other words, the more X is similar to Y, the higher the probability 
that X belongs to Y or is generated by Y. The second heuristic is “adjustment and 
anchoring”. This occurs when people have an initial evaluation of an event and use 
their assessment to anchor following events. During this process, they adjust the 
assessment by including more information, thus getting a better evaluation of the 
problem.  
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) demonstrated that people tend to adjust their 
perceptions when they are given a fixed situation. They asked people what percentage 
of African countries are members of the United Nations (UN). In a first experiment they 
were asked the following question as the anchor: “was it more or less than 45%?” 
Subjects responded by giving figures (adjustment) lower than this percentage. In a 
second experiment they asked if it “was more or less than 65%”. Similarly, individuals 
gave figures below this percentage and never above it. 
 
The last is the “availability heuristic”, which occurs when people evaluate a problem’s 
probability by using what comes easily to their mind (Mercer 2005a). If the event is 
more evident, it becomes easier to remember it, which also leads us to overestimate 
the frequency of occurrence58. Also, subjects tend to use a single case as a whole 
representation of the population. This situation occurs when, for instance, a politician 
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considers that private electric utilities are more efficient than public companies by only 
observing one private company’s efficiency to formulate his opinion.  
 
Heuristics can also be used to explain how long and under what conditions people 
adhere to determined aspirations. Mercer states that if an aspiration becomes an 
anchor, it can block people from accepting other information, evidence, etc. In other 
words, people tend to adhere to specific aspirations and show resistance to change. 
Under these circumstances, when individuals move from one aspiration to other 
aspiration, a heuristic will be available to explain it59. Although heuristics help us to 
understand how people think and why they locate themselves in a domain of gains and 
losses, there is no answer to which heuristic is better than another. Conversely, in 
experimental laboratories, researchers can generate and use heuristics to influence 
individuals and therefore make them put themselves in one of the two PT domains 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974).   
 
(i.iv) Analogies 
Analogies are the forth technique proposed by Mercer (2005a) to define people’s 
domains. According to McDermott (1998), past analogies can be employed as very 
strong variables to define frames. To illustrate how analogies influence political leaders’ 
decisions, Mercer discusses the analysis of Richardson (1992). Richardson used the 
availability heuristic to understand the development of the Suez crisis in the mid-1950s. 
He states that Britain saw Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, as the new Hitler. 
So they thought about the Germany analogy. Also, this event affected Americans, who 
considered that Europeans were about to lead them into another war. 
 
“Do analogies affect beliefs or do beliefs affect the choice of analogy? Which analogies 
are the most important and why?” (Mercer 2005a, p. 9.) These are the limitations that 
users of analogies recognise (Houghton 2001; Khong 1992). However, Mercer states 
that these problems do not limit analogies to telling us in which of the two domains 
people are located. Recall that PT only requires the subject’s domain but not the 
source of that domain (Mercer 2005a).  
 
(i.v) Emotion 
Emotion is a central variable in PT (Mercer 2005a) because people do not consult 
utility, but they feel it (Kahneman 1994; Kahneman and Tversky 1984). Similarly, Read 
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(2002) considers that when individuals move from one reference point to another, the 
effects of such changes on people are considered as “feelings”. In the case of political 
science, emotions are extremely important, because these feelings of losses and gains 
(with respect to a reference point) have a very strong influence on how choices are 
made by political actors (Mercer 2005a; Bueno de Mesquita and McDermott 2004; 
McDermott 2004b). Mercer states that emotions such as greed (Hirschman 1977), 
desperation (Welch 1992), panic, fear, regret (Jervis 1992; McDermott 2004a), anger, 
pride (Gries 2004), trust (Mercer 2005b), or the desire for justice (Rabin 2002; Welch 
1993b) are key variables that help us to determine actors’ domains. 
 
Mercer uses the analysis offered by Farnham (1997) about World War II to show how 
emotions affected politicians’ choices. Farnham finds that feelings can lead us to 
reframe the way we initially structure a situation and therefore how it affects our final 
decisions. He states that President Franklin D. Roosevelt considered that the European 
conflict was not acceptable. Farnham indicates that since this crisis was not directly 
affecting the US, Roosevelt considered that there was no reason for them to 
participate. Although Americans were convinced that the crisis was surely going to 
become a war, they were also confident that Allies could easily put an end to the 
German ambitions.  
 
However, the reports from the battlefield affected the president emotionally. Germany 
was advancing and taking control of Allied positions. Germans became a real risk, not 
only for Europe but also for the United States 60 . As a consequence, Roosevelt 
reframed the war as a loss for Europe and for American interests. Farnham’s analysis 
shows that people define their choices during the development of the events. It implies 
that they are not hierarchical and stable (Mercer 2005a; Shafir and LeBoeuf 2002). “It 
was not about complex ideas, heuristics or dry information that explains how Roosevelt 
defined his domain, but feelings, mood, and the affect-laden reports of imminent war” 
(Mercer 2005a, p. 10).  
 
Mercer states that emotions can also lead people to take extreme decisions. By using 
the analysis of Welch (1993b), he demonstrates that emotions such as the feeling of 
injustice can trigger risky behaviour. In particular, Welch considers that policy-makers 
tend to behave in a very passionate way when they discuss social policies. For 
example, when governments do not adequately protect vulnerable groups, political 
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actors have a tendency to fiercely defend these social groups against the omission of 
the government. Another feature is that people’s negative emotions tend to have 
greater impacts than positive emotions (Frijda 1988). This is because people adapt 
more rapidly to gains than to losses (see section 2.3.2.). Consequently, individuals 
react in an asymmetric form to pain and pleasure. A painful situation will place 
individuals in the domain of losses.  
 
According to Mercer (2005a), these five techniques offer an innovative methodological 
framework to determine how people frame their environments. He acknowledges that 
these mechanisms have limitations but solve the problem of the application of PT to 
political science. “Anyone uncomfortable with these hedges should switch to 
mathematics, stay in the lab or simply assume an actor’s domain and be done with it” 
(Mercer 2005a, p. 11).   
 
3.3.3.2. Problem 2: The Aggregation Problem 
The second problem that explains the lack of interest in prospect theory by political 
scientists is the “aggregation problem”. This term was coined by Levy (1997) and refers 
to the limitation of PT in its application in collective decision-making. Kahneman and 
Tversky developed prospect theory by considering the evidence of individual decision-
making, not group decision-making (Levy 2003). However, Vis (2009a) solves the 
aggregation problem by offering evidence that demonstrates why PT can be applied to 
both kinds of decision levels. 
 
Vis states that this problem can be avoided when political systems are highly 
concentrated. In other words, individual decision-making becomes collective decision-
making when a player holds almost absolute power. For instance, Germany’s political 
and economic system was strongly controlled by Hitler during the Nazi regime (Levy 
1997). Another interesting case is found in Mexico, where the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) ruled the country for seventy years. Llosa (1990) called 
Mexico’s political system the “perfect dictatorship”. In this regime, the Mexican 
president was seen as the only person who could make any decision about the socio-
economic destiny of the country.  
 
Vis (2009a) considers that for some studies the collective decision-making process 
plays a fundamental role, which means researchers have to deal with the aggregation 
problem. She states that this limitation is not as complex as it seems. According to her 
study, there is a significant amount of experimental and empirical evidence that 
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confirms that, in many instances, group and individual behaviour are similar. For 
instance, Bowman (1980) finds that firms from eleven industrial sectors took risky 
decisions when they were experiencing losses. Similarly, Fiegenbaum and Thomas 
(1998) demonstrate that companies (2,322) from different industries (47) showed risky 
behaviour when they were failing to reach the target returns on equity (ROEs). On the 
other hand, when companies were successful in reaching this indicator they were risk 
averse.  
 
Vis states that collective decision-making is more consistent with PT than individual 
decision-making. She confirms it by analysing Whyte’s (1993) research, which is based 
on an experimental study that analysed how people reacted to six investment decision 
situations. In particular, Whyte explores the “escalating commitment” phenomenon by 
using PT at the individual and group decision-making levels. Escalating commitment 
occurs when decision-makers continue to adhere to an investment plan which has 
been considered unsuccessful. Thus, this incorrect decision is carried out despite it 
costing the decision-makers a considerable amount of economic resources. The key 
reason behind the willingness to continue to invest in such a plan is clearly found in the 
expression “too much invested to quit” (Teger 1980). It is also related to concepts of 
“sunk costs” (Thaler 1980), “entrapment” (Brockner and Rubin 1985) and the “dead 
loss effect” (Kahneman and Tversky 1984).  
 
The six hypothetical situations were associated with specific investment problems. For 
example, scenarios 1, 3 and 5 were based on the following statements: “a bank vice-
president who must decide whether to make a high-risk loan to protect an earlier 
investment”; “an investor in the stock market who must decide whether to sell shares 
that have declined in value and likely will decline some more”; and “a senior public 
official who must decide whether to close an expensive but superfluous airport” (Whyte 
1993, p. 439). Whyte found that escalating commitment was present at the collective 
and individual decision-making levels. Interestingly, in some cases, groups behaved 
much better than individuals in decision-making. Collective decision-making was also 
more consistent with prospect theory, because it paid more attention to sunk costs (see 
Section 3.3.2.2). Vis (2009a) states that since sunk costs are a key factor in political 
players’ decision-making processes, PT represents an adequate method to analyse 
such behaviour. 
 
Kühberger (1998) proposes another study that Vis uses to demonstrate that individual 
and group behaviour are strongly correlated. The research employs a meta-data 
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analysis that consists of a data pool of 136 studies that empirically explore the framing 
effects of 30,000 individuals. Kühberger evaluates how framing effects are structured 
under different research designs. According to Tversky and Kahneman (1981, p. 453), 
framing is the “decision-maker’s conception of acts, outcomes and contingencies 
associated with a particular choice. The frame that a decision-maker adopts is 
controlled partly by the formulation of the problem and partly by the norms, habits, and 
personal characteristics of the decision-maker”. In terms of the results on framing 
groups, he finds that individual and group studies have similar effect sizes. In other 
words, the way that people frame their choices in collective decision-making has the 
same characteristics as decisions made at the individual level.  
 
In conclusion, although PT was originally developed as an individual decision-making 
theory, the review presented in this chapter shows that PT can also be applied to group 
decision-making in many cases. At the individual level, “the aggregation problem per 
definition” (Vis 2009a, p. 9) does not represent a limitation to the application of PT. In 
the case of the collective level (e.g. decisions made within cabinets, groups of advisers, 
etc.), the diverse evidence found in experiments, meta-analyses and empirical data 
confirm that such behaviour is compatible with individual decisions (Vis 2009a).  
 
3.3.4. Key Applications of Prospect Theory in Political Science 
This section provides an analysis of a selection of recent and key PT applications in 
political science. We consider that it is important to show how scholars have 
successfully applied PT to different political phenomena and how they designed 
specific methodological frameworks to operationalise the PT findings. Recall that PT 
requires knowing people’s domains (gains or losses) in order to predict their risk 
propensity. Thus, their methodologies serve as input for PT. We offer a discussion of 
PT applications in welfare state reforms developed by Vis (2010), politics of market 
reforms in Latin American economies by Weyland (2002) and three case studies in 
international politics by McDermott (1998). These works show the explanatory and 
predictive power of PT and how this theory is fully in line with political behaviour.   
 
3.3.4.1. Prospect Theory and Welfare State Reform 
Vis (2010) offers a very interesting application of PT to the case of welfare state 
reforms in some advanced economies. She considers that the current literature about 
the study of welfare state reform only focuses its attention on explaining why some 
economies reform more than others. Such literature excludes the analysis of the 
governments’ decision-making processes as a mechanism for explaining the dynamics 
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of welfare state reforms. For example, Vis states that “partisanship” theories do not 
fully explore this behaviour. These theoretical frameworks consider that right-wing 
governments tend to favour welfare state cutbacks and strongly reduce the support for 
labour market policies. On the other hand, left-wing governments tend to strengthen 
such policies. However, Vis indicates that factors such as the current scenario of 
“permanent austerity” (Pierson 2001) do not allow left-wing governments to easily 
favour spending. This means that leftist and rightist governments will be at some point 
forced to carry out drastic economic measures and therefore affect their society’s 
interests. The consequences of implementing these policies will be reflected in the 
elections when voters punish their governments. In this way, partisanship theories are 
incomplete, because they do not state under what situations governments decide to 
apply risky and unpopular reforms.  
 
The “socio-economic” arguments are another method to understand welfare state 
reforms. This approach considers that social and economic variations (e.g. a sharp 
decline in the industrial sector, high unemployment levels) lead countries to implement 
reforms. This argument clearly explains why some economies reform more than others 
(Bonoli 2007). However, why do some countries not immediately react when the 
economy is experiencing an adverse scenario such as a high unemployment level (Vis 
2009b)? Why do other governments have an instant response when they face a similar 
situation? “The socio-economic account identifies, so to speak, what loads the gun for 
reform (socio-economic problems), but fails to pinpoint what triggers this gun off” (Vis 
2009b, p. 397). Similarly, the “crisis approach” has the same limitations. This literature 
states that socio-economic shocks lead governments to reform (Rodrik 1996). Vis 
(2009b) states that this theoretical framework has restrictions, because it does not 
indicate when crises will lead to political action. It also fails to specify when the costs of 
waiting to apply the reform will be higher than its benefits. 
 
Vis’ research asks the following questions: 1) “Why are some British, Danish, Dutch, 
and German governments willing to accept the great electoral risk involved in 
unpopular reform, while other governments refrain from pursuing unpopular policies? 2) 
Can insights from prospect theory also help to account for the puzzling variation across 
governments in welfare state reform? And can these insights help to explain what 
drives governments’ behaviour in such reform?” (Vis 2009a, p. 13) The answer to the 
last two questions is yes61. 
                                                          
61
 Ibid. 
62 
 
In order to determine the governments’ domains, Vis structured a methodological 
framework based on a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). A fuzzy-set 
is a “fine-grained, [pseudo] continual measure ... carefully calibrated using substantive 
and theoretical knowledge relevant to set membership” (Ragin 2000, p. 7). This method 
allowed her to define the sufficient conditions that led these European governments to 
implement unpopular reforms (benefit cutbacks). She employs data on labour market 
policies applied by 23 British, Danish, Dutch and German governments from 1979 to 
2005. She finds that in most of the evaluated countries, their socio-economic conditions 
and their political gains and losses play a decisive role in welfare state reforms. 
Consequently, deteriorating scenarios (losses) trigger unpopular reforms. The key 
difference between this finding and the crisis argument is that a country’s difficult 
situation is not enough to reform. For example, Spain has experienced unemployment 
levels above 10%, but this factor has not motivated the government to make that 
choice (Vis 2009a).  
 
Her study also finds that deteriorating socio-economic conditions lead to benefit 
cutbacks if one of two factors is present: a deteriorating political position, or a right-
wing government. This is an interesting finding, because the common idea is that 
governments will easily reform when they are politically strong. PT states the opposite 
argument; it considers that governments will carry out risky unpopular reforms when 
they are in a deteriorating political situation, which means they are in the domain of 
losses. Vis indicates that when governments’ political opposition gets stronger (e.g. 
electoral victories) it also puts them in the domain of losses.  
 
3.3.4.2. Prospect Theory and the Politics of Market Reform in Latin American 
Economies 
Weyland (2002) provides another important application of PT to political science. He 
analyses how political leaders implemented very risky neo-liberal adjustment policies in 
Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela. Similarly to Vis (2010), Weyland states that 
under specific circumstances, the current literature on the politics of economic 
adjustment does not give convincing explanations of determined phenomena. In 
particular, he points out that the “economic structuralism”, “political institutionalism”, 
“ideational theories”, and “rational-choice theories” provide key contributions, but they 
also have lacunae. 
 
The economic structuralism considers that developing countries implemented market 
reforms because international financial institutions (IFIs), more specifically 
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organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
forced them to. Weyland states that in the case of Latin American countries, the debt 
problems generated during the beginning of the 1980s, originally when the Mexican 
government declared its illiquidity, led them to accept a structural adjustment package 
called the “Washington Consensus” (Williamson 1990). However, he agrees with 
Stallings (1992), who states that “markets” and “leverage” did not influence 
governments’ decisions. This is because governments reacted at the end of the 
decade and not when the debt crisis occurred, between 1982 and 1983 (Weyland 
2002). This means that IFI policies were ignored. “Why did Latin American 
governments suddenly decide to listen?” (Weyland 2002, p. 20.)  
 
When countries decided to implement their reforms, such policies were different from 
the Washington Consensus. According to the author’s interviews (interview with Mello 
1995, Cavallo 1997 and Llach 1997), which were applied to key economic decision-
makers from these four countries, their adjustment policies were more painful than the 
IFI recipes and were prepared by domestic economists. For example, Argentina’s 1991 
convertibility strategy and President Collor’s first adjustment plan were structured by 
local policy-makers. The IFIs were concerned about possible strong social reactions 
against the governments’ decisions and advised them to be prepared for it (author’s 
interviews with Boloña 1996, Rodríguez 1996 and Naím 1993). This situation reveals 
that these governments were independent of external pressures. Consequently, 
economic structuralist arguments fail to explain the motivations that led these countries 
to take drastic economic measures62. 
 
Political institutionalism theories state that governments tend to implement severe 
adjustment policies because of their strong institutional structures. For example, 
governments that enjoy a centralised political system with a centripetal political 
opposition are easily able to impose drastic economic measures and control opposition 
groups (Weyland 2002). This approach also states that “long-established and 
consolidated democracies” (Weyland 2002, p. 23) are more likely to apply orthodox 
adjustment policies. Conversely, countries that have just moved from an authoritarian 
to a democratic political system tend to have more limitations in terms of imposing 
adjustment mechanisms (Kaufman and Stallings 1989; Haggard and Kaufman 1989). 
New democracies prefer heterodox policies that can stabilise their economies without 
high costs to society (Weyland 2002).  
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Weyland indicates that political institutionalism cannot explain why these countries 
decided to adopt orthodox strategies. This is because the economies’ political 
structures were unstable and not aligned with the central government. For instance, the 
majority in Congress was unwilling to support President Fujimori (Peru). Moreover, his 
party was not politically well organised and therefore it could not adequately strengthen 
the president’s plans. In the case of the governments of Argentina, Brazil and 
Venezuela, their negotiating capacity levels were not strong enough to obtain support 
from other political actors to benefit their reforms. This evidence confirms that the 
political institutionalism argument has restrictions in explaining what triggered the 
application of adjustment policies63.  
 
According to Weyland, rational choice models can be divided into two groups: 
economic-distributional models and political decision models. The first category was 
developed by economists and focuses its attention on explaining rationally why the 
distributional benefits of adjustment polices are delayed. One of the key reasons that 
lead governments to postpone these reforms is caused by a “war of attrition” (Alesina 
and Drazen 1991). It is generated by the actors’ unwillingness to accept the political 
costs of such policies. The policies are applied finally when one of the players does not 
want to continue with this game or is politically defeated (Weyland 2002).  
 
Another explanatory variable in this category is the economic crisis factor. Rodrik 
(1994) states that deep crises trigger drastic economic adjustment. In other words, it 
occurs when the collective gains of stabilisation outweigh its distributional costs 
(Weyland 2002). Although these theories offer a good explanation, they ignore the high 
uncertainty levels that surround the adjustment reforms. For instance, these 
distributional models underestimate the social and political impacts of crises and 
reforms. Consequently, the role of political parties, politicians and other state structures 
are excluded from the analysis. The economic-distributional approach is a one-
dimensional perspective.64       
 
In the case of political decision models, Geddes (1994) proposes a very important 
methodology. It states that radical stabilisation mechanisms are applied when “political 
outsiders” emerge. These outsiders impose these measures because their objective is 
to reduce the incumbents’ errors in policy-making. Since they promise to put an end to 
the crises, people support them. Moreover, they prefer to pay the cost of stabilisation in 
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order to make neo-liberal reforms irreversible (Przeworski 1991). For example, 
Presidents Alberto Fujimori, Carlos Menem, Fernando Collor and Carlos Andrés Pérez 
were relative newcomers and carried out radical market reforms. The problem with this 
approach is that it does not state under what conditions outsiders emerge and why 
people opt for these risky candidates and their risky policies (Weyland 2002).     
 
Weyland’s research design is based mainly on extensive fieldwork. He interviewed key 
decision-makers from these four Latin American countries. The interviews provided 
information on the decision-making processes of the structural reforms’. Moreover, his 
analysis employs statistical data and information about key events that strongly 
influenced individuals’ perceptions. This allowed him to identify their domains in PT’s 
value function. Data and information about the structural reforms cover the 1980s and 
1990s.    
 
The central cognitive-psychological findings of his research are interesting. He finds 
that market reforms were applied shortly after the presidents took office. The 
deteriorating conditions that these countries were experiencing led them to immediately 
respond. More specifically, these economies were strongly hit by uncontrolled 
hyperinflation that reached over 50% per month65. Not only were the political leaders in 
the domain of losses but the public was also affected enormously by such declining 
conditions. As a result, and surprisingly, there were no severe social uprisings against 
the governments’ risky policies. Since people were in the domain of losses, they voted 
for the outsiders who represented the risky choices. People opted for relatively 
unknown candidates that were not connected with the incumbent presidents.  
 
Conversely, Venezuela showed a different picture. Since this country had moderate 
inflation and the government hid part of the information about the economic crisis, 
people did not accept the market reforms. This situation triggered violent protests 
against the government’s decisions.  
 
3.3.4.3. Prospect Theory and International Politics 
Our third analysis is based on the PT application developed by McDermott (1998). It 
attempts to explain why countries take “crazy risks” (McDermott 1998, p. 2). Her study 
focuses on exploring the cases of the Iranian hostage rescue mission, the decision-
                                                          
65
 Ibid. 
66 
 
making processes about the 1979 admission of the Shah of Iran to the US, the 1960 U-
2 crisis, and the 1956 Suez crisis. 
 
McDermott states that one of the key factors that have been ignored is how risk-taking 
behaviour originates. For example, in international relations it is very important to 
understand what triggers wars or what deters countries from engaging in such conflicts. 
Political players always face these kinds of decisions involving high risk levels, 
incomplete information, limited time and high stress. In this way, prospect theory 
effectively captures all these elements, which are inherent in these choices, whereas 
other conventional analyses lack convincing explanatory arguments.  
 
PT provides an organised way “to both explain and predict risk propensity” (McDermott 
1998, p. 4). PT can explain the causal factors behind particular choices and predicts 
that individuals will adopt cautious behaviour when they are satisfied with their status 
quo (gains), whereas take risks when they are in bad situations. This means that PT 
can predict risk tendency given a prior definition of the domain66. The author states that 
this explanatory and predictive technique constitutes a very powerful alternative for 
exploring highly complex uncertain decision-making processes in situations of risk. 
 
McDermott’s study uses PT as its methodological framework. She indicates that her 
work is a “parallel demonstration of theory” (Skocpol and Somers 1980, p. 175). In 
other words, the objective of her analysis is to test PT arguments in different historical 
events and consequently confirm its applicability in international politics. This technique 
allowed her to strengthen the development of the theory. In terms of her 
methodological structure, she studies the decision-making processes of two American 
presidents in both PT domains (gains and losses). The idea was to find variations in 
their risk propensities and therefore see if such differences were in line with PT 
predictions.  
 
President Eisenhower (1953–1961) and Carter (1977–1981) were the two decision-
makers analysed by McDermott. The empirical model’s independent variable is a 
domain which takes the form of gains or losses relative to a reference point. The 
dependent variable is risk propensity, which can be either risk aversion or risk seeking. 
The information used to determine the presidents’ domains was based on interviews, 
memoirs, economic indicators, public opinion polls, important international events, 
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newspaper editorials, public opinion and other archival material67. She selected the 
United States because it offers a very good case of a hegemonic status after World 
War II.    
 
In the case of the Iranian hostage rescue mission, McDermott concludes that this 
tactical operation failed because of President Carter’s bad decision-making process. 
When Carter decided to rescue the 53 American hostages in Iran68, his administration 
was experiencing extremely adverse conditions. The public, the political opposition and 
the international community (including the United Nations) were severely criticising how 
the government was handling Iran-US relations. This means that Carter’s 
administration was in the domain of losses. As a result, he took the riskiest choice69, 
which consisted of sending military personnel to the site where the hostages were held. 
However, one of the helicopters had an accident and eight people died; the mission 
was suspended. He opted for the decision that was going to allow him to recover the 
previous losses and therefore obtain the status quo ante 70 . The hostages were 
released after the negotiations ended during the first two minutes of Ronald Reagan’s 
administration.           
 
The second event studied by McDermott (1998) was the decision-making process 
behind the admittance of the Iranian Shah71 into the US. Her research shows how 
President Carter had erratic behaviour in this international case. PT demonstrated that 
the reason that Carter did not allow the Shah to enter the US was because the 
president was in the domain of gains. Positive internal and external (e.g. the Panama 
treaties were successful) political situations led him to take a cautious option (the 
denial of entry to American territory). Then, when Carter saw that his political situation 
was strongly deteriorating, he shifted his position to the domain of losses. On 23rd 
October 1979, the president took the risky choice of allowing the Shah to have medical 
treatment in the US. This decision caused enormous losses for Carter’s administration 
and the country itself. Iranian militants used Carter’s decision as an ostensible excuse 
for the seizure of 53 American citizens.  
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The 1960 U-2 espionage affair offers another excellent example of how decision-
making processes coincide with PT. In 1956, President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
approved an intelligence mission that consisted of carrying out secret overflights in the 
former Soviet Union by a U-2 airplane. According to McDermott, Eisenhower was in the 
domain of gains since the U-2 programme started and knew the risks involved in such 
an operation. However, on 1st May 1960, the plane was shot down by Soviet armed 
forces. This event moved the American president to the domain of losses. So he 
decided to implement a risky and badly planned cover-up strategy. Eisenhower 
understood that he could face a very serious scenario if his spying game was revealed. 
The web of lies he used to protect his public credibility was uncovered. This decision 
led Soviets to take severe measures against the US such as the cancellation of an 
important summit meeting with the Americans and their allies (the United Kingdom and 
France); this scandal worsened the Cold War between these two countries. Had the 
cover-up succeeded, the secret of the US espionage programmes would have 
continued.                 
 
Finally, PT shows why, in the 1956 Suez crisis, governments took different decisions. 
On 26th July 1956, Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser decided to nationalise the 
Suez Canal. This situation angered the British and French governments, who saw that 
their economic and colonial interests would be affected enormously by such a decision. 
The nationalisation placed these European governments in the domain of losses. 
Moreover, and interestingly, the British and French perceived Nasser as “a modern-day 
Hitler” (McDermott 1998, p. 148). This “analogy” and their economic losses pushed 
Eden and Mollet deeper into the domain of losses. Their risky decision took the form of 
military action against Egypt. 
 
British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and French Prime Minister Guy Mollet attempted 
to persuade President Eisenhower to join them in order to recover the Canal. However, 
the American president was in the domain of gains and therefore he did not support 
them. The strong internal popularity of Eisenhower during this event and the lack of 
American economic interests in the Canal led him to take a cautious role. In addition, 
he was convinced that Egypt’s new status quo (the nationalisation of the Suez Canal) 
was acceptable72, whereas Eden and Mollet tried to re-establish the old SQ. The risky 
and costly operation carried out by the Europeans completely failed73.  
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McDermott (1998) concludes that the PT application to these four case studies 
demonstrates the theory’s explanatory and predictive power. She states that the 
“dynamic nature of its predictions” (McDermott 1998, p. 176) allows researchers to 
explore actors’ decision-making processes over time. For example, PT can predict that 
in determined situations, people will attempt to recoup sunk costs and therefore 
engage in riskier behaviour. Conventional theories of decision-making such as rational 
choice models have limitations in these kinds of situations. 
 
3.4. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has presented prospect theory as a very strong alternative to conventional 
decision-making theories. The empirical evidence of the violations of the expected 
utility axioms demonstrate that normative models fail to explain how people make 
decisions. The problem with expected utility models is that their objective is to describe 
what individuals “ought to do”, whereas descriptive theories such as PT focus on what 
individuals “actually are doing”. Any analysis that considers that expected utility models 
are superior to prospect theory must find evidence against “prospect theory’s 
devastating criticisms of rational choice’s descriptive inaccuracies” (McDermott 1998, 
p. 14).  
 
Contrary to expected utility theory, prospect theory has two phases of decision-making: 
editing (framing) and evaluation. In the case of the evaluation phase, we showed that 
the value function is the backbone of the theory, because it states people’s risk 
propensity under determined conditions. If people are in the domain of gains, they will 
behave in a cautious way. Conversely, if people are in the domain of losses, they will 
make very risky decisions. This dynamic mechanism can be used to explain the causal 
factors behind decisions and predict risk tendency prior to the definition of people’s 
domain. Another PT finding that cannot be found in rational models is the “strategic 
framing” argument.  
 
This chapter discussed the key problems that deter researchers from applying PT to 
political science. We showed that these limitations cannot be considered to be as 
problematic as they seem. Although PT is a “reference-dependent theory without a 
theory of reference point” (Levy 1997, p. 100), researchers’ ingenuity has solved this 
restriction. For example, the five techniques developed by Mercer (2005) allow us to 
define people’s domains. Similarly, the analysis of Vis (2009a) proves that collective 
decision-making is more consistent with PT. So the lack of interest in the application of 
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PT to political science can be caused by an unwillingness to use psychology as a 
methodological framework.  
 
Our analysis of the three PT applications to political science offered interesting 
information. These studies state that conventional theories do not offer convincing 
arguments about political decision-making. For example, the role of the International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) was not a key determinant that led some Latin American 
economies to apply very risky and costly structural reforms. PT found that deteriorating 
economic scenarios triggered governments to adopt such policies. In terms of 
international politics, we discussed how American presidents made risky decisions 
because they saw themselves in the domain of losses.  
 
Another remarkable element in the three PT applications was the different 
methodologies used to determine actors’ domains. Vis (2009a) employed a fuzzy-set 
qualitative comparative analysis to determine the adequate conditions that triggered 
unpopular reforms. Weyland (2002) and McDermott (1998) designed a methodological 
system based on statistical data, interviews, official reports, newspaper editorials, key 
events, public opinion polls, etc. As we can see, PT offers a flexible way to define 
people’s domains and therefore it is not a rigid theory of decision-making.      
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CHAPTER 4: THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR IN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
What were the motivations that led some developed and developing countries to carry 
out their electricity reforms? What kinds of electricity models were implemented? What 
are the elements of the electricity privatisation projects proposed by President Ernesto 
Zedillo (1994–2000) and President Vicente Fox (2000–2006)? This chapter answers 
these questions by presenting a review of the most important elements of such 
projects. Section 4.2 offers a discussion about the reasons behind electricity reforms in 
key economies. For instance, we discuss the reasons that led the British government to 
reform the electricity markets in England and Wales. The case of Chile is also 
reviewed, where the political conditions in the 1970s led to a radical change in the 
structure of its electricity industry, from public to private ownership.  
 
Section 4.3 reviews the electricity models applied by an important group of developed 
and developing countries. We analyse the British experiment, which has been 
considered to be a guiding model for other countries. One of its key features is the 
creation of the Electricity Pool. Countries such as Colombia based its electricity reform 
on the British system. Section 4.4 offers a discussion of the two electricity projects that 
have been presented by the Mexican government. We pay special attention to the Ley 
del Servicio Público de Energía Eléctrica (LSPEE) – Electricity Act – which is the law 
that has allowed private sector participation in electricity generation. However, the 
Mexican electricity industry is still a vertically integrated sector and is under public 
control. To allow private investors to freely participate in the industry, the Constitution 
must be modified.  
 
4.2. INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT FOR STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE 
ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
4.2.1. Determinants of Electricity Reform in Developed Countries 
Although developed economies started implementing electricity industry reforms in the 
early 1990s, the private sector had already participated in such industries. At the end of 
the nineteenth century, private capital played a fundamental role in the development of 
different industries (e.g. water and telephone services) in Europe, North America, 
Africa, Asia and some regions in South America (Kessides 2004). However, after World 
War II the structure of the electricity sector around the world changed. Countries 
72 
 
started modifying the industry from private to public ownership under different variation 
levels.  
 
According to Nawaal Gratwick and Eberhard (2008), this phenomenon was mainly 
caused by four factors. First, since the electricity industry has network characteristics, 
governments consider it to be a natural monopoly. A monopoly has the advantage of 
supplying goods or services less expensively than a market with multiple firms. This is 
because low average costs lead to a higher production level (Joskow and 
Schmalensee 1983). As a result, governments considered that a natural monopoly 
under a public ownership structure was the best option in order to protect people from 
the opportunistic behaviour of companies.  
 
Secondly, since electricity generation requires large amounts of capital to maintain the 
generators’ economies of scale, public ownership was the solution to reach such an 
objective. Thirdly, the three productive processes in the electricity industry can only be 
fully coordinated by a public company. Finally, the authors consider that the strategic 
characteristics of the electricity industry led governments to keep it as a public 
organisation. For instance, governments are able to use it as a trigger for developing 
their economies’ industrial sector (Yergin and Stanislaw 2002). 
 
In this way, Nawaal Gratwich and Eberhard indicate that during the 1970s and the 
1980s, the public ownership approach was severely questioned. They state that the 
factors that influenced governments to leave the status quo can be structured into five 
elements. First, ideology played a key role in forcing governments to move away from 
public ownership. Secondly, the development of new technology such as combined 
cycle generators (fuelled by gas), lowered electricity plants’ capital costs. Jamasb et al. 
(2004) and Thomas (2003) state that although the old model (monopoly) had different 
theoretical advantages, there were a high number of practical problems that affected 
such a system. For instance, utilities lacked control over costs and governments 
overinvested to prevent electricity shortages (Thomas 2003).  
 
Thirdly, the emergence of information and communication technologies gave 
policymakers the opportunity to control the three electricity processes (generation, 
transmission and distribution) without a vertical integration scheme. Fourth, the strong 
regulation on vertically integrated utilities was not considered efficient (Bacon 1995). 
Jamasb et al. (2004) state that the driving element that led developed countries to carry 
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out electricity sector reforms was the improvement of the industry’s economic and 
financial performance. 
 
4.2.1.1. United Kingdom (England and Wales) 
In the particular case of the United Kingdom, the main reason to privatise its electricity 
system was ideological (Bunn 1994; Newbery 1997). Pollitt (2002) considers that the 
electricity reform in the UK was mainly based on theoretical arguments related to 
property rights, bureaucracy, influence theories, economic regulation theories and 
commitment theories. These perspectives can be reflected in a speech by Nigel 
Lawson, who was the Chancellor of the Exchequer during the Thatcher administration: 
“the Conservative Party has never believed that the business of government is the 
government of business” (Newbery 1997, p. 3).  
 
Similarly, Newbery and Pollitt (1997) indicate that the electricity model (in England and 
Wales) that was publicly controlled from 1948 to 1990 was a typical case of a cost-of-
service regulated utility with extremely high capital costs and with a strong dependence 
on high-cost coal. Moreover, they point out that there were interests that were difficult 
to control under a public ownership structure. Groups such as the coal miners, the 
energy department, the treasury, large industrial consumers and the sector itself were 
affecting the sector’s efficiency. 
 
In terms of the political dynamics, the electricity privatisation plan was firstly announced 
in the Conservative Party Manifesto of 1987. The decision to reform the electricity 
supply industry led to a tense discussion between the government, political parties and 
very strong interest groups. There were groups such as the Central Electricity 
Generating Board (CEGB), the financial community, the British equipment supply 
industry, the nuclear power industry and the miners’ union that had to be conciliated 
(Midttun and Thomas 1998). Although there were fierce debates about electricity 
reform, the power of the Conservatives in Parliament and the strength of the Cabinet 
blocked opposition groups (Bortolotti and Pinotti 2004). Thus, the reform was approved 
on 1st April 1990 (known as Vesting Day).   
 
4.2.1.2. Norway 
Norway was the second European economy to liberalise its electricity industry. The 
main factor that led the government to reform this sector was its dissatisfaction with the 
pricing system and the way the investments were handled. Moreover, the British 
electricity experiment and the reform initiatives that the EU was still preparing 
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motivated the Norwegian government to design its own economic project. So the 
ministries of finance and energy worked together with the Norwegian School of 
Economics and Business Administration to structure a reform proposal (Midttun 1996). 
     
The political debate on electricity reform was not a complex issue in Norway. Although 
some political segments in Parliament were not strongly convinced about the proposal, 
they voted in favour of the government’s economic reform74. According to Midttun and 
Thomas (1998), one of the reasons that the reform was politically supported was the 
country’s free market tradition. This situation can be reflected in a statement by a 
government representative in the Norwegian parliament: “More market and less 
regulation is a principle that gains more and more approval in industrialised countries, 
irrespective of ideological point of departure and political mode of governance” (Midttun 
1996, p. 53). Moreover, since the reform had a discreet ideological and political profile 
(Midttun and Thomas 1998), political actors were able to reach agreements, and 
therefore Parliament (Storting) approved it in June 1990. This condition did not 
motivate interest groups to block the electricity reform75.     
 
4.2.1.3. European Union 
The British reform was seen as an attractive policy in other European countries. In fact, 
the motivation for reforming the electricity sectors in the European Union (EU) was 
similar to the British case. Pollitt (2009) states that the European Commission’s 
theoretical objective was to implement a reform based on the theory of the competitive 
markets. This means that the purpose of the reforms was to develop a market structure 
with competing electricity generators and retailing companies. The decision to reform 
the electricity industry by the EU came after Norway liberalised its electricity sector.  
 
Although the EU finally decided to liberalise its electricity markets in 1996, there were 
different discussions about the structure of the reform proposals between the EU 
members. For instance, the socialist group in the European Parliament was concerned 
about the adequate conditions for guaranteeing the electricity supply to member states 
(Eising 2002). Countries such as Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Spain were not entirely satisfied with the reform, because they considered that such a 
policy was going to negatively affect the economic conditions of their sectors76.  
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4.2.1.4. United States 
The US electricity market has traditionally been under private ownership for many 
years77. More specifically, electricity was supplied by regional monopolies that owned 
the power generators and the transmission lines for electricity distribution. In exchange 
for allowing these utilities to have monopoly power over electricity customers, states 
strongly regulated them. During the 1980s, under this structure there were efforts from 
the government to introduce more competition into the wholesale electricity market 
where the regulated vertically integrated monopolies were operating.  
 
One of these efforts materialised in the 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act 
(PURPA). This law had the objective of allowing independent power producers to build 
generators and sell electricity to utilities. Although PURPA was originally created to 
improve energy efficiency, it unintentionally encouraged deregulation in the American 
electricity supply industry (Bacon 1995). Unfortunately, these measures were unable to 
increase the competition level sufficiently because of the industry’s vertically integrated 
system (Joskow 2003).  
 
According to Joskow, during the twentieth century the US electricity sector was efficient 
on average. The industry enjoyed a high productivity rate and was very competitive 
compared to international standards in terms of production costs, labour productivity, 
etc. During the 1970s and 1980s, problems started to appear when fossil fuels, 
inflation, interest rates and nuclear plant costs increased considerably (Joskow 1974, 
1989). These events raised the real retail electricity prices. Although prices started to 
decline during the mid-1980s, the costly long-term contracts of nuclear investments 
continued to negatively affect retail prices.  
 
The states of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Maine and 
Pennsylvania were the main entities affected by high retail electricity prices. The 
political sector was thus interested in electricity reform. Other interest groups such as 
industrial customers and independent power producers were also promoting a change 
in the industry’s structure (White 1996). One of the reform supporters was Enron, which 
played a key role in motivating these pioneer states to deregulate their electricity 
markets (Joskow 2003). The selling argument promoted by this company to state 
regulators and legislators was that competition was going to radically reduce retail 
prices. The deregulation process was carried out during the 1990s by a series of 
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federal actions and decisions by the states. This debate led to the creation of laws that 
ordered the breaking up of monopolies. 
 
4.2.2. Determinants of Electricity Reform in Developing Countries 
The determinants of electricity reforms in developed and developing economies have 
been significantly different. There were macroeconomic conditions that led developing 
countries to reform their electricity supply industries. For example, the 1970s oil shocks 
affected countries in different ways. These shocks increased inflation levels and foreign 
debt. The negative macroeconomic and fiscal scenarios forced governments to 
implement radical structural reforms, which decreased public spending levels and 
promoted the participation of foreign investments in the economy (Williams and 
Ghanadan 2006).  
 
These factors put the energy sector at risk, particularly the electricity markets. 
According to Jhirad (1990), during the 1980s, the loans that were employed for energy 
projects represented 25% of developing countries’ total foreign debt service. Williams 
and Ghanadan (2006) consider that although some countries’ utilities were profitable, 
the public debt financing was not enough to meet future investment plans. This 
situation was caused by an expected increase in electricity demand from 471 to 844 
gigawatts (GW) during the 1990s. So, in order to satisfy such demand, governments 
needed 1 trillion USD, 100 billion USD per year (Williams and Ghanadan 2006; Jhirad 
1990; Dunkerley 1995). 
 
Under this context, international financial institutions and multilateral organisations 
played a key role. Institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) offered new loans for energy investment projects and to renegotiate 
developing countries’ foreign debt (Ruiz-Mendoza and Sheinbaum-Pardo 2010). This 
financial support was conditioned to determine recommendations that were based on 
the neo-liberal policies of the Washington Consensus. These recommendations were: 
a) countries need to attract foreign and domestic private capital; b) economies had to 
integrate their energy markets, which was a key condition for the development of a 
regional economic integration; c) countries had to increase their electrification rates; 
and d) countries had to develop mechanisms for increasing energy efficiency (Ruiz-
Mendoza and Sheinbaum-Pardo 2010; IADB 2000).     
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It is important to highlight that the World Bank’s role in the energy sector has always 
been very important. From 1947 to 1991, 15% (US$75 billion)78 of this organisation’s 
total loans were channelled into different energy projects (Nawaal, Gratwick and 
Eberhard 2008). Moreover, during the 1980s, 7% of the bank’s total financial resources 
for energy investment was provided to developing economies (World Bank 1993). As 
we can see, the World Bank played a key role in electricity reforms. This participation is 
reflected in one of the bank’s influential reports called “The World Bank’s Role in the 
Electric Power Sector”.  
 
This document provides a list of five recommendations (grouped under five principles) 
that also represent the prerequisites of the bank’s lending policy. These guiding 
principles can be summarised in the following points: countries have to structure a 
clear legal framework; developing countries have to import services (e.g. a well-
educated and trained labour force) from more advanced economies to improve their 
weak public and private sectors; and countries have to develop the corporatisation of 
the private sector participation in their energy industries. Countries with a strong 
commitment (in line with the above principles) to improve their electricity markets will 
have adequate financial support and the promotion (by the World Bank) of private 
investments in their electricity industries through different lending mechanisms (e.g. 
lending to financial intermediaries)79.           
 
4.2.2.1. Chile 
Electricity industry reforms in developing countries have been carried out under 
different economic, political and structural conditions. In this way, Chile constitutes an 
interesting case, because it was the first economy in the world that implemented reform 
of its electricity supply industry. The country’s political circumstances were the key 
factors that led to a complete change in Chile’s electricity model. More specifically, 
electricity reform was one of the consequences of the overthrow of President Salvador 
Allende (1970-1973) in a military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet.  
 
During Allende’s administration, many companies were nationalised, including banks 
and utilities, which represented 39% of the country’s GDP in 1973 (Pollitt 2005). When 
Pinochet assumed power in December 1974, he started implementing neo-liberal 
economic policies developed by Milton Friedman, Al Harberger and other key 
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economists from the University of Chicago80. All the companies that were nationalised 
by Allende were returned to the private sector. Moreover, in the 1980 Constitution, 
Pinochet strengthened the defence of property rights and commercial information 
against legislative and administrative abuses (Bitran and Serra 1998).    
 
The electricity reform was developed by Chicago economists. They designed the 
regulatory and legal structure, which was reflected in the 1982 Electricity Act. 
According to Pollitt (2005), Chilean officials visited the UK, Belgium and France to 
obtain some information about electricity reforms. Although these economies did not 
have enough experience of it, the Chilean authorities returned to their country with 
interesting ideas. For example, they returned with the idea of separating the electricity 
generation and distribution sectors. Another idea was the dispatch system based on a 
marginal cost structure81.       
 
4.2.2.2. Argentina 
The electricity market reform in Argentina was one of the key elements of the neo-
liberal project in Latin America (Haselip and Potter 2010). It started when Carlos 
Menem became the Argentinean president from the Peronist Party. Although Menem’s 
economic agenda focused initially on radical social reform, he changed his position and 
implemented a massive privatisation programme. Pollit (2004) considers that the 
reason behind such a policy change was the country’s hyperinflation. This privatisation 
programme sold 154 public companies in energy, railways, banking and other sectors. 
The sale of these companies generated US$18 billion (Shaikh 1996), which decreased 
the public debt and associated interest payments (Ennis and Pinto 2002).  
 
In terms of the electricity reform, the industry’s structural change started in 1989 with 
the Federal Electricity Pact. During 1990 and 1991, the electricity sector’s structure 
was designed by considering many aspects of the Chilean model with some 
adjustments. In April 1992, a new Electricity Law (24,065)82 was promulgated, which 
announced the separation and sale of the utilities, the creation of a wholesale electricity 
market and a regulator83. The reform was led by the Minister of Energy, Carlos Bastos, 
and was supported by the World Bank.  
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4.2.2.3. Brazil 
Similar to other developing and developed countries, Brazil followed the trend towards 
privatisation and deregulation of electricity markets. The Brazilian privatisation 
programme raised nearly US$90 billion, whereas the electricity privatisation generated 
US$15 billion alone (Gabriele 2004). Other factors put enormous pressure on the 
government to carry out electricity reform. For instance, the 1980s debt crisis and the 
country’s economic instability increased the inflation level. In order to control the 
inflation, the government applied different kinds of measures.  
 
One of these anti-inflationary mechanisms was implemented by the Ministry of 
Treasury, which artificially lowered electricity tariffs to keep inflation at a stable level 
(Mendonça and Dahl 1999). However, this mechanism and the loss of international 
credit negatively affected public investment in the electricity industry (Oliveira and 
Araújo 1996), and therefore this sector experienced a severe crisis. The reform 
process started in 1993 with Law 8631, and from 1993 to 1995 the State established 
the new administrative and institutional rules that facilitated the privatisation process. 
Law 9648 and Decree 2655 announced the formation of a wholesale electricity market 
(Ruiz-Mendoza and Sheinbaum-Pardo 2010). Unlike Argentina and Chile, the Brazilian 
electricity reforms were gradual and more cautious.84      
 
4.2.2.4. Colombia 
Finally, the Colombian electricity reform was also inspired by the previous neo-liberal 
experiments, mainly from the British (England and Wales) and Chilean cases (García 
and Dyner 2000). Additionally, the reform was triggered by an adverse scenario in the 
electricity industry. According to Larsen et al. (2004), there were three reasons that led 
the government to modify the country’s electricity model. Firstly, there were two key 
blackout periods (1983 and 1992–1993) that politically affected the government. So 
politicians had to find a solution to protect their political capital against these events 
that were unacceptable for voters. Secondly, to solve the blackout problems the 
government needed to expand the electricity system capacity. However, there were not 
enough economic resources for that operation, because resources had been 
channelled into anti-poverty programmes. Consequently, a private financing scheme 
was the ideal solution to this problem. Finally, to increase the efficiency levels of the 
generation capacity, deregulation and incentives for the private sector were needed.  
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In this way, the reform started in 1994 when Electricity Law No. 143 and Public 
Services Law No. 142 were officially approved (Ruiz-Mendoza and Sheinbaum-Pardo 
2010). These two laws announced the separation of the vertically integrated electricity 
system, competition among new electricity generators, promotion of private investment, 
development of the electricity pool market, creation of the regulatory framework and 
third-party access to transmission and distribution networks85.            
 
4.3. THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY MODELS 
4.3.1. The British Electricity Model 
Before privatisation, the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) operated the 
electricity market in England and Wales. The CEGB was one of the world’s largest 
electricity companies (55 GW of capacity in 1989) and controlled all the electricity 
generation and transmission systems (Green 1991). There were twelve regional area 
boards that distributed electricity to consumers in their respective areas. In other 
words, the CEGB and the regional boards had a monopoly over the wholesale market 
and the retail supply respectively (Vickers and Yarrow 1991b).  
 
Under the Electricity Act 1989, the vertically integrated state-owned Central Electricity 
Generating Board (CEGB), with its 74 electricity generators, was divided into four 
companies. National Power was given 60% of the generating capacity and the rest was 
given to PowerGen (Newbery 2004). The nuclear power stations were placed in 
Nuclear Electric, which was not initially privatised. It was kept under public ownership 
until 1996, when it was sold as British Energy (Newbery and Pollitt 1997). The 
distribution sector, operated by the twelve regional boards, was sold without any 
structural modification and they were renamed as regional electricity companies 
(RECs). The transmission sector, which was previously controlled by the CEGB, was 
placed in a new company called the National Grid Company (NGC). The NGC is 
owned by the RECs.  
 
The most interesting institutional transformation in the British electricity market was the 
design of the Electricity Pool (Newbery 2004). This system was introduced in 1990 but 
it had to be transformed because electricity prices did not substantially decrease. As a 
result, in 2001 the Pool was replaced by the New Electricity Trading Agreements 
(NETA), and in 2003 the British Electricity Trading and Transmission Agreements 
(BETTA) was introduced. Initially, the Pool’s objective was “a compulsory bulk 
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electricity spot market that determined the merit order and wholesale price of electricity 
in Britain” (Newbery 2004, p. 3). 
 
This new system operated on the basis of bids from the generators. Each day the 
generating companies had to indicate at what price they were willing to supply 
electricity and provide information on their power availability for each of their generating 
units. Companies had to carry out these operations in 48 half-hourly blocks over a 24-
hour period86. These bids had to be notified one day in advance to the National Grid 
Company (NGC), which was responsible for controlling this system. The NGC used this 
information to rank stations into merit order (Vickers and Yarrow 1991b). Conversely, 
before electricity reform, the CEGB used a merit order of increasing costs based on the 
stations’ costs (Green 1991).  
 
According to Thomas (2006a, p. 589) the wholesale electricity market principles can be 
summarised in the following way: “1) supply and demand was balanced every half 
hour; 2) all generators had to make a successful bid into the Pool to operate their 
plants; 3) the Pool price was the highest successful bid and paid to all successful 
bidders; and 4) retailers had to buy all their supplies from the Pool at Pool price”. The 
price that was paid to generators for supplying electricity to the Pool at a specific half 
hour was the pool input price (PIP). Vickers and Yarrow (1991b) state that this price 
was the result of two components.  
 
The first component was the system marginal price (SMP), which was the cost of the 
most expensive generator used in each half hour of the schedule (Green 1991; Bunn 
1994). It was based on the projected demand and ignored transmission constraints 
(Newbery 1999). The second component was a capacity factor, which was paid for all 
capacity that was considered available whether or not the generators supplied 
electricity to the system. 
 
However, the Pool experienced serious problems. The first problem was that electricity 
generators were able to restrict supply and therefore increase wholesale prices. This 
situation occurred after the system started its operations when there were few 
generators, particularly PowerGen and National Power (Pond 2006). In other words, 
there was price manipulation in the bidding process. This opportunistic behaviour 
allowed generators to artificially increase the Loss of Load Probability (LOLP) by taking 
                                                          
86
 Ibid. 
82 
 
generating sets out of service (Tovey 2003). The LOLP is a measure that indicates 
probabilistically that the demand will be met87. Another problem was that generators 
and electricity suppliers avoided the Pool by using long-term contracts, which were not 
linked to the Pool price, to carry out their sales and purchases (Thomas 2006a). These 
events led the Office of Electricity Regulation (OFFER) to force PowerGen and 
National Power to sell part of their electricity generating capacity to allow more 
companies to participate in the market (Tovey 2003).  
  
These problems in the Pool led the government to change the electricity market. In 
1997, New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) were introduced but did not 
actually start operating until 200188. NETA was created to promote competition in the 
wholesale electricity market. In other words, the government tried to decrease 
electricity prices and reduce the companies’ market power. NETA is based on bilateral 
trading between generators, suppliers, traders and customers (OFGEM 1999). 
 
 According to Thomas (2006a), NETA is a very complex system, but its principles are 
simple. For example, one of the characteristics of NETA is that it is based on long-term 
confidential contracts (not disclosed to regulators). Consequently, there is no “marker 
price” in NETA (Thomas 2006a). After the implementation of NETA, wholesale prices 
decreased by around 40% (Pond 2006). In April 2005, Scotland was incorporated into 
the electricity market under the British Electricity Trading and Transmission 
Agreements (BETTA), which is the expansion of NETA. The principles of this system 
were not modified and its objective is to have an integral wholesale market. 
 
The introduction of competition for final consumers is another key characteristic of the 
British model. The retail market was opened up to users in three phases (Pond 2006; 
Thomas 1998). The first phase occurred after privatisation, when industrial users who 
annually consumed more than 1 MW (around 5,000 customers) were able to buy 
electricity from any accredited supplier. In 1994, the number of users increased to 
50,000, when the limit was reduced to 100 kW (Pond 2006). Then, in 1999, the market 
was opened up to all domestic users (more than 26 million). The options available were 
any of the regional electricity companies (RECs) and new entrants (Thomas 1998). 
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The 1989 Electricity Act considered the creation of the Office of Electricity Regulation 
(OFFER), which was headed by the Director General of Electricity Supply (DGES). 
Professor Stephen Littlechild was the first person to hold this position. He was a key 
player in the regulatory policy-making in the telecommunications and water sectors 
(Vickers and Yarrow 1991b). The regulatory framework and its policies were based on 
previous mechanisms used in the telecommunications sector. One of these measures 
was the RPI (retail price index)-X system, where X is a productivity factor that is set by 
the regulator. The formula’s objective is to control the transmission and distribution 
prices (Pond 2006). Moreover, it encouraged companies to increase their efficiency 
levels and reduce costs89. Under this scheme, the National Grid Company and the 
regional companies could raise their prices at the inflation level minus an X factor 
(Littlechild 1983). In 1995, the formula was evaluated, so the X factor included the 
companies’ rate of investment. 
 
In 1999, OFFER became the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM), which 
was the result of the merger between the gas and electricity regulators. The new 
regulator was established under the Utilities Act of 2000. OFGEM implemented the 
same objectives as OFFER. In addition, this new regulator has the duty to grant 
permission for generation, transmission, supply and distribution activities. OFGEM also 
has the duty to protect vulnerable social groups (e.g. disabled and low-income people), 
individuals from rural areas and to control the effects of the electricity industry on the 
environment (Simmonds 2002).  
 
Finally, it is important to state that although the British electricity system has been 
promoted as a model by different countries and international organisations, there are 
different positions about the benefits of this market approach. For instance, Newbery 
and Pollitt (1997) state that the privatisation and restructuring of the Central Electricity 
Generating Board (CEGB) in England and Wales led to key benefits. They used a 
social-cost benefit analysis to study the British experiment. They found that the 
important benefits were connected to the efficiency gains from the generators, and the 
switch away from nuclear fuels and coal90. Domah and Pollitt (2002) applied the same 
methodology to analyse the twelve regional electricity companies. They found that the 
new electricity model benefited society, but these benefits were not uniformly 
distributed in the different social groups.  
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Conversely, there are scholars who are not completely convinced about the British 
model’s benefits. Thomas (2004) considers that the new market structure is controlled 
by confidential long-term contracts, and the generating and retail companies dominate 
the market. Moreover, vulnerable groups (e.g. poor people and small consumers) are 
not well protected under this system. Similarly, Thomas (2006a) states that the British 
model is used as the basis for electricity reforms in the world because it leads to 
reductions in real electricity prices. However, he states that the reforms that have been 
implemented in the electricity industry have failed in terms of creating an efficient and 
transparent wholesale market. In particular, this failure “places the onus on consumers 
to impose competitive forces on electricity companies by switching regularly” (Thomas 
2006a, p. 583). Thomas concludes that the good results in the British case are caused 
by three elements: 1) “Good luck, particularly extremely advantageous fossil fuel 
markets” (Thomas 2006a, p. 599); 2) an important progress in the nuclear plant’s 
performance; and 3) since the electricity industry was sold for “less than a half of its 
accounting value”, taxpayers transferred resources to electricity users.   
 
4.3.2. Electricity Market Model in Chile  
The electricity reform in Chile started under the 1982 Electricity Act, which describes 
the current legal structure of the Chilean electricity market. Endesa was one of the 
state-owned companies that controlled generation, transmission and distribution of 
electricity in Chile. This company was divided into fourteen companies: six generators, 
six distribution companies and two small companies that generated and distributed 
their own electricity. Another utility that was divided into three companies was 
Chilectra: a generator and two distribution firms (Pollitt 2005). At this time, Chile has 31 
generating firms, five transmission firms and 36 distribution firms. The lack of 
restrictions on foreign investors has allowed the free entry and exit of companies in the 
generation and transmission operations (Nagayama and Kashiwagi 2007).   
 
The electricity reform led to the creation of a market that consists of four regional 
independent systems: the Sistema Interconectado Central (Interconnected Central 
System – SIC), the Sistema Interconectado del Norte Grande (Norte Grande 
Interconnected System – SING) and two smaller sub-systems. The market is operated 
by the Centro de Despacho Económico de Carga (Economic Dispatch Load-Centre 
CDEC). The CDEC is managed by the most important generators and transmission 
firms. SIC covers the central and southern areas, whereas SING covers the country’s 
northern area. The system that operates in these markets requires generators to define 
their electricity availability and their marginal operating cost every hour.  
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According to Pollitt (2005), this information is used to determine the spot price (basic 
marginal electricity price), which is employed by the generators to carry out their 
trading operations among themselves. This price is strongly influenced by the water’s 
opportunity cost. In other words, it is mostly based on a hydroelectric system, which 
depends on Chile’s main reservoir, Las Lajas. There is a strong correlation between 
the spot price and the water level in that lake (Arango et al. 2006). In terms of 
regulation, the government created different organisations (Basañes et al. 1999). For 
example, the Comisión Nacional de Energía (National Energy Commission – CNE) has 
the objective (with the Ministry of Energy) of designing the electricity policy and 
establishing the regulated distribution charges. The Superintendencia de Electricidad y 
Combustibles (Superintendent of Prices of Electricity and Fuels – SEC) has the 
responsibility of obtaining information that is used to implement the regulatory policies 
efficiently, to respond to customer complaints and to apply fines for low quality services 
(Pollitt 2005).    
  
4.3.3. Electricity Market Model in Argentina 
The new structure of the Argentinean electricity market was based on the experiences 
in the United Kingdom and Chile. The idea of the horizontal-vertical unbundling of the 
sector was taken from the UK model. The open access wholesale system, the marginal 
cost pricing and the deregulation of large electricity consumers were based on the 
Chilean model (Besant-Jones 1996). Moreover, Argentina included new elements in its 
model which are related to the restriction of ownership concentration across (vertical) 
and within (horizontal) segments and the introduction of an electricity regulator 
(Estache and Rodriguez-Pardina 1996).      
 
Argentina’s largest utility, Servicios Eléctricos del Gran Buenos Aires (SEGBA), was 
divided into five generators and three distribution firms. Edenor (Empresa Distribuidora 
y Comercializadora Norte), Edesur (Empresa Distribuidora Sur) and Edelap (Empresa 
de Electricidad de la Plata) were the companies created from SEGBA. The country’s 
second largest utility was Agua y Energía Eléctrica (AyE), which had 16 generators, 
transmission networks and regional distribution firms. In 1993, these companies were 
sold and divided up (Pollitt 2008). In the same year, Hidroeléctrica Norpatagónica 
(Hidronor), which controlled hydro power stations in the Comahue area, was privatised. 
This operation included the granting of concessions for controlling the transmission 
grid, Compañía de Transporte de Energía Eléctrica de Alta Tensión (Transener).  
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According to Pollitt (2008), in 2001 there were more than 40 generation firms and 30 
distribution firms managed by private investors. The role of foreign investors has been 
an important element that has influenced the Argentinean electricity market. 
Companies such as AES (US), Endesa (Spain) and Total (France) are key players in 
electricity generation. Moreover, foreign investors have carried out other market 
operations. For instance, the British company National Grid purchased Transener, 
Edesur was taken over by Endesa and Edelap was purchased by AES91.    
 
The new wholesale electricity market (Mercado Eléctrico Mayorista – MEM) covers 
93% of the country’s electricity demand. The Mercado Eléctrico Mayorista del Sur de 
Patagonia (MEMSP) covers 6% of the market, and the rest of the demand is covered 
by other systems. MEM is controlled by Compañía Administradora del Mercado 
Mayorista Eléctrico SA (CAMMESA), which is a non-profit corporation owned by the 
federal government, electricity generators, brokers, large consumers, distributors and 
transmission firms (Bouille et al. 2002).  
 
CAMMESA has a cost-based electricity price determination system that works under a 
bidding structure. Nuclear and thermal generators have to submit their bids, indicating 
the price they are willing to accept and their available capacity (every hour for the next 
six months). Hydroelectricity power plants have to specify the value of water in their 
reservoirs (Pollitt 2008). Electricity transmission lines are operated under concession 
contracts of 95 years, which are renewed every 15 years. Similarly, electricity 
distribution is operated and regulated under contracts of 99 years92. The distribution 
concession contracts guarantee the electricity supply to all residential and small 
consumers, but at the same time, these contracts guarantee the concessionaires’ 
monopoly (Bouille et al. 2002).      
 
The Ente Nacional Regulador de la Electricidad (ENRE) was created to be responsible 
for the application of the regulatory policy. Bouille et al. (2002) state that this regulator 
has the objective of setting the transmission and distribution tariffs, protecting users’ 
rights, promoting competition in generation, applying laws for the transmission and 
distribution companies and promoting investments.  
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4.3.4. Electricity Market Model in Brazil 
Similar to other countries, the original structure of the Brazilian electricity model was 
based on a vertically integrated system. However, the government changed it under 
Law 8631, which considered the British electricity system as its initial model. The 
elements that were adopted from the UK were the industry regulator, the independent 
system operator, bilateral contracts, a spot market and unbundling of electricity 
generation, transmission, distribution and trading (Wanderley et al. 2011).   
 
The government created the Mercado Atacadista de Energía Eléctrica (MAE – Electric 
Energy Wholesale Market). This market allowed large consumers (10 MW and more 
than 2 MW since 2000) to buy electricity from generators and independent power 
producers (IPPs). Moreover, the MAE defines the spot price by using an optimisation 
model (Arango et al. 2006). In terms of regulation, the Agência Nacional de Energía 
Eléctrica (ANEEL – National Electricity Agency) was created and had the objective of 
preparing the technical analysis to meet quality standards, structuring transmission 
costs and applying tariff reviews in the retail market (Wanderley et al. 2011). 
 
However, the 2001 electricity crisis led to key changes in the Brazilian electricity 
system. The crisis was mainly caused by problems in the new electricity model. More 
specifically, this event was triggered by a lack of investment in generation capacity, a 
poor legal framework, an inadequate grid development and a lack of effective planning 
(Arango et al. 2006). Moreover, the reform process was severely criticised because it 
was completely disorganised. This means that the process did not have an adequate 
order; that is, to develop and apply the regulatory framework and after that to carry out 
the privatisation to allow foreign capital to participate in the electricity market 
(Wanderley et al. 2011).  
 
As a result, the government had to implement determined measures that attempted to 
rationalise the country’s electricity consumption from June 2001 to February 2002 (De 
Souza and Legey 2010). Some of these measures included information campaigns on 
television to promote energy rationalisation (Almeida and Pinto 2005). These 
conditions led the government to apply other reforms to shift its electricity policy. The 
2004 reform focused mainly on modifying the regulatory framework under Law 10847, 
Law 10848 and Decree 5163. According to Dutra and Menezes (2005), the framework 
has three main objectives: 1) to have an adequate electricity contracting system for 
captive consumers; 2) to supply electricity at low prices; and 3) to supply electricity to 
all socio-economic sectors around the country.   
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The above reforms also strengthened the role of the government in the electricity 
sector. In particular, the planning and policy-making processes were more centralised. 
Other elements that were considered in these reforms were the creation of two contract 
environments in the wholesale market: 1) Regulated Contracting Environment and 2) 
Free Contracting Environment. The first environment is connected with the wholesale 
power pool and its objective is to protect captive consumers. It is based on long-term 
contracts from 15 to 30 years between generators and distribution firms. The second 
environment allows large consumers (more than 3 MW) to freely choose their electricity 
suppliers.  
 
4.3.5. Electricity Market Model in Colombia 
In 1994, the government started to reform the country’s electricity market under Laws 
142 and 143. The new model had the objective to unbundle the public utilities’ 
electricity productive chain, to trigger private competition in generation and supply 
divisions, and allow third-party access to transmission and distribution systems (Ruiz-
Mendoza and Sheinbaum-Pardo 2010). Colombia used the British electricity system as 
its model, which was adapted to the country’s own needs. The reform included the 
creation of an electricity spot market (pool) and a regulatory framework. The 
Regulatory Commission for Electricity and Gas was created to control the electricity 
and gas sectors and to manage the interdependence between these two industries. 
 
Another key characteristic of the Colombian electricity reform is its mixed ownership 
structure. In other words, private and public investments can participate together in the 
market under the context of regional and central governments93. Larsen et al. (2004) 
state that the Colombian system allowed incumbents to maintain their productive 
operations as electricity generators and distributors. However, there were some 
important restrictions. For instance, distribution firms can only buy 60% of their 
electricity from a generator and the remaining 40% from other companies. Moreover, 
generators or suppliers cannot have a market share above 25% of the total94.    
 
One of the public utilities that was part of the privatisation process was the Empresa de 
Energía de Bogotá (EEB). This is a very important company because it supplies 
electricity to the capital of the country, Bogotá, and another 95 municipalities (Cavaliere 
et al. 2007). In 1996, Bogotá’s City Council and other organisations such as trade 
unions allowed the sale of 49% of the utility. The remaining 51% was kept under public 
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ownership to retain control over private investors. In other words, EEB changed from a 
municipally owned firm to a public limited firm. 
 
The electricity market is based on a price system. Firms submit bids to the system 
operator (Centro Nacional de Despacho – CND), which uses a merit system to 
dispatch electricity. There were also capacity payments that stimulated investment in 
the generation segment. These mechanisms are operated by the CND and mainly 
benefit thermo-electric plants. The Colombian electricity system is essentially 
structured by a huge hydroelectricity sector (70%) and is seen as one of the most open 
markets in the developing world (Arango et al. 2006; Larsen et al. 2004).    
 
4.3.6. Electricity Market Model in California 
California was one of the first US states to carry out important reforms in its electricity 
system. Consequently, it offers a good picture of such reforms in the American 
economy. In 1996, the state legislature approved the implementation of an electricity 
model that allowed retail competition, the creation of a wholesale market with an hourly 
spot market and a transmission-system operator. According to Woo (2001), the 
Californian model has four main characteristics: 1) a wholesale electricity market where 
buyers and sellers make supply and demand bids; 2) an independent system operator 
(ISO) that structures the wholesale market operations – the ISO carries out such 
activities by operating the high-voltage transmission owned by the T (transmission) and 
D (distribution) firms; 3) the T&D firms are regulated by the application of the rate-of-
return system. These companies have to provide unrestricted access to all users; and 
4) the retail market has to allow its customers to choose any electricity supplier. 
 
In this way, the Assembly Bill 1890 (AB 1890) is the key state law95 that provided the 
legal framework for introducing competition in California. For instance, the AB 1890 
called for the creation of two organisations: the California Power Exchange (PX)96 and 
the California Independent System Operator (ISO). According to Rotwell and Gómez 
(2003), the California PX was a non-profit organisation that had the objective of 
developing a wholesale spot market. Rotwell and Gómez state that the PX had three 
main characteristics: 1) it openly allowed suppliers and buyers to participate in the 
market; 2) the PX defined the electricity price for the day-ahead market and the hour-
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ahead/day-of97 markets – it used information on the bids submitted by PX players; and 
3) the three key Investor-Owned Utilities (IOUs) had to buy electricity from the PX. 
Moreover, these companies had to sell their generation under the PX system.  
 
The three main IOUs in California are the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), 
Southern California Edison (SCE) and the San Diego and Electric Company (SDG&E). 
These companies supply 75% of the total load in California, whereas the remaining 
25% is supplied by more than 40 small utilities (investor-owned and government-
owned).  
 
In the day-ahead and day-of wholesale markets, players were allowed to submit their 
bids for buying electricity hour-by-hour and to submit bids for selling electricity hour-by-
hour. Sellers and buyers obtained a market-clearing price, which was defined by using 
the demand and supply curves from the bids. This price was determined for each hour 
(Sweeney 2002). The second organisation created under the AB 1890 was the 
California Independent System Operator. The objective of this institution is to organise 
the day-ahead and the day-of schedules, to control the generation dispatch and to 
balance load and generation (Rotwell and Gómez 2003). 
 
4.4. THE MEXICAN ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY’S PRIVATISATION PROPOSALS 
4.4.1. Ley del Servicio Público de Energía Eléctrica – Electricity Act 
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994) from the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party – Partido de la Revolución Institucional (PRI) – started to set up the bases of the 
Mexican electricity industry’s (MEI) reform. In 1992, Salinas allowed the participation of 
private investors by modifying the Ley del Servicio Público de Energía Eléctrica 
(LSPEE) – Electricity Act or IPP Law. On 23rd December 1992, the changes in the 
LSPEE were published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación – Official Gazette of the 
Federation98.    
 
In 1975, this law was created as a complementary element to the Mexican Constitution. 
Initially, its objective was to confirm that the MEI was officially a public industry. In 
particular, it considered the Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE) – Federal 
Electricity Commission – and Luz y Fuerza del Centro (LyFC) – Central Light and 
Power Company – the two state-owned electric utilities as the only electricity suppliers 
in Mexico (Carreón-Rodríguez et al. 2003). However, after its amendment it 
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established that individuals could generate electricity. The LSPEE, or the Independent 
Power Producers (IPPs), law enabled private investors to undertake independent 
power generation as well as participate in the natural gas sector. Specifically, it 
authorised private sector participation in determined sub-areas of the industry such as 
cogeneration, self-generation, independent production and import-export of electricity 
(Núñez-Luna 2005).  
 
According to the Mexican Constitution, energy is a strategic sector for the economy 
and therefore grants the nation exclusive control over it. In other words, articles 25, 27 
and 28 state that generation, transmission and distribution of electricity are the state’s 
responsibility. The Constitution does not consider these activities to be monopolistic 
structures. Although the LSPEE’s changes allowed private sector participation in the 
MEI, the decree still considers the constitutional principles (Campos 2003). 
Consequently, private investment did not flow as expected due to the law’s restrictions. 
The restrictions are: a) CFE is the only electricity purchaser; b) CFE cannot buy more 
than 20 MW if the sale is outside the bidding; and c) tariffs are only controlled by the 
government.  
 
The LSPEE states that independent power production is the process by which 
electricity is generated by a power plant that is financed, built and owned by a private 
operator. Each power plant has to be designed to generate electricity above 30 MW, 
which can only be sold to the country’s public utility, the Federal Electricity Commission 
(CFE). CFE grants IPP contracts by carrying out a bidding process that requires 
investors to submit their lowest generation prices. The utility also uses other kinds of 
information in that process such as installed capacity, type of generator and the 
company’s technological needs.  
 
This administrative and technical mechanism (IPP contract) has to be approved by the 
Ministry of Energy and included as part of CFE’s investment programmes. The 
Programa de Obra e Inversiones del Sector Eléctrico (POISE) – the Electricity Sector’s 
Investment Programme – is one of the key documents that is used to plan the sector’s 
investment projects. Once private investors obtain the government’s approval, their 
assets are subject to national laws and protected against determined threats (e.g. 
expropriation).     
 
According to Breceda (2000), independent producers have to participate in the MEI 
under three main financial schemes: 1) Build-Lease-Transfer (BLT); 2) Independent 
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Power Producers; and 3) Public Funding. The BLT scheme states that the design, 
financing and commissioning of the electricity plant has to be carried out by the 
interested private investors. Contracts will be granted by CFE through a bidding 
process, and when the project starts its operations, it is leased to CFE for 25 years. 
During this period, CFE is responsible of the operation of the plant and its maintenance 
services. The complete project is financed by private resources.  
 
The Independent Power Producer scheme considers that if a private investor is willing 
to participate in the MEI, he has to be responsible for constructing, financing and 
operating the plant. The contract is granted through a bidding process and the new 
plant has to sell its electricity to CFE at a price considered in the long-term power 
purchase agreements. The plant is owned by the private company and it is financed 
through the PIDIREGAS scheme. The third financing scheme is Public Funding, which 
states that the project developer has to fund the building of the electricity plant and the 
other necessary investments. Once the plant is ready to start its operations, CFE has 
to liquidate or pay the total cost of the project. CFE uses the PIDIREGAS scheme to 
finance it.     
 
Article 18 of the Public Debt Law99 considers that Proyectos de Impacto Diferido en el 
Registro del Gasto (PIDIREGAS) – Deferred Impact Status Projects – can be defined 
as “obligations derived from funding of long-term productive infrastructure projects 
related to priority activities and, as a result of which the relevant federal public entities 
acquire goods or services in any form which generate sufficient cash flow to re-pay 
such obligations shall, with the prior approval of the Ministry of Finance under the terms 
of Article 30 of the Federal Public Budgetary, Accounting and Expenditures Law (now 
Article 32 of the Budget Law)100 only be counted for purposes of this law, as direct 
liabilities to be paid during the current or the next fiscal year. Any remaining amounts 
shall be considered contingent liabilities, until the funding has been fully paid to the 
extent such amounts are available” (Article 18 of Public Debt Law in White & Case 
2009, p. 2). In other words, PIDIREGAS is an instrument that is used to attract private 
investors by offering them attractive long-term projects, which are protected against 
budgetary cuts or economic shocks.   
  
 
 
                                                          
99
 See Diario Oficial de la Federación: http://dof.gob.mx/index.php?year=1995&month=12&day=21 
100
 See Diario Oficial de la Federación: http://dof.gob.mx/index.php?year=2006&month=03&day=30 
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4.4.2. First Electricity Privatisation Proposal 
In 1999, President Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000) proposed the first privatisation project. 
As stated in the previous section, the Mexican Constitution grants the nation exclusive 
control over the energy sector. More specifically, constitutional article 27 indicates that 
the state is the only institution that has the absolute power to control “strategic sectors” 
such as the oil and electricity industries. In other words, the Mexican state has the 
exclusive rights over electricity generation, transmission and distribution. Article 28 
specifies that monopolies and monopolistic behaviour are not allowed in the economy. 
However, this law states that there are some sectors that are not considered 
monopolies such as the electricity industry. So, in order to allow private investors to 
freely participate in the MEI, Zedillo proposed that Congress modify these articles101.   
 
In terms of the project’s technical aspects, Zedillo proposed the participation of private 
investors in electricity generation, transmission and distribution. Nuclear power 
generation and a specific proportion of hydroelectric power generation were maintained 
under public control in this proposal. The transmission and distribution areas were 
going to be under regulation because of their monopolistic structure. Electricity 
generation and retail sectors were supposed to be open to competition. In particular, 
and according to the Proposal of Structural Change in Mexico’s Electricity Industry 
prepared by the Ministry of Energy (SENER 1999), the reform process was divided into 
three main phases.  
 
In the first phase, the country’s two public utilities, Comisión Federal de Electricidad 
(CFE) and Luz y Fuerza del Centro (LyFC), are divided into different generator, 
transmission and distribution companies with independent managerial structures. In 
this stage, the system operator is created and controlled by the government. Moreover, 
the application of a regulatory framework is carried out. The second phase consisted of 
the implementation of the wholesale electricity market and the system operator. Private 
and public generators compete with each other to obtain contracts from distribution 
firms and large customers. In the last phase, the public companies created at the 
beginning of the process are privatised.    
 
 
 
                                                          
101
 For a detailed description of articles 27 and 28, see http://info4.juridicas.unam.mx/ijure/fed/9/28.htm 
and http://info4.juridicas.unam.mx/juslab/leylab/250/29.htm respectively. 
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4.4.2.1. The Centro de Operación del Sistema Nacional (COSEN) – The National 
System Operator 
As part of the privatisation project, COSEN was proposed as the system operator in the 
new electricity market. It is an independent organisation responsible for operating the 
national transmission grid and the wholesale electricity market. SENER (1999) states 
that COSEN has the objective of guaranteeing adequate operation of the system, 
balancing the electricity demand and supply, dispatching at a minimum cost, 
coordinating the maintenance programmes in generation and transmission and 
carrying out emergency procedures.  
 
On the other hand, the responsibility of COSEN as a market operator is to control the 
system’s financial flow. In particular, its objective is to administrate the wholesale 
market and to determine the electricity price according to the market operation rules, to 
charge generators and distribution companies the transmission price, to pay the Red 
Eléctrica Nacional (REN) the transmission price and to contract risk management 
mechanisms in the financial system in order to prevent possible price increases in the 
electricity market.  
 
COSEN’s administrative structure is based mainly on an executive board. This board is 
coordinated by nine members appointed by the Ministry of Energy. Each member is a 
representative of a specific sector. Generators, qualified users, distribution and 
transmission companies each have a delegate representing the interests of their 
sector. The remaining five members do not represent anybody. The president is 
appointed by the Minister of Energy, whereas the executive director is elected by the 
board. COSEN and REN are independently managed to avoid any conflict of interest.     
 
4.4.2.2. The Wholesale Electricity Market 
In Zedillo’s electricity project, the wholesale electricity spot market is controlled by 
COSEN; its objective is to dispatch at a minimum cost. Other key responsibilities of 
COSEN are: 1) to initially develop the market’s operating rules; 2) to obtain information 
from generators about their electricity capacity and the price at which they are willing to 
supply electricity; 3) to determine the electricity demand from distributors and qualified 
users; 4) to use previous information to inform generators at what level they have to 
balance their electricity supply with respect to demand at the lowest possible cost; 5) to 
provide sufficient mechanisms to lead buyers to continue paying for the electricity they 
demand. Similarly, COSEN has the objective to offer instruments that lead sellers to 
continue charging for the electricity they supply to the system.  
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Generators have to indicate their power availability and the minimum price at which 
they are willing to supply electricity. These companies have to notify COSEN one day 
in advance, who then selects the lowest bids. The chosen bids have to satisfy the total 
demand at a minimum cost. The price that generators receive will be the bid of the last 
generator dispatched in each hour. All generators will have this price and all buyers will 
have to pay it. In case electricity generators’ variable costs are below that price, they 
will get compensation to cover part of their fixed costs. The price will be determined for 
each hour, and if electricity demand is low, prices will also be low, because only 
efficient generators will be allowed to operate. Conversely, if electricity demand is high, 
prices will also be high.      
  
Electricity transmission congestion or transmission restrictions lead high-cost 
generators to supply electricity in some areas, whereas low-cost generators will be 
unable to supply electricity in other areas. In this case, it is difficult to provide electricity 
where it is demanded at low cost. Under these circumstances, the marginal cost of 
electricity will be different in some areas of the country. As a result, prices (regional 
prices) will also be different, which means that in certain regions, prices will be higher 
than in other places.  
 
According to the privatisation proposal, these regional prices will be based on low-cost 
generators from each region and they will include the cost generated by the 
transmission restrictions. The proposal states that regional prices will trigger the 
development of new generation capacity and transmission networks. Moreover, this 
mechanism will force consumers to reduce their demand in areas where electricity is 
limited.  
 
In addition to the use of regional prices to expand the generation and transmission 
operations, the reform considered a K factor to develop the system’s generation 
capacity. The K factor is an economic incentive that is annually provided to all 
generators with available capacity. It is paid by distribution companies and consumers. 
In the same way, the government considered buying a contingency plan (in the 
financial markets) in case electricity prices are affected by external variables such as 
environmental phenomena that can significantly increase prices.    
 
Bilateral contracts are other elements included in the wholesale market system. The 
government states that since electricity prices tend to fluctuate in determined periods of 
the year and at specific hours of the day, bilateral contracts can be used to decrease 
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the effects of such price volatility. Generators and electricity buyers (distributions firms, 
qualified users and retailers) will be allowed to negotiate prices freely under long-term 
contracts. These agreements can take the form of a financial contract or a contract for 
difference. A contract for difference is an agreement to pay the difference between the 
negotiated price in the contract and the price defined in the wholesale market.   
 
4.4.2.3. Regulatory Framework 
In terms of the new electricity market’s regulatory structure, the privatisation proposal 
states that the development and application of regulatory measures will be carried out 
by the Comisión Reguladora de Energía (CRE) – Energy Regulatory Commission. The 
main objectives of this organisation are: 1) to attract enough private capital to the 
industry; 2) to supervise the application of the regulatory policies by using financial and 
operative information from regulated companies; 3) to grant concessions and 
permission; 4) to set up the basis of the tariff regulation and to establish quality controls 
for the transmission and distribution services; 4) to approve the transmission and 
distribution companies’ investment plans; 5) to provide the mechanisms to solve 
controversies between the different players in the industry; and 6) to penalise 
companies when they do not respect the regulations.    
 
Under the electricity project, CRE is responsible for granting permission, concessions 
and organising the transmission and distribution tariffs. Electricity generation and 
commercialisation will not be regulated, but they will require special permissions from 
CRE. Permission for electricity generation will be granted for 30 years, whereas 
permission for electricity commercialisation will be granted for five years. Both kinds of 
agreement can be renewed. Transmission and distribution companies will be regulated 
and they will be required to obtain concessions to use the infrastructure. Transmission 
and distribution operations will be subject to a maximum tariff scheme and they will be 
reviewed every five years. These tariffs will be individually calculated for each company 
according to their costs, efficiency levels, investment and maintenance programmes.  
 
The company that holds the concession to control the Red Eléctrica Nacional (REN) – 
National Electricity Grid – will be responsible for expanding the national transmission 
network. This operation will be carried out under specific conditions. For instance, REN 
will propose transmission expansion projects to COSEN, which will analyse them and 
identify the most important proposals. The Ministry of Energy and CRE will be involved 
in this process. The privatisation project indicates that other parties will also be able to 
carry out transmission expansion projects if they are not interconnected to the national 
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transmission network. These projects’ concessionaires will be able to directly operate 
the transmission networks for 30 years, and can be renewed. 
  
4.4.3. Second Electricity Privatisation Proposal 
In 2002, the second electricity privatisation project called Propuesta de Modernización 
del Sector Eléctrico – Electricity Sector Modernisation Proposal – was presented by 
President Vicente Fox (2000–2006). It is important to highlight that Fox’s proposal is 
not very clear and lacks a detailed technical structure, but it is similar to Zedillo’s 
electricity project. The proposal mainly focuses its attention on reforming constitutional 
articles 27 and 28. The proposal recommends changing the definition related to “the 
electricity consumption of large consumers” from the electricity industry’s legal 
framework.  
 
In other words, by modifying it, private generators and private consumers (with a 
demand of more than 2,500 MW/hour) will be able to sell and buy electricity 
respectively. So the government will not be the only supplier. Moreover, private 
electricity generation is allowed in cogeneration, independent production, small-scale 
production and electricity exports and imports, which means that the terms and 
conditions of the LSPEE or IPP law are originally maintained. More specifically, under 
this proposal there are two types of electricity generation structure: public and private 
generators. Public generators will be privatised after they reach adequate efficiency 
levels.   
 
Public generators are the power stations operated by the two state-owned electricity 
utilities, Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE) and Luz y Fuerza del Centro (LyFC). 
Private generators (IPPs) that supply electricity under the public service scheme are 
also considered in this group. These producers operate under the Ley del Servicio 
Público de Energía Eléctrica (LSPEE) – IPP Law, which was modified in 1993 (see 
Section 4.4.1). On the other hand, the private generation structure consists of investors 
who are willing to participate in the Mexican electricity industry. These players can join 
the market by signing long-term contracts. 
 
Conversely, Fox’s proposal indicates that transmission and distribution operations will 
be under public control because they are natural monopolies, but private users can 
have access to these networks. The transmission system is called Red Nacional de 
Transmisión (RNT) – National Transmission Grid. The proposal indicates that private 
users can incorporate their transmission networks into the system. This means that 
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private electricity transmission lines can be part of RNT. If the transmission system 
needs to be expanded, the government can also incorporate these private investments. 
 
Another characteristic of Fox’s proposal is the creation of the Centro Nacional de 
Control de Energía (CENACE) – National Energy Control Centre – whose objective is 
to economically control the operation of generators connected in the national 
transmission network. According to the project, this organisation has an administrative 
structure of five members: the Minister of Energy, a representative of state generators, 
a representative of private generators, the Procuraduría Federal del Consumidor 
(PROFECO) – Consumer Protection Federal Agency – and a representative of large 
customers.  
 
CENACE has other roles in the electricity market, for instance to participate in the 
financial transactions between the different players, to collect the charges for the 
electricity sold to Specialised Traders 102  and Self-Consumers 103  and transmission 
services, to pay generators and the utilities with transmission assets, and to maintain 
the stability of the system. CENACE uses a merit order of increasing costs based on 
the stations’ operating costs (the proposal does not provide more detailed information 
about this).  
 
4.5. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presented a review of the different factors that led developed and 
developing countries to reform their electricity markets. The most important case in 
developed economies is the British experiment, which offers a model that other 
countries have imitated. The implementation of a new electricity market in England and 
Wales was mainly motivated by ideological reasons. On the other hand, we consider 
that in addition to the specific problems of each developing country’s electricity 
industry, governments were encouraged by the international financial institutions (IFIs) 
to implement such market reforms. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
                                                          
102
 “Specialised Traders are understood to be electricity buyers engaged in the generation dispatch and/or 
the agreement of bilateral contracts, either to buy electricity directly from generators or electricity 
imported for sale to Self-Consumers, to other Specialised Traders or for export, as well as the 
coordination of the transaction operations between generators, Self-Consumers and Specialised Traders” 
(SENER 2002, p. 19).  
103
 “Self-Consumers will be considered to be those users who, due to their own specific economic and 
consumption needs, will have the opportunity of using alternative supply sources; i.e., to generate their 
own electricity as required or to obtain it from a third party based on long-term contracts” (SENER 2002, 
p. 18).  
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World Bank played a key role in promoting structural changes in economies’ electricity 
sectors. 
However, electricity reforms have generated mixed results. In particular, there is 
evidence that shows how these measures have failed to reach the promised benefits. 
This situation has led IFIs to vaguely recognise that reforms are not perfect and 
therefore can place economies in complex situations. Thomas (2006a) indicates that 
despite the reforms’ failures, there are vested interests (e.g. private consultants) that 
will continue to promote such policies. These interest groups obtain significant 
economic incentives from these market mechanisms. 
 
According to the World Bank (2004), one of the problems with electricity models is 
found in the countries’ weak regulatory structure and is not due to distrust of 
privatisation itself. Consequently, this financial organisation recommends that 
regulation has to be strengthened and be free of political influence. Under these 
circumstances, there are scholars that severely question the position of the World Bank 
on electricity reforms. For instance, Thomas (2006a) states that there are specific 
factors that are not considered in the liberalised-privatisation electricity industry 
models. These elements are also behind the failure of such reforms.  
 
One of the factors is that economic players strongly consider that market forces will 
guarantee that investment levels will continually flow in the sector. The reality is that 
the electricity industry is a very special case, because there are many risks involved in 
its operation. For example, there are currency risks, demand risks and political risks 
that can generate conflicts in the electricity sector. Another interesting element 
mentioned by Thomas is that “electricity is different from other commodities”.  
 
Electricity has the following characteristics: 1) it cannot be stored; 2) demand and 
supply need to match at all times; 3) it does not have substitutes; 4) it has an important 
role in modern society, which means that people strongly depend on it; 5) it has 
environmental impacts; and 6) electricity is a standard product, so a specific generator 
cannot produce better electricity than another. As a result, markets are controlled by 
prices.     
 
We consider that the Ley del Servicio Público de Energía Eléctrica (LSPEE) or IPP 
Law is a very important factor in the Mexican electricity industry. Although the 
government has not carried out radical privatisation, the LSPEE allowed private 
investment participation in electricity generation. The vertical integration of the industry 
100 
 
is still maintained due to the restrictions stipulated in the Constitution. Two reform 
proposals have been presented by two different federal governments. President 
Ernesto Zedillo’s proposal shows a better picture of the new electricity model than 
Vicente Fox’s project. In other words, Zedillo’s privatisation project directly tells us what 
kind of electricity market is going to be implemented.  
 
On the other hand, President Fox’s project does not provide enough detail on the 
electricity model’s technical aspects. For instance, the project focuses on opening the 
generation sector to competition but it does not clearly define the role of private 
investors in the transmission and distribution sectors. His project states that these 
sectors will be under public control, but it seems that the lack of information leaves an 
open window for possible complete private sector participation. According to a 
policymaker interviewed during our 2005 fieldwork, the presidents’ projects are the 
same electricity models but are “strategically” presented in two different ways.   
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CHAPTER 5: REVIEW OF MEXICO’S PRIVATISATION PROGRAMME AND THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION IN THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Some analysts consider that the privatisation policy has generated benefits for the 
economy. For instance, more roads were built and the ports’ installed capacity 
increased considerably. However, this chapter shows that the most important 
privatisations have severely affected the Mexican economy. In particular, we discuss 
the privatisation of a telecommunications company and the banking sector. In both 
cases, the government did not carry out an adequate privatisation process. The 
government sold the banks to people who did not have financial experience and the 
telecommunications company was sold as a monopoly. Moreover, political interests 
played an important role in the process.  
 
The Mexican electricity industry (MEI) was also part of this neo-liberal agenda. The 
MEI has not been privatised, but President Carlos Salinas (1988–1994) allowed private 
investors to have limited participation in electricity generation (see Chapter 4). Private 
companies can participate in the MEI as independent power producers (IPPs). This 
chapter evaluates it and finds that there are serious problems that have generated high 
costs for the public finances. Our analysis offers evidence that indicates that the IPPs 
have been displacing the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) from the electricity 
generation system. This chapter states that the MEI has a generation capacity that has 
been underused. 
 
Moreover, we offer an analysis of two interesting cases connected to the IPP scheme. 
Firstly, we state that the government has been financing the IPPs with a very costly 
programme called Proyectos de Impacto Diferido en el Registro del Gasto 
(PIDIREGAS) – Deferred Impact Status Projects. Secondly, this chapter provides 
evidence that indicates how CFE irregularly awarded a very important natural gas 
contract to the Spanish oil company Repsol. Similarly, the banking and the 
telecommunications sectors and the partial participation of the private sector in the MEI 
has important irregularities that have generated high costs for the economy.  
 
Before we start analysing these cases, a historical review of the key economic events 
in Mexico is presented. More specifically, we discuss how President Lázaro Cárdenas 
(1934–1940) carried out oil expropriation to trigger the country’s industrial 
development. The nationalisation of the electricity sector, the import-substitution policy 
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and the creation of many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were other mechanisms 
used to continue with the industrialisation process. The development of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) also occurred during this historical period. Consequently, this 
chapter provides a description of the key changes in this political party. We consider 
that this historical review gives us important elements to formulate a better 
understanding of the economic and political situation in Mexico. Moreover, the next 
chapter uses this information to complement the analysis. 
 
Chapter 5 is divided into two main sections. Section 5.2 offers a historical review of the 
key economic events in Mexico. Section 5.3 analyses the key aspects of the 
privatisation strategy. In particular, it explores two important privatisation cases. We 
selected the privatisation of Teléfonos de México (Telmex), which is the country’s 
telephone monopoly, and the banking sector. This section then evaluates the 
participation of the IPPs in Mexico’s electricity generation system. Finally, the Pidiregas 
projects and the natural gas contract between CFE and Repsol are analysed. 
 
5.2. KEY ASPECTS OF THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BASES OF MEXICO 
This section offers a historical review of the key economic and political elements that 
were determinants of the initial development in Mexico. In particular, the decisions 
taken during President Cárdenas’ administration were extremely important for the 
Mexican economy. Oil expropriation was the key decision made by Cárdenas, which 
triggered the development of the domestic energy sector and set up the bases of the 
country’s industrialisation process. The nationalisation of the electricity sector and the 
import-substitution policy were other important events that contributed to strengthen the 
country’s industrialisation process. The development of the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party (PRI) represents a factor that cannot be excluded from this historical review. This 
organisation experienced different transformations that were important to consolidate 
the regime’s hegemonic power. We cannot study the current situation of the energy 
industry without firstly understanding the key aspects from such historical phases.  
 
5.2.1. The Cardenismo Oil Expropriation 
The Cardenismo was one of the outcomes of the 1910 Revolution. It represents an 
important phase in Mexico’s socio-economic development. This period took place 
during President Lázaro Cárdenas’ administration and it is known as Cardenismo. 
Cardenismo’s main economic objective was to initiate the domestic industrial sector’s 
development. To carry out such a plan, Cárdenas’ economic policy was based on a six-
year programme. It included different actions; for instance, it set up the bases of the 
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import substitution system, and by grouping people into corporatist structures, he could 
transfer the labour force from the agricultural to the industrial sector. Consequently, he 
developed the production of consumer goods that protected the economy from external 
competition (Dussel-Peters and Kim 1993).  
 
His economic programme also supported the education and agrarian sectors. He 
founded research institutions (e.g. Instituto Politécnico Nacional IPN – National 
Polytechnic Institute) that focused their attention on developing knowledge for specific 
industrial sectors such as textiles, mechanical engineering and oil engineering. In other 
words, this education system was a complementary factor for Cárdenas’ industrial 
strategy. In addition to his land redistribution programme, the government created 
financial institutions for the development of the agrarian sector (Montes de Oca 1999). 
In particular, these organisations provided financial resources to small and medium 
enterprises to buy raw materials and production inputs. 
 
A positive combination of domestic and external factors strengthened the Cárdenas 
administration’s political power. The reorganisation of economic-political sectors and 
other social groups into a single political party104 allowed the government to make 
decisions with strong support from such interest groups. In terms of the external 
elements, we consider that the Mexican regime understood that the US government 
was giving Mexico more independence in its decision-making process.  
 
This situation is reflected in Lorenzo Meyer’s105 analysis in Thelen (1999, pp. 606–607): 
“The United States saw in Mexico a model … a system that was not clashing with its 
society and for that reason could produce results, stability … the Mexican political elite 
in those years received, in exchange for its efficiency in keeping the control of Mexican 
society, a certain amount of freedom and relative independence …The US was not 
telling them who was going to be the next president, who was going to be in charge of 
the Bank of Mexico or what they have to do in economic terms.” 
 
Under these circumstances, Cárdenas started to make important decisions. In 
particular, he focused his attention on the oil sector. This industry was seen by 
Cárdenas as a strategic factor to trigger the country’s economic development. 
However, the oil industry was controlled by foreign companies, mainly from the United 
                                                          
104
 In the following section, we discuss how the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was developed. 
105
 Lorenzo Meyer is an emeritus professor of Political History at the Centre for International Studies, El 
Colegio de México (COLMEX) in Mexico City.    
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States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The Mexican government started 
confronting the oil companies when it cancelled some of their important investment 
concessions (Cronon 1960). These corporations reacted strongly against this action, 
because they considered that the Calles-Morrow Agreement106 had been violated by 
Cárdenas. Moreover, the Mexican authorities got involved in the labour conflicts 
between these firms and their workers. More specifically, Cárdenas supported the 
workers’ demands. The Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros de la República 
Mexicana (STPRM) – the Mexican oil workers’ union107 – demanded annual wage 
increases, further retroactive payments and restriction on the number of workers hired 
by the companies (Macmahon and Dittmar 1942). If the petitions were not accepted by 
the oil corporations, workers were going to go on strike.  
 
Foreign investors accepted the increase in worker benefits (Macmahon and Dittmar 
1942), but the union decided to reject the offer and therefore a strike was called for 27th 
May 1937. The discussions between the Mexican government and the oil investors 
continued without reaching any important agreement for improving their economic 
relations. In the following months, the stronger political power provided by the 
reorganisation of the Mexican Revolution Party, the Mexican government’s aspiration 
(to strengthen the country’s economy), the deteriorating economic conditions of the 
country and the higher independence level provided by the American government108 
created an adequate scenario to make an important choice.  
 
On 8th March 1938, after having some meetings with the companies’ representatives 
and with his cabinet, Cárdenas took the decision to expropriate the oil industry. He 
prepared an expropriation decree, which officially stated that all the companies’ assets 
belonged to the country. He then sent Congress a legal initiative that reformed 
constitutional article 27 in order to guarantee Mexico’s absolute control over all the oil 
                                                          
106
  This was an informal and implicit agreement in which President Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928) 
and the US Embassy agreed to maintain respectful and cooperative relations about the role of American 
economic interests in Mexico. According to Aguayo (2009), this agreement allowed Americans to have 
control over some economic sectors in Mexico.  
107
 In 1934, 10,000 people (structured in 19 unions) worked for the oil industry. In 1935, the Cardenismo 
could group them in only one organisation, the STPRM. 
108
 Although the American authorities gave Mexico a higher independence level, they still supported the 
oil corporations. The US government carried out different actions that attempted to stop Cárdenas from 
harassing such companies. 
It is important to indicate that the American government did not provide strong support to these 
companies. According to Cronon (1960), an American diplomat, Benjamin Welles, on behalf of the US 
government told the businessmen that the he was going to pay careful attention to the situation in Mexico. 
However, he was not willing to intervene in the conflict. Welles contacted the British Embassy in Mexico 
City and informed it that he was not going to put unnecessary pressure on Mexico to solve the conflict.   
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and gas resources. It indicated that all the activities such as the exploration, 
exploitation and commercialisation of hydrocarbons were controlled by the government.  
 
Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) was the state oil company that was founded to carry 
out such operations. During the first years, the members of the PEMEX’s union 
(STPRM) were appointed to key posts to operate the company (Meyer 1966). Since 
PEMEX existed until the early 1980s, the Constitution was continuously reformed to 
strengthen the oil sector, which was considered to be a strategic industry for the 
country. 
 
5.2.2. The Mexican Electricity Industry  
Mexico’s electricity industry was created under Porfirio Díaz’s presidential term (1876–
1911) to provide traction, lighting and a water supply to the industrial sector. In 
particular, he granted concessions to foreign companies to supply electricity to 
activities related to the manufacturing, mining and textile industries. After 1910, 
investors from the US, Canada and Germany became the key players in the industry. 
Canada was the main investor with more than 50% of the total capital, followed by the 
US with US$90 million and Mexico with US$10 million. Germany supplied equipment to 
the electricity companies (Bastarrachea and Aguilar 1994). As a result of the country’s 
economic expansion and the participation of the private investors in the electricity 
industry, between 1911 and 1937 the installed capacity increased from 135 to 629 
megawatts (MW)109. 
 
In 1937, President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940) created Comisión Federal de 
Electricidad (CFE) – the Federal Electricity Commission. It had two main objectives: 1) 
to control the foreign companies’ behaviour and to serve as a mediator between these 
and the government; and 2) to carry out rural electrification, which was considered by 
private investors as an unprofitable activity (Carreón-Rodríguez et al. 2003; Breceda 
2000).  
 
In the same way as in the oil industry, the regime’s strategies in the Mexican electricity 
industry (MEI) had the objective to strengthen the domestic industrial sector. 
Consequently, in 1944 the nationalisation of the electricity industry started when CFE 
acquired some private companies. More specifically, the government acquired Chapala 
(the third largest utility) and some regional monopolies, which were restructured into a 
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single company. In 1960, President Adolfo López Mateos (1958–1964) completed the 
MEI’s nationalisation. He considered that the private companies were interfering with 
the development of the country and national sovereignty. The oil expropriation served 
as a reference point that led the government to make such a decision. Under these 
conditions, López Mateos started negotiating the acquisition of the private companies’ 
assets. 
 
The Mexican government acquired 95% of Impulsora de Empresas Eléctricas’’ 110 
common shares and obtained a majority stake from the Mexican Electricity Light and 
Power Company, which was owned by an American group. Additionally, a new state 
utility was created, Compañía de Luz y Fuerza del Centro (LyFC), to serve the areas 
that CFE did not cover such as the States of Hidalgo, Estado de México, Morelos, 
Puebla and Mexico City (Breceda 2000). The nationalisation was formalised in the 
constitutional articles 25, 27 and 28. These articles granted the nation exclusive control 
over the electricity industry. In particular, generation, transmission and distribution of 
electricity could only be carried out by the government. Moreover, these processes 
were not considered as monopolistic activities. Under the new legal structure, the MEI’s 
investments grew at an annual rate of 6% from 1960 to 1970. As a result, the industry’s 
total installed capacity increased from 2,308 to 5,517 MW (Breceda 2000).  
 
5.2.3. The Import-Substitution Industrialisation Strategy 
From the 1940s to the early 1970s, the economic growth model implemented by the 
political regime was mainly based on the import-substitution industrialisation strategy 
(ISI). President Cárdenas set up the conditions for the country’s industrialisation 
process by changing the oil industry’s organisational structure. So the next PRI 
governments had to define the country’s economic direction and consolidate it. 
Mexico’s regime, like other Latin American governments111 (e.g. Argentina and Brazil), 
carried out the ISI strategy to protect their domestic economies from the impact of 
imports. Mexico’s national market could be protected by implementing tariff duties on 
imports, by applying permits with strict conditions on imports and by prohibiting access 
to a large number of imported products. Moreover, direct foreign investment (DFI) was 
rigorously controlled. However, it was allowed in some economic activities that were 
not strategic sectors for the country (Moreno-Brid et al. 2009).  
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According to Moreno-Brid et al. (2009) and Moreno-Brid and Ros (2009), some of the 
benefits that the government provided to the manufacturing sector were: 1) low-cost 
energy; 2) preferential financial support from development banks; and 3) tax 
exemptions on imported machinery and equipment. The ISI policy led to extraordinary 
results. From 1950 to 1972, gross domestic production (GDP) grew at 6% annually, 
and at 3% per capita. Industrial production grew at an extraordinary rate of 8% 
(Ramírez 1986). Similarly, the Maquiladora programme was another factor that 
contributed to the government’s industrial objectives. Maquiladoras obtained different 
economic incentives, such as tax exemptions, to manufacture their products along the 
Mexico-US border.   
 
As part of the development strategy, the Mexican regime created many state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) to provide goods and services to the economy. The government 
also increased the number of SOEs by acquiring private companies with financial 
problems or with particular characteristics according to politicians’ interests (Chong and 
López-De-Silanes 2004). In 1940, the country had 36 SOEs, which increased to 144 by 
1954. Between 1970 and 1982, SOEs increased from 272 to 1,155 (see Table 5.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 
 
Table 5.1: State-owned enterprises in Mexico (1917-2003) 
Main Focus of State 
Activity 
 
Period 
 
Number of SOEs   
(end of period) 
Public administration and creation 
of the basic infrastructure 
 
Import-substitution oriented 
investments, transportation and 
communications and social 
security institutions 
 
Stable development: regional 
development and creation of 
employment 
 
Planned expansion: oil bonanza 
and government as an industrial 
engine 
 
Planned expansion: government 
investment in strategic areas 
 
Main programme of liberalisation 
of the economy and divestiture of 
the state-owned sector 
 
Consolidation of the privatisation 
programme 
 
 
1917–1940 
 
 
 
 
1941–1954 
 
 
 
1955–1970 
 
 
 
1971–1975 
 
 
1976–1982 
 
 
 
1983–1993 
 
 
1994–2003 
 
36 
 
 
 
 
144 
 
 
 
272 
 
 
 
504 
 
 
1,155 
 
 
 
258 
 
 
210 
 
             Source: Chong and López-De-Silanes (2004) 
 
The 1973 oil shock played a key role in the country’s development. High oil prices 
increased oil production for the domestic and international markets. The additional oil 
revenues and the external debt were used to finance very ambitious infrastructure 
programmes and to stimulate the private sector’s investment projects. For instance, 
90% of total oil revenues were channelled to the construction sector (Gavin 1996). The 
oil shock also allowed the government to explore and exploit new oil and gas reserves, 
which placed the country in a good position in the international oil market. In 1978, oil 
reserves accounted for around 40,194 million barrels, whereas in 1972 there were just 
5,388 (Ramírez 1986). 
 
However, in the late 1970s the ISI model showed signs of weakness. According to 
Dussel-Peters and Kim (1993) and Ramírez (1986), there were internal and external 
factors that weakened the model, and therefore the performance of the economy was 
negatively affected. For instance, there was an important emigration flow of labour 
force from rural to urban areas. This phenomenon was caused by the government’s 
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huge economic support of the industrial sector and large agricultural producers. In 
other words, these sectors were subsidised to strengthen the domestic market, 
whereas small producers and marginal rural areas were abandoned.   
 
In terms of the external factors, in the early 1980s the collapse of the international oil 
market and the high US interest rates represented two key events that affected the 
country’s economic system. The public foreign debt increased from $8 billion in 1974 to 
$60 billion in 1982. Similarly, the external public debt service reached 34% of the total 
value of exports (Hamilton 1984; FRB 1985). This situation led the López Portillo 
administration (1976–1982) to declare a moratorium in 1982. On the other hand, the 
decrease in international oil prices reduced oil export revenues. Oil sales represented 
70% of the country’s total exports. Consequently, low oil prices triggered a severe 
economic crisis.  
 
According to Lustig (2001), the problem was that the Mexican regime engaged in a 
spending spree, assuming that high oil prices and cheap external financing were going 
to continue for a long period. Moreno-Brid et al. (2009) state that President López 
Portillo’s decision to suspend the debt payments constituted the end of the government 
as the key player in the country’s industrialisation process, and it also represented the 
end of the ISI strategy.  
 
5.2.4. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) 
What was the political system that implemented these key economic policies? The 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) constituted the main structure of Mexico’s 
political system, which ruled the country for 71 years. This organisation was another 
outcome of the 1910 Revolution. In other words, the PRI was founded by the revolt’s 
ideologists. In particular, in 1929 it was institutionalised by President Plutarco Elías 
Calles (1924–1928) under the name of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) – 
the National Revolutionary Party. President Elías Calles considered it extremely 
important to create an official party of unity. The assassination of President Alvaro 
Obregón led to severe conflicts between the different interest groups that participated 
in the revolution. Consequently, a consensus was required for the new regime to 
survive such power disputes (Davis and Brachet-Márquez 1997). 
 
Additionally, and according to Meyer (1999), the American government was convinced 
that Mexico was ready to develop its own political life. Americans considered that the 
new Mexican elite grouped in the PNR was strong enough to be responsible for the 
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country’s destiny. What is more, the United States required Mexico to have a stable 
socio-economic system, which was one of Calles’ objectives. However, Washington 
recognised that the PNR lacked America’s democratic ideology due to the PNR’s 
omnipotent structure. But since the PNR had social bases which were absent in the 
rest of the Latin American countries, it really convinced Americans of Mexico’s strong 
political system112. 
 
Since its origins, the PRI had a supreme political structure. The President of Mexico 
was the only leader who controlled the PRI and therefore the country’s political 
organisations. For instance, the entire Congress was controlled by the party’s loyal 
members, who were appointed by the president. The majority of the congressmen were 
from the PRI, which means that the president did not have any real political opposition. 
There were small political parties, but they did not really have a strong presence in the 
political arena. Since then, the Mexican Congress was absolutely subordinated to the 
presidential power (Meyer 1977).  
 
The PNR’s structure included almost all the country’s relevant forces. It grouped the 
caudillos and caciques (the political and military chieftains who participated in the 
revolution) from all regions of the country (Migdail 1987). Moreover, the PNR grouped 
13 confederations of workers, 57 federations and 2,781 unions with around 350,000 
members (Reyna 1976). The Catholic Church 113  and the private sector 114  did not 
participate in the party, but their interests were in some way represented (Newell and 
Rubio 1984). 
 
In 1938, President Lázaro Cárdenas transformed the PNR into the Partido de la 
Revolución Mexicana (PRM) – the Mexican Revolution Party. According to Davis and 
Brachet-Márquez (1997), President Calles’ PNR did not completely include the popular 
bases. Cárdenas reorganised the political system in order to give it more popular 
legitimacy. In addition, the party allowed him to reach agreements with the labour 
sector, and therefore it was used to keep workers under control115. As a result, the 
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PRM was divided into four important interest groups: Agrarian, Labour, Popular and 
Military sectors. 
 
To control and organise such groups, certain institutions were created 116 . The 
Confederación Nacional Campesina (CNC) – the National Peasants’ Confederation117 
– was created to represent the agrarian sector, the Confederación de Trabajadores de 
México (CTM) – the Confederation of Mexican Workers118 – was created to represent 
all the workers in Mexico, and the Confederación de Organizaciones Populares 
(CNOP) – the National Confederation of Popular Organisations119 – was created to 
control the popular sector.  
 
The creation of these institutions gave the president and the PRM two advantages: 1) 
they provided an enormous labour backing and absolute control over the country’s 
political and economic structure (Newell and Rubio 1984); and 2) people’s demands 
could be effectively addressed. The PRM leaders were convinced that the party’s new 
organisation provided the country with a semi-democratic base, despite the absence of 
a competitive party system (Davis and Brachet-Márquez 1997). 
 
In 1946, under the government of Manuel Avila-Camacho (1940–1946), Cárdenas’ 
PRM became the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). According to Newell and 
Rubio (1984), the only difference between the PRM and the PRI was that Avila-
Camacho excluded the military from the party’s four interest groups. This meant that 
the military was not considered as a key player in the decision-making process. The 
last reorganisation in the PRI’s structure constituted the political system that ruled the 
country for 71 years. Under these conditions, we consider that the single-party political 
system had a structure based on three power levels. The first level was the most 
important, because it was structured by the incumbent president, former presidents, 
regional political leaders, wealthy individuals, labour union leaders and key members of 
the cabinet (e.g. the ministers of finance and defence).  
 
The second group was integrated by other members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the 
judicial power, state governments, religious societies, social organisations, professional 
associations, labour unions, the press and other political groups (opposition parties 
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such as the PAN120, which did not represent a real obstacle for the PRI). The final 
group was structured by the national bureaucracy, the armed forces and the PRI’s 
popular bases. These three groups were totally controlled by the president, who was 
the main decision-maker in the country. 
 
5.2.5. Conclusions 
When the 1910 Revolution finished, the newly formed political regime’s aspiration was 
to develop the country’s industrial sector. The oil expropriation allowed the government 
to reach this objective. Similarly, the creation of the Federal Electricity Commission 
(CFE) and the acquisition of the private electric utilities were also part of the 
government’s economic strategy. Mexico needed to increase its electrification levels for 
the new industrial sector and residential users. The only way to achieve this was by 
changing the electricity sector’s structure from private to public ownership. 
 
Contrary to the oil industry, nationalisation of the electricity sector was carried out 
gradually. The nationalisation process concluded after three presidential periods. In 
other words, it was completed during President López Mateos’ administration, which 
means it did not constitute an urgent issue for the government. Moreover, the oil 
expropriation had a higher impact on society than the nationalisation of the electricity 
industry. This situation was reflected in the way people reacted to Cárdenas’ decision. 
For instance, people offered their economic support to pay the foreign oil companies 
compensation.    
 
In both cases, the government sent to Congress constitutional articles that legally 
protected the energy sector from private sector participation. In addition, these articles 
delineated the strategic role of these industries in the economy and how the 
government had the exclusive rights to exploit and control all the energy resources in 
the country. Once the energy sector was under public control, other economic 
measures were implemented. The import-substitution policy served as an instrument to 
protect the economy and strengthen the manufacturing sector.  
 
As part of this policy, the SOEs played a key role in satisfying domestic demand. These 
SOEs were benefited by the low-cost energy provided by the state oil and electricity 
companies. In terms of the political dynamics, it is important to highlight that the 
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Mexican Congress was dominated absolutely by the PRI when these economic events 
occurred. In other words, all the economic initiatives presented by the president were 
strongly supported by deputies and senators. Another important historical event was 
the development of the PRI’s structure. The PRI was established to group most of the 
country’s interest groups into one political institution. For these reasons, the PRI was 
seen as a very powerful but antidemocratic political party. The PRI’s last reorganisation 
carried out by President Avila-Camacho could be maintained when Mexico’s economic 
model was changed from protectionism to neo-liberalism. 
 
5.3. THE NEO-LIBERAL ADJUSTMENT POLICIES 
In the previous section, we stated that at the end of the 1970s the economic policies 
that initially had the objective to strengthen the economy started to lose their 
effectiveness. The international oil market crisis was an element that contributed to 
weaken the economic system. Under these conditions, the Mexican government 
drastically changed its economic model. The privatisation of the SOEs was one of the 
neo-liberal measures carried out by the government.  
 
This section offers a general review of the privatisation strategy in Mexico. It also 
presents two case studies that show how the privatisation process was instrumented. 
More specifically, we selected the case of Telmex (the country’s telecommunications 
monopoly) and the banking sector. We chose these two different sectors because they 
have been the most important privatisations under the neo-liberal adjustment agenda. 
Moreover, their costly results offer a perspective of how badly the privatisations have 
been implemented in Mexico. Institutions such as the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the Auditoría Superior de la Federación 
(ASF) – the Federal Audit Office – have documented the negative effects of these 
privatisations on the economy.  
 
The electricity sector was also part of Mexico’s neo-liberal agenda. However, this 
sector was not completely opened to private investors. Private companies can only 
participate in the Mexican electricity industry (MEI) under the IPP scheme. This section 
provides an interesting evaluation of the partial participation of the private sector in 
electricity generation. Moreover, we analyse two key problems that are strongly 
connected with the IPP programme and that have negatively affected the country’s 
public finances. Firstly, we discuss how the independent power producers (IPPs) 
represent a very costly alternative for the country. Secondly, we question the conditions 
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in which the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) granted a natural gas contract to a 
private company.  
 
5.3.1. A General Perspective of the Privatisation Process  
President Miguel De la Madrid (1982–1988) started the application of drastic neo-
liberal policies. His economic measures focused mainly on liberalising the financial 
market, privatising SOEs, reducing public sector participation in the economy and 
market deregulation. Moreover, the government reduced considerably the different 
tariffs and other restrictions on imports 121 . In 1986, Mexico joined the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), now the World Trade Organization (WTO). As 
a new GATT member, Mexico agreed to significantly improve the bilateral trade 
relations with the US.  
 
Mexico’s privatisation agenda is important because it has been one of the largest in 
terms of scale and scope (Chong and López-de-Sidales 2004). It occupied the fourth 
place in the world after England, Germany and Japan (Schwartz and Silva 1993). 
Between 1982 and 2003, Mexican SOEs significantly decreased from 1,155 to 210. 
The policy included the sale of companies related to 13 productive activities such as 
bottled drinks, textiles, cement, automobiles, pharmaceuticals and secondary 
petrochemicals (Chong and López-de-Sidales 2004). 
 
Chong and López-de-Sidales (2004) state that there were two key periods in Mexico’s 
privatisation process. The first period occurred during the De la Madrid administration, 
which consisted of restructuring the public sector and improving its efficiency. The 
restructuring programme had specific mechanisms for detaching SOEs from the 
government such as liquidation, termination, integration and transfer (Hoshino 1996). 
The second period occurred during President Carlos Salinas’ government (1988–
1994). We consider that Salinas’ administration was the most important period, 
because he accelerated and deepened the country’s privatisation process and other 
neo-liberal policies. For instance, the implementation of the North America Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) increased the economic liberalisation level in Mexico. This 
agreement practically eliminated all tariffs and other restrictions to intra-regional trade.  
 
The privatisation policy under Salinas’ regime focused mainly on the sale of large-scale 
SOEs. More specifically, he sold companies from different economic sectors such as 
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the airline industry, iron and steel, mining, fertilisers, telephone services and sugar 
refining. The energy sector was not considered in his privatisation strategy. The 
revenues obtained from the sale of SOEs accounted for around US$18 billion122.     
 
 
            Table 5.2: Some key privatised large-scale companies and their buyers 
SOEs Sector Acquiring Entities 
1. Teléfonos de México 
(TELMEX) 
 
2. Red Nacional de 
Televisión (TV Azteca); 
Televisión de Chihuahua; 
Compañía Operadora de 
Teatros; Estadios América  
 
 
3. Siderúrgica Lázaro 
Cárdenas  
 
 
4. Fertilizantes Mexicanos 
 
5. Ingenios (Calipam, Plan 
de San Luis, San Cristóbal) 
Telephone operations 
 
 
TV broadcasting, movie 
theatres and studies 
 
 
 
 
 
Iron and steel 
production 
 
 
Fertiliser production  
 
 
Sugar refining 
Grupo Carso (1990)* 
 
 
Grupo Radio 
Televisora del Centro 
(1993)* 
 
 
 
 
Grupo Villacero 
(1991)* 
 
 
Industrias Peñoles 
(1992)* 
 
Consorcio Industrial 
Escorpión (1992)* 
          *Date of the privatisation 
        Source: Hoshino (1996) 
 
Table 5.2 shows some of the large-scale SOEs that were privatised and their buyers. It 
indicates that TELMEX was acquired by Grupo Carso. Grupo Radio Televisora del 
Centro acquired the government’s national television company, which after its 
privatisation became TV Azteca. This company together with Televisa constitute 
Mexico’s television duopoly. In the case of the sugar refining companies (Ingenios), 
most of them were sold to different bottling corporations such as the Pepsi-Cola 
Company. There were other foreign companies that acquired SOEs. For instance, 
Bombardier (Canada) acquired Constructora Nacional de Carros de Ferrocarril (railway 
car manufacturing industry), two Japanese companies, Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co. and 
Sumitomo Corp., acquired Fermentaciones Mexicanos (chemical industry), and 
Unilever (UK and Netherlands) acquired some food processing plants that were owned 
by Compañía Nacional de Subsistencias Populares (CONASUPO) – the National 
Company of Popular Subsistence123.  
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Some scholars consider that Mexico has obtained important benefits from its 
privatisation policy. For instance, La Porta and López-De-Silanes (1999) determined 
the benefits of privatisation in the Mexican economy. They used data on 233 non-
financial SOEs that were privatised from 1983 to 1991. In particular, La Porta and 
López-De-Silanes employed financial statements, privatisation contracts, information 
from the 1994 Economic Census and questionnaires. Their key results indicate that the 
privatised companies’ profitability levels did not increase at the expense of society. In 
other words, the authors state that the modest post-privatisation price increases had a 
minimum effect on the companies’ profitability levels. The analysis considers that the 
economic transfers from laid-off workers constituted an important factor for increasing 
privatised companies’ profitability. These labour force reductions were motivated by the 
excess of workers in SOEs. However, La Porta and López-De-Silanes state that the 
social cost caused by these layoffs was compensated by the significant amount of 
revenue that the government received from the sale of SOEs.  
 
Chong and López-De-Silanes (2004) did similar research into the positive impacts of 
privatisation on the Mexican economy, but the period of analysis is extended. They 
state that SOEs’ profitability increased 24 percentage points after these companies 
were privatised. These profitability levels are similar to those reached by private firms. 
The post-privatisation price increases contributed 5% to the companies’ profitability, 
whereas transfers from laid-off workers contributed 31%. The analysis also indicates 
that the privatisations allowed the government to reduce subsidies and obtain more 
revenue by increased tax collection.  
 
Chong and López-De-Silanes state that the privatised SOEs were able to supply their 
goods and services to a greater number of people. Moreover, these companies had a 
higher impact on the economy. For instance, under the toll road concession 
programme, roads increased from 4,500 km in 1989 to 9,900 km in 1994. In the case of 
the ports, the new operators developed the installed capacity from 59 million tons in 
1993 to 94 million tons in 1998 and the capacity utilisation increased from 41 to 59% 
during the same period (World Bank 2003; Rogozinski and Tovar 1998).  
 
The research finds that the application of restructuring programmes before the sale of 
SOEs constitutes a counterproductive measure for the selling price. It indicates that 
these programmes remarkably extended the privatisation process. As a result, prices 
decreased 2% for each month of delay. Finally, the authors recommend using the 
Mexican privatisation case as a model for other countries. They state that the 
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significant profitability levels obtained by the privatised SOEs have generated important 
benefits for the government and consumers.     
 
5.3.1.1. The Telecommunications Industry: The Privatisation of Telefónos de 
México (TELMEX) 
Telmex was initially a private firm owned by the ITT Corporation and Ericsson. In 1972, 
the Mexican government decided to acquire most of the company’s assets and 
debts124. In 1989, President Carlos Salinas (1988–1994) started Telmex’s privatisation 
process, which concluded in 1990 when the company was finally sold. Although 
Telmex’s efficiency levels were low, the company did not have any financial problems. 
Consequently, there was no precise technical reason behind its privatisation (Galal et 
al. 1992). Salinas’ decision to change Telmex’s structure from public to private 
ownership sent a key message to the international market that his government was in 
line with the policies of the Washington Consensus125. 
 
The government carried out a restructuring programme before the privatisation in order 
to strengthen the company’s economic and financial system. For instance, local calls 
increased from 16 to 116 pesos per minute126. Moreover, the government implemented 
an indirect tax that was used to pay the company’s debts127. Noll (2007) states that the 
government had three main arguments to defend the sale of Telmex without modifying 
its monopolistic structure. First, President Salinas announced that the national 
investors were going to be the key players in the privatisation process. Therefore, 
Telmex was going to be maintained as a Mexican company. Second, by keeping 
Telmex as a monopoly, the “universal service objective” was going to be easily 
reached. In other words, the company would be able to supply its services to low-
income sectors and rural areas where telephone lines were not installed because of the 
difficult geographical conditions. Third, by transforming Telmex into a private monopoly, 
more technology was going to be used to solve key problems such as faults in the 
communication networks.  
 
Some of the consultants hired by President Salinas were not entirely convinced that 
selling Telmex as the only company in the market was the best option. These advisors 
suggested that the government split Telmex into other new companies under a 
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competitive environment. The World Bank also preferred a competitive industry instead 
of a market dominated by a monopoly (Galal et al. 1992). However, this financial 
institution decided to strongly support the government’s privatisation project. On 20th 
December 1990, Telmex was sold mainly to Grupo Carso, owned by Carlos Slim, 
under a sealed-bid auction. Southwestern Bell Corporation and France Cable et Radio 
were also part of this business operation. However, these foreign companies were 
subject to limited participation. 
 
Bazdersch and Elizondo (1993) state that the privatisation of Telmex led to positive 
results. For instance, the company’s productivity remarkably increased, the 
government obtained important fiscal gains, employment hardly declined and the 
investment levels were improved. However, we consider that the way Telmex was 
privatised severely affected the Mexican economy. One of the main problems is that 
Telmex was sold as a private monopoly. Contrary to the arguments offered by the 
government, monopolies tend to have low investment levels and sell their products at 
higher prices than competitive companies. Consequently, Telmex has been taking 
advantage of such monopolistic conditions to obtain considerable excess profits since it 
was privatised (Noll 2007). Moreover, there is evidence that Telmex has not adequately 
improved its services as they promised during the privatisation process.  
 
Noll provides an interesting analysis of the development of Telmex’s services in the last 
years. His study compares certain indicators of twelve developing countries such as 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela. In 2005, Mexico was located in the 
middle of this group in terms of Internet usage. With respect to Internet access, Mexico 
has the lowest wireless penetration level (45 out of 100). The country also has the 
lowest penetration level (63) in fixed telephone lines and wireless connection. 
Argentina has a penetration level of 79, Brazil has a level of 69 and Chile has a level of 
88. These indicators measure the telephone penetration levels per 100 households 
(reference point).  
 
As we can see, the development of the telephone services in Mexico provided mainly 
by Telmex has been significantly poor compared to other Latin American economies. 
Noll (2007) states that the reason behind this underdevelopment in the 
telecommunications infrastructure was the creation of an unregulated monopoly. 
Another problem of Telmex’s privatisation process was that the government did not 
establish an adequate regulatory framework before the sale of this company. The 
regulator was created six years after Carlos Slim acquired Telmex (in 1996). President 
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Zedillo established the regulatory agency , calling it Comisión Federal de 
Telecomunicaciones (COFETEL) – the Federal Telecommunications Commission.  
 
Since its formation, COFETEL has been strongly coordinated by the Ministry of 
Communications and Transportation. This means that COFETEL lacks real autonomy 
and consequently is subject to political decisions that can influence the regulatory 
process. In 2009, the Bank of Mexico’s governor declared that Telmex represents a 
factor that blocks competition in the telecommunications industry. He also indicated 
that Telmex is considered to be a company that offers its services at very high prices in 
the world. Such prices represent an obstacle for the country’s economic growth (All 
Business 2006). 
 
Noll (2007) states that the real reasons behind Telmex’s strong monopolistic power are 
related to political interests. He considers that Telmex became a private monopoly 
because President Salinas’ objective was to favour the political regime. Firstly, by 
selling Telmex to a national investor, Salinas was able to attract financial support to his 
political party’s electoral campaigns (Institutional Revolutionary Party – PRI). In other 
words, the owner of the company became a sponsor of the PRI’s economic and 
political plans. Secondly, by privatising Telmex without modifying its monopolistic 
structure, the company’s union was benefited. This means that the Telmex union’s 
labour force and political influence could be maintained. This union has been 
considered as a strong supporter of PRI governments. Therefore, it was important to 
keep the union’s status quo (SQ) without any change. Finally, the sale of Telmex to a 
Mexican investor represented a way to support the feeling of nationalism in different 
socio-economic sectors.  
 
President Salinas’ privatisation strategy gave Telmex strong political power. Telmex’s 
new owner (Carlos Slim) not only acquired an industrial monopoly, but also obtained an 
international reputation and extensive political power (Murillo 2004). This power has 
allowed the company to impose its conditions on the political system. During the 
administrations of Zedillo (1994–2000), Vicente Fox (2000–2006) and Felipe Calderón 
(2006–2012), Telmex has maintained its SQ. For instance, this company continues to 
carrying out its price gouging practices and delays or blocks competitors from 
accessing its network (Noll 2007). Moreover, it has not cut its prices even though 
technology has considerably reduced the companys costs (OECD 2009).     
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Noll indicates that COFETEL and the judicial authorities are captured. He points out 
that since its creation, this regulatory agency has ignored Telmex’s anticompetitive 
behaviour. Moreover, the courts have been playing an important role in protecting 
Telmex from the accusations about its monopolistic practices. Del Villar (2009) found 
evidence that shows how this company has obtained important injunctions that delayed 
for many years the judicial processes against it.  
 
5.3.1.2. The Privatisation of the Banking System 
The banking sector represents another important and controversial case in Mexico’s 
privatisation agenda. On 1st September 1982, President José López Portillo (1976–
1982) announced the nationalisation of private banks. The official reason that led the 
government to carry out this action was that for years, private banks had obtained an 
impressive amount of profit by using their monopolistic power against customers 
(McQuerry 1999). There are other scholars such as Haber (2005) who consider that 
this argument was used to distract people’s attention from the fiscal deficit, which could 
not be controlled by the government.  
 
Haber indicates that there was a fiscal crisis that was caused by the government’s poor 
taxation system. The Mexican authorities were expending more than they could obtain 
through that system. Consequently, the government used the banking sector’s services 
(including foreign banks) to finance its operations (e.g. in SOEs). In 1982, this situation 
worsened because the country started experiencing hyperinflation. These adverse 
scenarios led the government to stop paying its foreign debt, and dollar denominated 
bank accounts were changed to pesos. Moreover, President López Portillo accused 
banks of the exchange rate collapse128.    
 
To maintain banks under public ownership, the López Portillo administration 
established a legal framework for the banking system. In particular, the government 
modified constitutional articles 28 and 123. These amendments to the Constitution 
indicated that the Mexican state was the only institution that could offer financial 
services to the public. Moreover, these articles considered the banking system as a 
mechanism for promoting economic development (De Buen 2000). In this way, the 
government acquired 58 out of 60 banks by compensating private investors with 10-
year indemnification bonds. Only two banks were not nationalised, Banco Obrero 
(owned by a union) and a regional branch of Citibank (Welch and Gruben 1993). 
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However, the situation changed when President Miguel De la Madrid took office (1982–
1988). Contrary to López Portillo, the De la Madrid administration did not completely 
support the idea of state-owned banks. In addition, domestic and international capital 
markets strongly disagreed with the nationalisation. Since De la Madrid required the 
support of private investors to stabilise the economy, he started to liberalise the 
financial sector. According to Unal and Navarro (2005), the government modified three 
main structural elements of the banking sector. Firstly, banks were restructured and 
consolidated. For instance, these institutions were reduced from 49 in 1983 to 18 in 
1986. Secondly, the banks’ legal structure changed from corporations to credit 
associations. Their shares were converted to Certificados de Aportación Patrimonial 
(CAPs) – Capital Stock Certificates (class “A” shares) – and 34% of these certificates 
were sold to private investors. Finally, non-financial subsidiaries from the stated-owned 
banks were divested and sold to the former bank owners.    
 
President Carlos Salinas (1988–1994) continued with the banks’ liberalisation process. 
At this stage, and after the restructuring programme, the banking system represented a 
very profitable activity for the government (Barry et al. 1994). However, Salinas was 
firmly convinced of the market reforms’ benefits. Consequently, his privatisation 
strategy required the modification of the legal framework established by President 
López Portillo. On 2nd May 1990, Salinas’ administration submitted a constitutional 
amendment to Congress. The changes to articles 28 and 123 had the objective of 
allowing private investors to participate in the banking sector. This means that the 
government’s proposal consisted of excluding the financial sector from the strategic 
activities reserved for the Mexican state. Congress approved Salinas’ constitutional 
amendments without any key opposition (Unal and Navarro 2005).  
 
The banking sector privatisation started in June 1991 and finished in July 1992. The 18 
banks were sold to private investors for US$13 billion (Barnes 1992). The government 
and some analysts such as McQuerry (1999) declared the privatisation process 
successful, transparent and lucrative. Barnes (1992) and Unal and Navarro (1999) 
identify three main phases in the banking system privatisation process. The first phase 
consisted of analysing and selecting the potential bidders by the Bank Divestiture 
Committee. This committee was structured by the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 
Labour, the Ministry of Social Development, the Bank of Mexico, the Mexican Banking 
Commission and the National Securities Commission.  
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These organisations also had the objective of carrying out the economic valuation of 
the banks. The committee was assisted by external consultants. Merrill Lynch, 
Goldman Sachs, McKinsey, CS First Boston and Price Waterhouse were some of the 
consultancy firms that were closely involved in the process. Unal and Navarro (2005) 
indicate that each bank was valuated individually. The valuations focused on defining 
the reservation prices, which served to reveal the fairness of the bid prices. These 
companies also determined the equity values and the going concern values. The 
committee, the banks and the external consultants analysed all the valuation reports 
and their results were considered to be highly confidential129. Finally, one of the key 
requirements in this phase was that all the interested investors had to demonstrate 
their experience and capacity to manage a financial institution.  
 
In the second phase, the government carried out the auctions in which the investors 
made their bids. The winning bids had to be higher than the bids offered by other 
investors and the valuations of the banks, which were determined by the Bank 
Divestiture Committee. Moreover, to participate in the auction, investors had to sign a 
letter of confidentiality and make a security deposit to prove that they had sufficient 
financial resources to buy the banks. Banks were grouped in six packages of three and 
four institutions. This process allowed the government to auction all the banks at the 
same time. Finally, in the last phase, the banks were sold to the winning investors.  
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Table 5.3: Privatised banks 
 
 
 
 
                                        
 
 
 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       
           Source: Trillo and López (2011) 
 
Table 5.3 shows the privatised banks and their buyers. In particular, it indicates that 
Bancrecer was the bank that had the lowest price. It was sold at a price 2.53 times 
higher than its book value, whereas Atlántico was the institution with the highest price. 
It had a price 5.30 times higher than its book value. In this way, a new financial elite 
emerged from the acquisition of these institutions. According to Hoshino (1996), 
Mexico’s new businessmen can be classified into two categories: 1) investors who 
employed privatisation to strengthen their market power; and 2) new investors who 
took the chance of that structural programme to increase their reputation and therefore 
their economic power. These banks were sold to national businessmen. 
 
In addition to the implementation of market reforms, Salinas’ administration could reach 
important economic agreements (e.g. the North American Free Trade Agreement – 
NAFTA) with other countries. These factors sent positive signals to the international 
Banks Winning Investors Price 
(US$millions) 
Package 1 
Mercantil del Norte 
Banpaís 
Banca Cremi 
 
Package 2 
Banca Confía 
Banco del Oriente 
Bancrecer 
Banamex 
 
Package 3 
Bancomer 
BCH 
 
Package 4 
Serfin 
Comermex 
Mexicano Somex 
 
Package 5 
Atlántico 
Promex 
Banoro 
 
Package 6 
Mercantil del Norte 
Internacional 
Banco del Centro 
 
 
José Madariaga 
Angel Rodríguez 
Villa y Flores 
 
 
Jorge Lankenau 
Margain Berlanga 
Roberto Alcántara 
Hernández y Harp 
 
 
Garza Lagüera 
Carlos Cabal 
 
 
Sada y Luken 
Agustín Legorreta 
Gómez y Somoza 
 
 
De Garay y Rojas 
Eduardo Carrillo 
Rodolfo Esquer 
 
 
González Barrera 
Antonio del Valle 
Hugo Villa 
 
2.66 
3.02 
3.40 
 
 
3.73 
4.00 
2.53 
2.62 
 
 
2.99 
2.67 
 
 
2.69 
3.73 
4.15 
 
 
5.30 
4.23 
3.95 
 
 
4.25 
2.95 
4.65 
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markets and as a result, the country received net capital inflows of $120 billion between 
1990 and 1994. However, this scenario started changing dramatically because of three 
key political and social events.  
 
The first event occurred on 1st January 1994, when a guerrilla movement declared war 
against the Mexican government. In particular, the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación 
Nacional (EZLN) – the Zapatista Army of National Liberation that was formed by 
indigenous people from one of the country’s poorest areas (Chiapas) – demanded 
better socio-economic conditions (e.g. political autonomy, better health care services, 
respect for their human rights, etc.) for their communities. Interestingly, the EZLN 
initiated its social movement the day that NAFTA came into effect. The second event 
occurred on 23rd March 1994, when the PRI’s presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo 
Colosio, was assassinated. Finally, the third event occurred on 28th September 1994, 
when the PRI’s general secretary, José Francisco Ruiz-Massieu, was also 
assassinated.  
 
These events had an immediate impact on the economy. For instance, the country’s 
foreign currency reserves decreased from US$29.3 billion in February to US$17.7 
billion in March (Arner 1996). The Bank of Mexico attempted to decrease the outflow of 
capital by increasing interest rates from 10% to 17.8%. This situation was worsened by 
the unexpected rise of the US interest rates. The three-month T-bill rate increased from 
3% to 5.64% during 1994 (Urzúa 1997).  
 
The crisis erupted three weeks after President Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000) took office. 
The peso was devaluated and then it was allowed to freely float, because the 
government was not able to maintain the exchange rate (McQuerrry 1999). According 
to OECD (1995), this action had different severe effects on the Mexican economy. For 
instance, GDP growth fell from 4.4 to -6.2%, the unemployment rate doubled to 7% 
during the first eight months of 1995 and the prime lending rate increased from 17% in 
1994 to 58% by the middle of 1995. One of the consequences of the high interest rates 
was that people were unable to pay their bank debts. To protect their investments from 
the banks’ legal actions, many small socio-economic groups (e.g. farmers) formed 
important associations. El Barzón was a group of debtors that attempted to persuade 
the government to reduce their debts.  
 
There are different perspectives that explain the connection between the 1994–1995 
economic crisis and the collapse of the banking sector. Some analysts consider that 
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this economic shock was the factor that led to a crisis in the banking industry. More 
specifically, the policy-makers involved in the banks’ privatisation process support this 
argument (Haber and Kantor 2003). However, there is strong evidence that indicates 
that the privatisation worsened the 1995 economic crisis. In other words, the banking 
sector was already in a very critical condition before that economic shock.  
 
Haber and Kantor state that Salinas’ administration did not adequately design and 
implement the policy. There were different irregularities in the privatisation process that 
negatively influenced the banks’ operations. For instance, the government sold the 
banks without considering the new owners’ financial experience. This means that these 
investors lacked the knowledge to manage their institutions. Salinas’ administration 
only focused on maximising the banks’ prices without paying attention to other key 
elements. Moreover, the authorities did not have the regulatory mechanisms to control 
the banks’ behaviour. Consequently, these companies did not operate under 
international standards and were inefficient (Sigmond 2011). When the privatised 
banks started operating, credit rapidly increased. The high prices that investors paid for 
the banks led them to immediately recover their investments.  
 
The urgency of recovering such investments triggered competition among banks and 
therefore commercial lending increased considerably 130. For example, after the banks 
were completely privatised, mortgage loans increased 47% per year and credit offered 
by department stores for durable goods increased to 67% (McQuerry 1999). Gruben 
and McComb (1993) state that the banks expanded credit without reviewing people’s 
creditworthiness adequately. The inefficient analysis of this factor by the banking 
industry, the government’s inability to regulate the banks and a poor judicial system 
generated a large amount of non-performing loans (Sigmond 2011).  
 
The financial crisis not only uncovered the irregularities of the privatisation process, it 
also showed the corrupt practices carried out by the Mexican authorities and the banks’ 
owners. These events emerged when President Zedillo decided to bail the banks out of 
the financial collapse. The Fondo Bancario de Protección al Ahorro (FOBAPROA) – the 
Banking Fund for the Protection of Savings – was the programme used by the 
government to rescue the banking system. FOBAPROA’s main objective was to 
recapitalise all the private banks. Moreover, this programme acquired these financial 
institutions’ debts.  
                                                          
130
 Ibid. 
126 
 
The cost of the bailout was estimated to be around US$120 billion (Galván 2009), 
which was converted into public debt by President Zedillo and his political allies (e.g. 
the National Action Party). This decision was considered to be an illegal action, 
because there were constitutional restrictions that did not allow the federal authorities 
to acquire debt. It represented a significant fiscal cost for the country. The problem was 
that a considerable number of the FOBAPROA’s liabilities were non-performing loans 
generated by the bankers themselves. More specifically, these investors obtained 
loans from their own banks at low interest rates for their ghost companies.  
 
The political opposition found evidence that shows that the privatised banks’ owners 
were closely related to President Salinas 131 . The banks were given to small and 
powerful interest groups related to the political regime. Moreover, Ramírez (2003) 
states that a group of families that owned and controlled the banks before the 1982 
nationalisation recovered their financial institutions. Some of these investors 
contributed financially to the 1994 and 2000 presidential campaigns. For example, 
Carlos Cabal Peniche, who owned BCH (see Table 5.3), was accused of illegally 
financing President Zedillo’s political campaign. He contributed US$30 million, obtained 
from bad loans, to the PRI’s political activities. The loans were absorbed by 
FOBAPROA (Smith 1998). The negative effects of the privatisation on the economy 
angered people enormously. As a result, this situation was one of the factors that led 
the PRI to lose the majority in Congress in the 1997 mid-term elections (Haber 2005). 
 
5.3.2. Private Sector Participation in the Mexican Electricity Industry  
5.3.2.1. The Independent Power Producers’ Structure 
In Chapter 4, we indicated that the Ley del Servicio Público de Energía Eléctrica 
(LSPEE) – the Electricity Act or IPP Law – was the legal mechanism that allowed the 
partial participation of private companies in electricity generation in the Mexican 
market. Moreover, the amendment to constitutional article 27 allowed private investors 
to participate in the natural gas sector. More specifically, companies can freely store, 
transport and distribute this kind of fuel in the country. The reason that the government 
decided to open the gas industry was because the economy does not have the 
infrastructure (e.g. pipelines) to transfer large amounts of gas to areas where the 
demand is high. However, the investors can only focus their operations on the proven 
gas reserves and therefore they cannot participate in the exploration of other gas fields 
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(Núñez-Luna 2005). The key companies that have been investing in this area are Gas 
Natural (Spain), Tractebel (Belgium) and Sempra (US)132.  
 
At the end of the 1980s there were two projects called Carbón II and Rosarito that had 
the objective of generating electricity under an operative structure similar to the 
independent power producers (IPPs). These investments could not be implemented 
because the government did not have enough technical knowledge to control these 
coal-fueled generators correctly (Protego 2000). In 1997, the government granted the 
first IPP project to the American company AES Mérida III. Table 5.4 shows that this 
electricity generator started operating in 2000 with a total investment of US$214 million. 
At the moment there are 21 IPPs that generate electricity, which is sold to CFE. In 
2007, the total investment under this scheme was around US$7 billion. 
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Table 5.4: Independent power producers in Mexico 
Company Authorised 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Authorised 
Energy 
(GW/Year) 
Investment (in 
thousand 
USD) 
Date of 
Operation 
1. Mérida III  
2. Fuerza y Energía de 
Hermosillo 
3. Central Anáhuac 
4. Central Saltillo 
5. Energía Azteca VIII 
6. Electricidad Aguila de 
Tuxpan 
7. Iberdrola Energía 
Monterrey 
8. Transalta Campeche 
9. Electricidad Aguila de 
Altamira 
10. Fuerza y Energía de 
Naco-Nogales 
11. Energía Azteca X 
12. Fuerza y Energía de 
Tuxpan 
13. Iberdrola Energía 
Altamira 
14. Transalta Chihuahua 
15. Central Lomas de Real 
16. Central Valle Hermoso 
17. Iberdrola Energía La 
Laguna 
18. Iberdrola Energía del 
Golfo 
19. Compañía de 
Generación de 
Valladolid 
20. Electricidad Sol de 
Tuxpan 
21. Iberdrola Energía 
Tamazunchale 
531 
 
253 
569 
247 
597 
 
535 
 
570 
275 
 
565 
 
339 
597 
 
1120 
 
1154 
318 
541 
547 
 
518 
 
1089 
 
 
563 
 
548 
 
1079 
3400 
 
1800 
3700 
1650 
4399 
 
3707 
 
3685 
2103 
 
3631 
 
1920 
4850 
 
7362 
 
7797 
2174 
3780 
3700 
 
3704 
 
8259 
 
 
3849 
 
3787 
 
8518 
292,325 
 
138,985 
312,730 
136,125 
328,350 
 
294,558 
 
313,500 
151,250 
 
310,915 
 
188,615 
328,488 
 
616,000 
 
636,535 
174,845 
297,550 
300,850 
 
284,790 
 
598,862 
 
 
309,870 
 
301,620 
 
593,362 
2000 
 
2001 
2002 
2001 
2002 
 
2001 
 
2002 
2003 
 
2002 
 
2003 
2003 
 
2003 
 
2003 
2003 
2004 
2005 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
 
2006 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
Source: Energy Regulatory Commission (2005). 
 
The IPPs in Mexico are mainly international corporations. In particular, Unión Fenosa 
(Spain), Iberdrola (Spain), Mitsubishi Corporation (Japan), Mitsui & Co., Ltd (Japan), 
Transalta Energy Corporation (Canada), Électricité de France EDF (France), AES (US) 
and Intergen (US) are the key players in the electricity market. In this way, these IPPs 
generate 40% of the electricity in the country, which is a very high level (see Graph 
5.1).     
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      Source: Own estimations with data from the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) 
 
 
In 2007, the companies’ market shares were: Iberdrola had a market share of 34%; 
Électricité de France (EDF) 16%; Unión Fenosa 14%; Mitsubishi Corporation 13%; 
Intergen 9%; Mitsui & Co., Ltd 5%; Transalta Energy 4%; and AES 5%. Graph 5.2 
shows that Iberdrola has the highest market share, whereas Transalta Energy has the 
lowest market share in the Mexican electricity industry.     
  
 
 
            Source: Own estimations with data from Pérez (2010). 
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Graph 5.1: Electricity generation by source 
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Graph 5.2: Independent power producers' market shares 
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Table 5.5: Development of the IPPs’ market shares in 
the Mexican electricity industry (%) 
Company 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
AES 
EDF 
Iberdrola 
Intergen 
Mitsubishi Corporation 
Mitsui & Co., Ltd 
Transalta Energy 
Unión Fenosa 
100 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
80 
4 
- 
- 
5 
- 
- 
11 
15 
29 
11 
17 
23 
- 
- 
5 
12 
20 
10 
16 
17 
- 
5 
20 
7 
18 
20 
15 
11 
- 
7 
22 
7 
19 
25 
13 
11 
- 
6 
19 
 
5 
20 
26 
11 
11 
3 
5 
18 
 
5 
15 
34 
9 
13 
5 
4 
14 
    
         Source: Own estimations with data from Pérez (2010). 
 
Table 5.5 shows the development of the private companies’ market shares from 2000 
to 2007. It indicates that in 2000, AES was the only company that was generating and 
selling electricity to CFE. In 2002, Iberdrola started its operations with a market share 
of 11%, whereas EDF was the main player in the industry with a market share of 29%. 
According to Pérez (2010), in 2002 Iberdrola sold 2.2 billion kilowatt hours (kWh) to 
CFE. In 2007, the electricity sold by the same company increased to 24 billion kWh. 
During the same period, Électricité de France increased its electricity sales to CFE 
from 179 million to 9 billion kWh.  
 
Table 5.6: The cost of electricity compared to  
CFE’s programmable expenditure 
Year Total Amount of Electricity 
Sold to CFE by IPPs (GWh) 
CFE’s 
Programmable 
Expenditure (in 
million USD) 
Cost Paid for 
IPPs’ Electricity 
by CFE (in 
million USD)  
% 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
Total 
1,227,629,008 
4,005,092,131 
21,204,654,900 
30,112,095,663 
45,579,280,460 
45,157,439,828 
58,074,316,962 
70,291,803,793 
275,652,312,745 
10,782 
11,144 
11,246 
14,560 
14,691 
17,602 
18,582 
18,764 
117,371 
59 
165 
791 
1,874 
3,224 
3,917 
4,169 
4,991 
19,190 
0.55 
1 
7 
13 
22 
22 
22 
26 
- 
        
       Source: Own estimations with data from Pérez (2010). 
 
Table 5.6 shows the amount of electricity sold to CFE. We can observe that from 2000 
to 2007, CFE purchased 275, 652 million kWh with a total cost of more than US$19 
billion. We can also observe that in 2000, the cost paid by CFE for the electricity 
generated by IPPs represented only 0.55% of the utility’s programmable expenditure. 
However, in 2007 the cost of electricity increased to US$4.9 billion, which represented 
26% of the company’s programmable expenditure.    
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Table 5.7: Operating reserve margin in the Mexican electricity industry (%) 
Month 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
Average 
 
17 
9 
7 
20 
11 
15 
16 
13 
12 
14 
10 
8 
13 
8 
4 
1 
3 
3 
10 
0 
2 
1 
2 
8 
8 
4 
5 
7 
1 
2 
5 
8 
6 
3 
3 
4 
1 
1 
4 
4 
7 
3 
5 
7 
10 
12 
4 
11 
4 
13 
11 
7 
4 
10 
8 
12 
7 
15 
19 
18 
17 
20 
13 
24 
14 
18 
20 
17 
15 
15 
16 
22 
20 
17 
12 
11 
9 
16 
 
20 
7 
22 
17 
13 
13 
22 
9 
11 
14 
13 
12 
14 
17 
23 
14 
12 
15 
14 
19 
15 
17 
18 
13 
19 
15 
26 
25 
22 
27 
22 
24 
24 
28 
26 
27 
23 
24 
25 
 
       Source: Sener (2000).  
 
Table 5.7 provides very interesting data on the industry’s operating reserve margin 
(ORM). The ORM indicates the national electricity system’s capability level (expressed 
as a percentage). It is used to determine if the system satisfies the country’s electricity 
demand. According to Pérez (2010), in 1998 the CFE’s executive board, the Ministry of 
Energy, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Audit considered that the electricity 
generation capacity had to be 6% higher than the electricity demand. In Table 5.7, we 
can observe that the ORM increased from 13% in 2000 to 25% in 2007. In other words, 
this industry has been generating electricity above the optimal level agreed by the 
authorities. 
 
In the particular case of 2007, the ORM indicates that there is a significant electricity 
oversupply of 19%, which has not been used by CFE. Consequently, this situation can 
be very costly for the public finances, because the government is paying for an 
underused electricity generation system. This evidence also tells us that the IPPs have 
been displacing the CFE’s participation in electricity production. 
 
5.3.2.2. Two Key Problems in Mexico’s IPP Programme  
In this section, we have selected two key cases that show some of the problems in the 
Mexican electricity industry (MEI). In particular, the first case is the Pidiregas 
programme, which is the financial structure that the government has been using to 
expand the electricity supply system. The Pidiregas projects have been considered by 
analysts as a very costly financial alternative for the country. The second case offers 
an example of the different irregularities found in the CFE’s investment projects. We 
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present an analysis of a natural gas supply contract between the CFE and a private 
company. 
 
(i) The Pidiregas projects 
In Chapter 4, we stated that the Proyectos de Impacto Diferido en el Registro del Gasto 
(PIDIREGAS) – Deferred Impact Status Projects – were the mechanisms that the 
government has been using to finance part of the expansion in the country’s electricity 
generation system. In December 1995, Article 18 of the Federal Public Debt Law and 
article 30 of the Federal Public, Budgetary, Accounting and Expenditures Law (now 
article 32 of the Budget Law) were modified to allow the government to create a long-
term contingent public debt scheme to finance large-scale infrastructure investments in 
the energy sector (oil and electricity). The federal authorities stated that the country’s 
low public revenue, the 1994–1995 economic crisis and the lack of internal financing 
were the factors that led them to opt for the Pidiregas projects.  
 
The Pidiregas projects have to satisfy certain conditions to be approved by the federal 
authorities. For instance, these projects have to be strategic investments for the 
economy and generate enough economic resources (revenue) to meet their own 
payment obligations (White and Case 2009). Thus, there are two kinds of Pidiregas 
projects: 1) direct Investments; and 2) conditional Investments. In the first type of 
investment, private companies finance and develop the infrastructure projects. When 
the project is concluded, the government is obligated to purchase it and its cost is 
considered as public debt. In theory, the government pays it by using the revenue that 
will be generated by such an investment (OECD 2005).  
 
In the case of conditional investments, the infrastructure projects (e.g. power plants) 
are financed, built, owned and operated by private companies (Draisma and Urbiola 
2001). Under this scheme, the government is contractually bound to acquire the 
electricity generated by these private power stations during a specific period. The 
investments are considered as contingent liabilities and the government absorbs the 
risk. The Pidiregas projects are annually amortised and this process is based on a 
period agreed between the government and the private companies. The cost of direct 
and conditional investments is included in the federal annual budget.  
 
The Pidiregas projects have a duration of 40 years and can be renewed. According to 
the Ministry of Finance, the country has been paying for these projects since 1996, and 
such payments will continue to be made to private investors until 2041. In 2009, the 
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cost of the Pidiregas projects was US$28 billion. In particular, direct investments 
represented 64% of the total cost and conditional investments represented 34%. There 
are three direct investment projects that concentrate most of the public expenditure in 
the electricity industry. Pacífico is a coal-fired power station that is located in the State 
of Guerrero, which started operating in February 2007. The cost of this investment is 
around US$1.1 billion. El Cajón is a hydroelectric power station that started operating 
in November 2006 and is located in the State of Nayarit. The cost of this power station 
is US$1.1 billion133.  
 
La Yesca is another hydroelectric power station that will start operating in December 
2012. The cost of the investment project is US$1.1 billion. From the IPPs’ initial 
operations to 2009, the government has paid US$22.5 billion for the electricity 
generated under the conditional investment scheme. This value represents only 17% of 
the total revenue that the private companies will receive during the agreed period. It 
means that from 2010 to 2041, the IPPs will obtain US$111 billion, which represents 
the remaining 83% of their planned total revenue134.  
 
What are the key problems in the Pidiregas scheme? We consider that the Pidiregas 
have been generating a huge amount of debt. Such liabilities will be paid by increasing 
taxes and by transferring economic resources from other sectors’ programmable 
budgets. If the government reallocates these resources, people’s welfare could be 
severely affected by the reductions in important social development programmes. In 
the particular case of the direct investment projects, we can state that the government 
did not need to pay for the power plants built by the private companies. This is because 
the CFE has been considered to be a financially stable company135. Consequently, this 
state-owned utility is able to obtain resources from the international financial market at 
lower interest rates than the private sector to build the power plants. 
 
According to ECLAC (2001), the Pidiregas projects have other negative effects on the 
country’s public finances. For instance, these projects are considered to be risky 
investments by the international capital markets. As a result, the country’s debt levels 
can also be rated as very risky. Since the Pidiregas are included in the country’s total 
debt, the government has a lower debt capacity. Finally, the direct investment projects 
were not well justified by the government. The Ministry of Finance has accepted that 
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the CFE significantly inflated the Pidiregas projects’ expected revenues. The public 
utility manipulated the information to show that the power stations were financially 
viable (Cruz 2005).  
 
Other irregularities have been found in the direct investment projects. For instance, in 
1998, the CFE started paying interest for the power plant Samalayuca II. One year 
later, the public utility initiated the amortisation of the project. However, Samalayuca II 
was not generating revenue during those years. Although in 2000 the power plant did 
generate revenue, these resources were not enough to cover its financial costs 
(interests and amortisation) for that specific year (Rodríguez 2002). 
 
Similarly, we consider that conditional investments (IPPs) represent a high cost for the 
economy. As we observed in the previous section, the Mexican electricity industry’s 
generation capacity is significantly high but has not been completely used. In addition 
to the IPP projects that are currently operating in Mexico, the government has 
approved the construction of another five new projects. These IPPs are called Noreste, 
Norte II, Guadalajara I, Norte and Baja California III. From 2010 to 2041, the 
government will be gradually paying US$43 billion for the electricity generated by these 
private companies. The IPPs will start operating between 2010 and 2016.  
 
There is an oversupply of electricity that is generating an enormous debt, which has to 
be paid during the following forty years. The authorities have accepted that the CFE 
overestimated the electricity supply for the country. For instance, in 2006, the power 
plants built by private companies did not use 30% of their total generation capacity 
(Cruz 2006). In 2010, the CFE decided to reduce its electricity supply by 16% (26,218 
GWh). Moreover, the CFE is shutting down its power stations in order to allow IPPs to 
generate electricity. Another problem is that the IPPs generate electricity by using 
natural gas. At the moment, Mexico has not carried out enough exploration and 
exploitation of natural gas reserves. Consequently, the country has to import gas at 
very high prices.  
 
(ii) The CFE-Repsol natural gas contract 
In April 2008, former presidential candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) 
accused the CFE of illegally awarding a natural gas contract to Repsol. In particular, 
AMLO publicly declared that the state-owned electricity utility gave the Spanish oil 
company a contract that was not subject to a clear bidding process. This permission 
allowed Repsol to supply and sell natural gas to the CFE for IPPs’ electricity 
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generation. By studying the information provided by AMLO’s Gobierno Legítimo de 
México (GLM) – Mexico’s Legitimate Government136 – we find key irregularities in the 
contracts’ bidding process.  
 
The information we analysed is structured by a significant group of fourteen files: the 
CFE-Repsol natural gas contract (File no. 1-2008); Repsol’s hydrocarbon exploration 
and production contract in Peru (File no. 2-2008); Peru’s presidential decree for 
exploring and producing hydrocarbons in lot 88; and Repsol’s different press bulletins 
about its investment programme in gas exploration and production in Peru (File no. 3-
2008). Further files include Mexico’s Official Journal of the Federation – 6th June 2006 
(File no. 4-2008); the natural gas terminal project in Manzanillo, Mexico (File no. 5-
2008); the CFE’s press bulletin which announces that Repsol won the contract for 
supplying natural gas to the Manzanillo terminal and a news bulletin which states that 
Repsol was the only company that presented a project for supplying gas to CFE (File 
no. 6-2008); Repsol’s Annual Report for the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the New York Stock Exchange NYSE (File no. 7-2008); an analysis of 
natural gas’s liquefaction costs (File no. 8-2008); an analysis of the effects of the CFE-
Repsol contracts on the Mexican economy (File no. 9-2008); the contract’s fifth 
modification for hydrocarbon production in lot 88 (File no. 10-2008); permission to 
initiate legal action against the Peruvian authorities who awarded lot 88 to Repsol (File 
no. 11-2008); Repsol’s press bulletin which announces the acquisition of different 
combined-cycle power plants from Électricité de France and Mitsubishi in Mexico (File 
no. 12-2008); PEMEX’s press bulletin which indicates that Repsol won a contract to 
develop a non-associated gas block in the field of Burgos (File no. 13-2008); and the 
Superior Auditing Office of the Federation’s report about the acquisition of Repsol’s 
shares by PEMEX (File no. 14-2008).   
 
(ii.i) Analysis of the contract’s bidding process 
According to the above group of information, we can state that in 2007 the federal 
government reached an agreement with Repsol in order to get a natural gas supply for 
electricity generation. In particular, the contract states that Repsol will supply the CFE 
with 500 million cubic feet of gas daily from Peru. This business operation has been 
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considered by the Spanish company as one of its most important and profitable 
projects in the world (File no. 1-2008). 
 
GLM (2008) states that in 2005 the federal government was working internally on a gas 
supply project and on a regasification investment programme in Manzanillo City. Under 
unexplained circumstances, Repsol obtained information about the CFE’s investment 
plans in Manzanillo. Then, on 12th December 2005, Repsol joined the group of private 
investors that had originally been awarded the concession to explore and exploit a gas 
reserve in the Camisea region, Peru137. In particular, the Spanish company obtained an 
investment participation of 10% in gas exploitation, 10% in transportation (via a pipeline 
network) and 20% in the liquefaction plant. Moreover, the company got an exclusivity 
agreement for gas commercialisation (File no. 2-2008).  
 
To get approval to participate in this project, Repsol had to inform the Peruvian 
government that it was going to sell natural gas to Mexico and to the United States 
(GLM 2008). Once the company got authorisation from Peru, Repsol’s contract was 
structured over eighteen years, three years for building the liquefaction plant and its 
pipeline network, and fifteen years for gas commercialisation. This meant that by 2011, 
Repsol was going to be technically able to supply gas to Mexico (File no. 3-2008). It is 
important to consider that Repsol had not held any previous legal contract to supply 
natural gas to Mexico. Under these conditions, how did Repsol know that it was going 
to sell gas to the CFE in 2005, one and a half years before the Manzanillo’s 
international bidding process was publicly opened? 
 
On 6th June 2006, the CFE officially announced the bidding process for the gas supply 
project and Manzanillo’s regasification plant in the Official Journal of the Federation 
(File no. 4-2008). According to this journal, the project offered an investment plan of 25 
years to the winning contractor (File. no. 4-2008). However, on the CFE web page, the 
length of the contract was reduced to twenty years (File no. 5-2008). 
 
On 18th September 2007, the CFE gave Repsol the contract, as no other private 
company participated in the international bidding process (GLM 2008 and File no. 1-
2008). The length of the contract was again modified; the gas supply agreement 
between the two companies was reduced to 15 years, which perfectly matched with 
Repsol’s gas commercialisation contract in Peru (File no. 6-2008). Moreover, and 
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according to File no. 7-2008, Repsol publicly announced that the end of the 
construction of the liquefaction plant in the Pampa Melchorita region of Peru would fall 
in late 2010, just before it would begin supplying gas to Mexico.    
 
(ii.ii) Analysis of the Manzanillo gas project’s costs  
According to the contract, the CFE would pay Repsol US$15 billion for the gas supply 
programme. However, this cost was estimated by using America’s Henry Hub Natural 
Gas Index (HHGI), which is considered to be the world’s most expensive gas reference 
price. It is traded in the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and the index is 
therefore expected to increase year by year according to various financial forecasts 
(GLM 2008). In particular, Repsol offered to sell its gas at 91% of the index level minus 
three cents per million British Thermal Units, BTU (File no. 9-2008). GLM states that 
the project costs were extremely inflated and therefore will negatively affect the 
country’s public finances.    
 
In order to understand the contract’s real value without using the HHGI, first we need to 
change cubic feet into million BTU138. For instance, if one cubic foot of natural gas is 
equivalent to 1,032 BTU, then (500 million cubic feet of gas) x (1.032) gives a result of 
516 million BTU. In this way, Repsol will supply the CFE with 90, 180, 360 and 400 
million cubic feet (CFT) of gas per day during the contract’s first four years respectively. 
Moreover, the Spanish company will supply Mexico with 500 million CFT during the 
following eleven years. Table 5.8 shows the conversion of these gas volumes from 
cubic feet into BTU. 
  
 
                       Table 5.8: Repsol’s natural gas programme for Mexico 
Year Million Cubic Feet 
per Day 
Million BTU 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5-15 
Total 
90 
180 
360 
400 
500 
92.9 
185.8 
371.5 
412.8 
5,676 
6,739 
 
                              Source: File 9-2008 
 
When the contract was signed in March 2008, the HHGI was US$9.70 per million BTU. 
Consequently, the price the CFE had to pay for Repsol’s gas was: (0.91 x 9.70) – 0.03 
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= 8.797, practically US$8.80 per million BTU. By using this information, we can state 
that the total cost of the business operation between the CFE and Repsol was 
estimated to be more than US$21 billion (see Table 5.9).  
 
 
            Table 5.9: Projected payments to Repsol 
Year Million BTU Days Price Annual Payments 
(USD) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
From year 
no. 6 to 
year no. 
15 
 
Total 
92.9 
185.8 
371.5 
412.8 
516.0 
 
 
 
 
365 
365 
365 
365 
365 
 
8.80 
8.80 
8.80 
8.80 
8.80 
 
 
298,330,560 
596,661,120 
1,193,325,452 
1,325,916,812 
1,657,395,212 
 
 
 
16,573,952,120 
 
21,645,581,276 
     
    Source: File no. 9-2008 
 
According to an analysis carried out by GLM, Repsol’s maximum price of gas per 
million BTU is US$2.45 139 . This cost is structured by the following elements: 1) 
production cost – 60 cents (per million BTU); 2) pipeline transport of the gas to the 
liquefaction plant – 40 cents (per million BTU); 3) liquefaction costs – US$1 (per million 
BTU); and 4) ship transport to Manzanillo – 45 cents (per million BTU). This price 
includes the company’s direct costs and its profits. In other words, Repsol’s real price 
of bringing natural gas from Peru to Mexico is US$6.35 cheaper than the contract’s 
agreed price (US$8.80). 
 
With this information we can determine how much the cost of the contract was 
overestimated. If we multiply the total natural gas imports (6,738,960)140 x the natural 
gas’ real price (2.45 USD) x (365 days), we obtain a real cost of US$6,026,314,980. In 
other words, Repsol is obtaining highly additional profits of US$15.6 billion 
(21,645,581,276
141
 - 6,026,314,980). However, GLM (2008) indicates that the federal 
government has been publicly stating that the contract’s cost is US$15 billion. GLM 
considers that the government is hiding the real cost of the transaction with a figure 
based on an index that tends to increase.  
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There is another irregularity in this business operation. While the CFE was buying 
natural gas for electricity generation at a very high price, Repsol protected itself against 
price variations. The contract between Repsol and the Peruvian government gave the 
Spanish company certain price limits that isolate it from price fluctuations that could 
negatively affect its financial structure. In particular, the contract states that the annual 
accumulated price increases for gas will not be higher than 5% during the first six years 
and 7% during the following five years (File no. 10-2008). This situation attracted the 
attention of Peru’s National Audit Office (Contraloría General de la República) and led 
it to investigate this agreement. The office found irregularities in the contract and 
ordered legal action against the authorities involved in this case (File no. 11-2008). 
 
Although there is no public information about the terms and conditions of the contract 
between the Peruvian government and Repsol, there is evidence of the National Audit 
Office’s resolutions. Some of the statements made by this organisation about this case 
are: “The adopted decisions (the contract) were against the State’s interests; these 
actions show that there was abuse of authority and omissions against the country’s 
penal code”; “According to the group of auditors, this operation allowed the winning 
contractor (Repsol and other players) to save a large sum of money because Peru will 
receive fixed royalty payments for the hydrocarbons exploitation in Camisea”; “A 
contract based on a fluctuating price system would have benefited Peru’s public 
finances because the price of hydrocarbons and other minerals tend to increase”; 
“Peru’s Hydrocarbons Law states that the projects’ royalty payments cannot be fixed 
and therefore they have to fluctuate and be subject to external changes” (File no. 11-
2008). This information clearly shows that the terms and conditions of the contract did 
not benefit Peru but considerably favoured this Spanish corporation.  
 
(ii.iii) CFE’s position on the Manzanillo gas project 
According to the CFE’s executive director, Alfredo Elías-Ayúb, the public utility did not 
favour the Spanish company. In particular, he stated that the contract was crucial for 
Mexico because they needed to guarantee the country’s electricity supply. In terms of 
the public bidding process, he declared that the CFE invited the Fundación Heberto 
Castillo – the Heberto Castillo Foundation – a very respectable left-wing organisation, 
to be a social witness (testigo social). Elías-Ayub stated that “this foundation observed 
how the CFE’s executives carried out a transparent bidding process ... the price of 
natural gas is 10% below the gas from the U.S. Therefore, we could save US$ 1.5 
billion with this operation” (El Universal 2008). Moreover, Elías-Ayub indicated that the 
natural gas from the Pacific area is limited. Consequently, Repsol had to build a high-
140 
 
tech pipeline network and other sophisticated infrastructures to obtain this fuel from 
Peru. The executive director recognised that he did not know how much economic 
resources Repsol obtained from its contract in that Latin American country142.  
 
However, the Gobierno Legítimo de México (GLM) and the Heberto Castillo 143 
Foundation itself strongly rejected all Elías-Ayub’s statements (La Jornada 2008a). In 
particular, Mrs Laura Itzel Castillo 144  and the foundation’s president María Teresa 
Juárez145 stated that the organisation’s name was illegally used by the CFE. They 
accused the electricity utility of publishing a press bulletin in a national newspaper to 
defend its contract with Repsol without the organisation’s permission. Moreover, they 
stated that the person who acted as the social witness during the bidding process, 
David Shields-Campbell, had already stopped working for the foundation. The opinions 
and observations he made about the contract represented his own point of view 
entirely. For instance, he signed the CFE’s International Public Bidding Act – no. 
18164067-009-06, in which Repsol presents the only offer to participate in the 
investment project. The foundation threatened to take legal action against the people 
who were responsible for this action146. 
 
5.4. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presented a discussion of the key events that have influenced Mexico’s 
economic development. We also showed that important privatisation programmes have 
not generated positive results for the people. The sale of Teléfonos de México 
(TELMEX) without modifying its monopolistic structure, the lack of competition and the 
high concentration levels in the telecommunications industry have been very costly for 
the economy.  
 
According to OCDE (2012), from 2005 to 2009 the high prices in the 
telecommunications sector significantly reduced people’s welfare by US$25 billion per 
year. During this period, consumers paid an extra total cost of US$129 billion for their 
telecommunications services (fixed telephone lines, mobile telephony and Internet 
access). This international organisation points out that this welfare loss is severely 
affecting a country with high poverty and inequality levels. The World Bank also 
recognised that the Mexican authorities did not choose the correct privatisation 
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strategy. This institution considered that the best option was to split Telmex into 
different companies147. Similarly, the bad privatisation process of the banking system 
led to the FOBAPROA bailout that cost US$120 billion. One of the irregularities found 
in this process was that the banks were sold to interest groups that were strongly 
connected to the political regime. Bad loans were used to finance the PRI’s political 
campaigns.  
 
The reform to the Ley del Servicio Público de Energía Eléctrica (LSPEE) – the 
Electricity Act – has negatively affected the country’s public finances. The evidence 
demonstrates that the country is paying a high cost for the electricity generated by the 
IPPs. Moreover, the MEI’s total generation capacity is significantly higher than the 
projected electricity demand. The cost of the electricity and the direct investment 
projects constitute a long-term debt that the country will have to pay during the 
following 41 years. This situation confirms that the strategy for allowing the private 
sector to participate in the MEI was not planned adequately.  
 
The natural gas contract revealed a delicate situation in the MEI. Why was Repsol the 
only company that presented the investment project? How did Repsol know about the 
Manzanillo project one and a half years before the CFE officially announced the 
bidding process? Why were the contract’s costs extremely inflated by the Mexican 
government (from 6 to 21 USD billion)? We consider that there are high corruption 
levels in this sector, which are generating large losses for the public finances. It is a 
very complex situation because top-level executives are directly involved in these 
illegal practices. In September 2011, the CFE’s Head of Operations was accused of 
illegal enrichment. The executive, Nestor Moreno, received a luxury yacht, a Ferrari 
and several million dollars in exchange for lucrative contracts for American companies 
(Luhnow 2010). Moreno has been investigated by the US. federal authorities, whereas 
the Mexican counterparts have remained silent about it.  
 
In conclusion, the evidence presented in this chapter showed that Mexico’s 
privatisation programme did not generate positive results for the economy. The 
privatisations were not adequately implemented and the political interests strongly 
influenced the companies’ operations. Although the MEI has not been privatised, the 
limited private sector participation has been extremely costly for society. In other 
words, we consider that these policies failed to achieve the benefits promised by the 
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political regime. In the next chapter, we continue with the analysis of the privatisation 
agenda. In particular, we focus our attention on understanding why the political system 
was unable to implement its privatisation strategy in the electricity sector. We propose 
an alternative theoretical approach to study this phenomenon.  
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CHAPTER 6: APPLYING PROSPECT THEORY TO THE NON-
PRIVATISATION OF MEXICO’S ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
The energy sector reform is Mexico’s most important structural reform programme. The 
federal government considers the privatisation programme of the electricity industry to 
be one of the key elements that can strengthen the country’s economic development. 
For that reason, a proposal to modify the Constitution in order to privatise the Mexican 
Electricity Industry (MEI) was introduced in 1999 by President Ernesto Zedillo (1994–
2000) from the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). The second privatisation 
proposal was presented by President Vicente Fox from the National Action Party 
(PAN). In both cases, the proposals were rejected by the different players involved in 
the political dynamics.  
 
Why were Presidents Ernesto Zedillo and Vicente Fox unable to implement their 
electricity privatisation proposals? We consider that these two federal administrations 
could not implement these economic policies because they faced a dynamic decision-
making process that involved risky and risk averse choices. We propose prospect 
theory (PT) as our methodological framework to explain these interesting behaviours. 
“Of course, one could say that is just political opportunism: The opposition likes to 
oppose! But from a prospect-theory perspective, it may also reflect the changing 
economic fortunes of the energy sector” (interview with Kurt Weyland 2005) 
 
This chapter is divided into four main sections. Section 6.2 presents the methodology 
design. In particular, it describes the two different models that we use to answer the 
above question. In section 6.3, we apply PT to understand why President Zedillo could 
not implement his electricity privatisation project. As an introductory context, we explain 
why the Ley del Servicio Público de Energía Eléctrica (LSPEE) – Electricity Act – could 
successfully be reformed during Salinas’ administration. Section 6.4 analyses why 
President Vicente Fox was unable to apply his electricity privatisation proposal. It is 
important to highlight that this study focuses mainly on exploring the political dynamics 
and the decision-making process of the two failed privatisation projects.  
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6.2. METHODOLOGY DESIGN 
6.2.1. Justification of the Research 
It is well known that the PRI and the PAN have the same economic platform and have 
supported each other’s policies (e.g. tax increases, bank bailouts, etc.) for many years. 
Also, both political structures consider the MEI privatisation as one of the economy’s 
main issues. However, the behaviour of these two parties has shown a different 
picture; both institutions have not reached any agreement in Congress to completely 
open the electricity sector to private investors. The two parties could easily form a 
coalition to approve the federal government’s market policy, but it has not occurred.  
 
The electricity privatisation proposals were rejected twice. As we discussed in Chapter 
4, in 1999 President Ernesto Zedillo publicly presented the first proposal. Zedillo’s 
administration required the National Action Party (PAN)’s support to have a majority in 
Congress to implement this economic project. However, the PAN did not support him. 
The president of the Energy Regulatory Commission, Xavier Salazar, simply stated that 
the PAN did not support Zedillo because the party’s candidate was very competitive 
and therefore it decided to discuss the proposal during the next administration. After 
President Vicente Fox took office, the PAN government presented its own proposal, but 
it was not supported by the different political actors, including the PRI.  
 
We consider that the decisions to not privatise the electricity industry are confusing and 
contradict these political players’ economic objectives (the implementation of a 
structural change in the electricity industry). The Party of the Democratic Revolution 
(PRD), Mexico’s left-wing party, has always been against any change in the Mexican 
Constitution in terms of the energy sector. The PRD’s position about reform will rarely 
be in support of modifying (from public to private ownership) the current status quo of 
the industry.  
 
The decision whether to carry out a privatisation programme or not has to be well 
evaluated by policy-makers. If policy-makers take inefficient decisions, the process of 
transforming an industrial sector can be negatively affected and therefore be very 
costly for the country’s economy (see the privatisation cases in Chapter 5). 
Consequently, a privatisation strategy has to be viewed as a risky choice. Under these 
conditions, we consider that policy-makers have to carry out their decision-making 
process by considering the context of the electricity sector. 
By analysing how other Latin American economies have instituted market reforms, we 
find some evidence that shows that political leaders faced risky situations when 
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deciding to reform their economies. In Chapter 3 we discussed how countries such as 
Argentina, Brazil and Peru experienced certain factors that shaped the context of such 
decision-makers’ and citizens’ choices during the 1990s. More specifically, serious 
economic crises triggered the implementation of painful market policies. This means 
that they moved from relaxed economic policies to bold and risky neo-liberal measures, 
which promised to end with economic chaos in those countries. Under this logic, we 
consider that the Mexican case in terms of the electricity sector showed some 
characteristics similar to the above countries. This phenomenon attracted our attention 
and therefore led us to explore the decision-making processes of the debate about the 
MEI privatisation programme. 
 
6.2.2. Research Questions and Models 
This evidence led us to formulate the following research questions: what are the 
reasons behind the unwillingness of the PAN to support President Zedillo’s electricity 
privatisation programme, and what explains the unwillingness of the political players to 
carry out the electricity privatisation programme proposed by the Fox administration? 
To understand why policymakers delayed the implementation of this economic 
measure, we propose the most influential behavioural theory of choice as our 
methodological framework, prospect theory (PT).  
 
Our research suggests that political players tend to make their decisions according to 
their own interests and the context of the particular situation they are experiencing. 
Moreover, if these political players are “outsiders”, their decisions can be strengthened 
by this condition. More specifically, politicians who are relatively unknown in the 
political arena tend to make important choices which are strengthened by people’s 
support. Our research also suggests that only a severe economic-financial crisis in the 
MEI can trigger its privatisation. These alternative hypotheses rest on the robust 
psychological arguments of risk aversion in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the 
domain of losses of prospect theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
According to them, people tend to opt for risky choices when they are experiencing 
losses. On the other hand, people who have the chance to select from different 
alternatives of gains prefer to behave in a very cautious way. Another important feature 
of prospect theory is that people tend to frame their decisions around a “reference 
point”.  
 
We consider that PT offers an alternative perspective to analyse the policymakers’ 
behaviour. The use of PT as the study’s main methodological framework departs from 
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the evidence, which shows that traditional theories of choice, such as economic-
structural, political-institutional and rational-choice theories, sometimes do not provide 
a satisfactory account of determined political phenomena (see Chapter 3). In this way, 
PT’s features question whether expected utility offers an adequate theory of how 
people really make choices under situations of uncertainty and risk. We consider that 
PT recognises the valuable characteristics of rational choice models based on 
expected utility, but at the same time challenges their foundations. 
 
Since rational choice theories have been playing a fundamental role in political science 
during the last thirty years, there has been a debate about the effectiveness of such 
theories for analysing countries’ political dynamics. On the other hand, critics of PT 
consider that this theory has determined restrictions that limit its applicability in politics. 
For instance, they state that PT lacks a theory of frames, which makes it difficult for 
researchers to determine how people frame their choices. Moreover, the aggregation 
problem is another key criticism. However, scholars in the field of political science have 
solved these problems. 
 
Our two PT models are based on the five complementary techniques developed by 
Mercer (2005a). In particular, these mechanisms provide a creative solution to the 
problem of the lack of a theory of frames in PT. These techniques allow the researcher 
to determine whether the decision-makers are in PT’s domain of gains or losses. 
Mercer’s five methods are: 1) the status quo as a reference point; 2) aspirations; 3) 
heuristics; 4) analogies; and 5) emotions148. Moreover, the second model presented in 
this chapter considers the crisis argument developed by Weyland (2002), which states 
that adverse economic situations trigger market reforms.  
 
We present two different models that apply prospect theory to explain the political 
dynamics in the MEI. Both models use documentary sources that help us to determine 
players’ domains. However, in some cases, the domain can be a subjective 
assessment and therefore it is difficult to define it. Recall that one of the characteristics 
of PT is that it does not have a “unique way to operationalise” its application. Under 
these circumstances, McDermott (2001) states that we can use the “thermometer 
analogy” to solve this problem. “If it is a hundred degrees outside, you do not need to 
know a whole lot about a particular individual to assume that he is probably hot” 
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(McDermott 2001, p. 11). In other words, we can use incomplete information to 
indirectly determine people’s domains.  
 
In the first model, we use this thermometer analogy to determine players’ domains. 
This means that the analysis employs a straightforward way of knowing how decision-
makers frame their choices. Moreover, recall that another characteristic of PT is that it 
requires identifying people’s domains but not the source of those domains. The model 
that answers the first research question has a dependent variable and different 
explanatory variables. The dependent variable can be the domain of gains or the 
domain of losses. The domain is defined by a number of different explanatory variables. 
These variables constitute the context of the situation or the events that the decision-
makers use to frame their choices.   
 
In this study, we use information from certain historical reviews and other discussions. 
More specifically, we employ information about the different key political and socio-
economic events discussed in Chapter 5. Moreover, this information is complemented 
by other analyses from important scholars. The decision-makers involved in our study 
are the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the National Action Party (PAN), the 
Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), different presidents of Mexico, opposition 
leaders and the public (voters).   
 
The analysis is divided into two main sections. The first section studies how specific 
factors deteriorated the PRI regime. In other words, it provides evidence of different 
key events and how players assimilated them during specific periods. In the second 
section, the previous analysis is used as a background to define how the players made 
important decisions, including the PAN’s opposition to the government’s electricity 
privatisation proposal. Our analysis mainly uses two techniques to define the players’ 
domains: the status quo as the reference point and aspirations as the reference point. 
 
It is important to indicate that before we answer the first research question, this chapter 
analyses the reform to the Ley del Servicio Público de Energía Eléctrica (LSPEE) – 
Electricity Act. We use two different approaches to explain this event in which 
President Salinas allowed partial participation by private investors in electricity 
generation. We explore the LSPEE reform from a political fragmentation perspective149 
and it is then complemented by prospect theory.  
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Contrary to the first research question, the operationalisation of our second PT model 
is more detailed. In other words, it does not completely depend on McDermott’s 
analogy and therefore expands the context of the variables that define the decision-
makers’ domains. The model for the second research question consists of two key 
sections. The first part develops six explanatory variables that capture the factors 
discussed by the decision-makers during the debate about the MEI’s privatisation 
programme. In other words, they provide the documentary evidence that validate the 
decisions-makers’ arguments about this policy. Moreover, the model attempts to 
determine the political players’ domains in the value function of prospect theory. 
Consequently, we can define whether decision-makers take risky bets or behave in a 
risk-averse way.  
 
These variables are related to two of the techniques developed by Mercer. Variables 
from one to four are connected to the method status quo as reference point, whereas 
variables five and six are connected to the technique analogies as reference point. The 
model is applied to the three main political parties in Mexico: The Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI), the National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the 
Democratic Revolution (PRD). 
 
To determine each variable of the model we employed two different kinds of 
information sources. On one hand, we employ data from public pronouncements, press 
reports, etc. In particular, we use economic and financial information (e.g. balance 
sheets) from one of the two electric utilities: the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE). 
The reason we use information from only one utility is because CFE has much better 
databases, whereas most of the data from LyFC are incomplete and not well structured. 
Additionally, we did not obtain any response from the LyFC staff when we requested 
the company’s financial information. Most of the CFE’s financial data were found on its 
website150. 
 
Also, we used certain energy indicators from different periods (from 1980 to 2008); for 
instance, data on natural gas prices, electricity and oil prices, oil exports, oil revenues 
and non-oil revenues. The data were mainly obtained from the Mexican Petroleum 
Institute (IMP), the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) and the 
Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC). The research uses information about 
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California’s electricity crisis and Argentina’s energy crisis. In this case, we used 
analyses developed by scholars from the Cambridge-MIT Institute Electricity Project at 
the University of Cambridge. As part of the research project, I attended numerous 
seminars and lectures about competition and regulation in the international electricity 
market in this institution from 2005 to 2007. 
 
The second source of information for the second model is based on face-to-face 
interviews. This kind of information represents a determinant factor for our research 
because it provides direct evidence from the main decision-makers involved in 
Mexico’s energy agenda. Consequently, it strengthens the effectiveness of our PT 
model. In particular, we interviewed the heads of the Federal Electricity Commission 
(CFE), the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) and the Federal Competition 
Commission (FCC). Moreover, we interviewed the CFE’s Director of Economic 
Analysis and a senator who was a member of the Senate’s energy commission.  
 
The interviews were carried out according to a protocol previously designed by the 
research student and his supervisors. The structure of the interviews allowed us to get 
very useful information from the decision-makers. For example, we structured general 
questions that let the interviewees analyse in depth the issues raised by the interviewer 
in order to obtain their complete ideas about the research problem. The objective of the 
questions was to discover the actors’ positions on the electricity industry and the 
government’s privatisation programme. Their arguments led us to understand how they 
framed their decisions and what aspects influenced them.  
 
The second part of our PT model analyses how key leaders from Mexico’s three main 
parties framed their choices. More specifically, the research evaluates how the 
explanatory variables influenced these players’ perceptions. To develop this section, 
we mainly employed information from one of Mexico’ leading newspapers, La Jornada. 
It is the only source of information that provides complete details of the actions, public 
pronouncements, behaviours, etc. of the political actors in the energy agenda. 
Consequently, it supplied an excellent amount of data for our model. It is important to 
highlight that in order for the analysis to be neutral we only used news reports and not 
editorial articles elaborated by La Jornada’s columnists. In other words, our work is not 
influenced by the newspaper’s editorial position. 
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As part of our research design, we contacted Jonathan Mercer151 from the University of 
Washington, Kurt Weyland152 from the University of Texas in Austin and Barbara Vis153 
from VU University Amsterdam for advice and comments about our research project. 
The explanatory variables are: financial conditions (EV1); electricity tariffs (EV2); MEI’s 
current regulatory framework (EV3); Mexico’s oil bonanza (EV4); California’s electricity 
crisis (EV5); and Argentina’s Electricity Crisis (EV6).  
 
Explanatory variables 1, 2, 5 and 6 influenced the PRD decision-makers’ positions. The 
PAN and the PRI were influenced by variables 1 and 3. It is important to indicate that 
we chose the interviewees (decision-makers) according to their relevant role in the 
energy debate from 2000 to 2005. For example, key economic advisors were the 
players that represented the PRD during the discussion of the MEI’s privatisation 
programme. For the PAN, we considered the head of the Federal Electricity 
Commission (CFE) as one of its central decision-makers.  
 
There are different political, economic and social sectors with certain interests that 
supported or opposed the MEI reform. We understand that by considering almost all 
the key sectors involved in this debate, our study can provide more detailed results. 
However, by including many factors, our research problem can become very complex 
to analyse. Consequently, we had to formulate an important assumption: we assume 
that all sectors of the economy are grouped and represented by the country’s three 
main political parties.  
 
6.3. CASE 1: WHY WAS PRESIDENT ZEDILLO UNABLE TO IMPLEMENT HIS 
ELECTRICITY PRIVATISATION PROPOSAL? 
In this section, we offer the first PT analysis that attempts to explain the reasons behind 
the Zedillo administration’s failure to implement its electricity privatisation project. As an 
introductory analysis, section 6.3.1 explores the factors that allowed President Carlos 
Salinas to reform the LSPEE – Electricity Act. It applies PT to discover how he framed 
his choices when he reformed this law. As we have previously stated, the main 
objective of this section is to understand the political dynamics of the first electricity 
privatisation proposal. 
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6.3.1. The Ley del Servicio Público de Energía Eléctrica (LSPEE) – Electricity Act 
Absolute presidential power allowed Miguel de la Madrid (1982–1988) and Carlos 
Salinas (1988–1994) to easily implement this economic programme. As we observed in 
the previous chapter, the PRI is a political party that was structured by all the interest 
groups in the country. These groups unconditionally supported the presidents, who 
were the most important players in the political system. Even the private sector was 
subordinated to the presidential power. Private investors considered themselves to be 
part of the “PRI’s political army”. For instance, Emilio Azcárraga Milmo (1930–1997), 
who was the former owner of Televisa, part of the country’s television duopoly, publicly 
considered himself to be “a soldier of the PRI and a soldier of the President” (Meyer 
2012). This statement clearly shows how the president’s power was stronger than that 
of the private sector elite.  
 
The PRI regime reached its climax during Salinas’ administration. His government was 
one of the most powerful presidential periods in the history of Mexico. Moreover, he 
continued and strengthened the application of the neo-liberal agenda, which was 
implemented initially by President de la Madrid. Salinas sold a large number of SOEs 
because his privatisation strategy was successfully approved by all the political actors. 
There were three main reasons behind his success: the president’s excessive 
concentration of power, the lack of political competition and the Salinas administration’s 
technical skills. In other words, his government had the same advantages that all the 
previous PRI presidents used to rule the country. However, he had an additional 
advantage that his predecessors did not have: a strong technocratic structure. 
 
There is a very important segment of the political economy literature that studies the 
connection between political power and the application of market reforms. This 
literature states that if a developing country’s political system is concentrated, there is a 
high probability to successfully apply the proposed economic policies (see Haggard 
and Kaufman 1995 and Nelson 1990). Conversely, if the political power is dispersed, 
there will be more incentives from the political opponents to delay or block the 
introduction of market reforms (Rodrik 1996). In the next chapter we offered a 
discussion of the political fragmentation perspective in Mexico.  
 
We consider that the case of Salinas’ administration can be analysed under this 
theoretical framework. The country had a political system in which the president 
manipulated all the socio-economic structures, including the legislative power. 
Consequently, Congress was only seen as a ratifying mechanism which did not 
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participate in the decision-making process. The political opposition was not a problem 
for the PRI. Mexico’s left-wing party, the Partido de la Revolución Democrática 
(PRD)154 - the Party of Democratic Revolution – was only recently established and 
therefore it was not strongly positioned in the political system.  
 
Although the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) – the National Action Party – was founded 
at the end of the 1930s, it was still a weak opposition for the government of Carlos 
Salinas. The World Bank (1995, p. 221) states that the privatisations were “politically 
feasible in Mexico because reformers controlled the relevant policymaking entities and 
had the means to overcome resistance”. This confirms that our perspective adequately 
explains why Salinas’ privatisation strategy could be approved. 
 
What were the other “means” that facilitated the application of the government’s neo-
liberal policies? The PRI administrations used authoritarian mechanisms to protect the 
implementation of their market reforms. For instance, the regime imposed strict 
censorship of the printed media and there was absence of freedom of expression. 
Repression was also used to control political opposition. It is well known that during the 
government of Salinas, 500 PRD members disappeared or were murdered because 
they opposed the regime (Monsiváis 2008).  
 
Another similar important case occurred when the Zapatista Army of National 
Liberation (EZLN) declared war against the Mexican government. The EZLN, which 
was consisted mainly of rural indigenous people, opposed Salinas’ North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). According to the 1995 Amnesty International Annual 
Report, the Mexican army tortured and disappeared hundreds of Zapatista members. 
These two political repression cases are examples of how Salinas sent a clear 
message to those who were not aligned with the government: it served as a 
mechanism to induce fear in opponents who could put at risk the president’s policies 
and therefore damage the political system’s stability. For these reasons, the 2010 
Nobel Prize Laureate in Literature, Mario Vargas Llosa, considered Mexico’s political 
system as “the perfect dictatorship” (Vargas Llosa 1990).  
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Finally, the policy-makers who were part of the Salinas administration constituted a 
determinant factor in the privatisation process. The group of people that prepared and 
carried out the sale of the SOEs were mainly technocrats with foreign graduate 
degrees in economics. To adequately carry out his economic programme, Salinas had 
a team that understood the technical and administrative aspects of the privatisation 
process and guidelines from international financial institutions (IFIs). Williamson and 
Haggard (1994) and Bates and Krueger (1993) state that these “change teams” were 
very effective in facilitating the sale of the public companies. 
 
Does the absolute presidential power explain the approval of the reform to the Ley del 
Servicio Público de Energía Eléctrica (LSPEE) – the Electricity Act – which allowed the 
partial participation of the private sector in the Mexican electricity market? In 1992, the 
Mexican Congress easily ratified the changes proposed by Carlos Salinas to the law. 
The political structure that approved part of Salinas’ neo-liberal agenda was also used 
to allow the IPPs to generate electricity in Mexico. During this period, the PRI controlled 
more than 60% of the Chamber of Deputies and more than 70% of the Chamber of 
Senators.  
 
In which PT domain was President Salinas when he implemented his privatisation 
agenda, including the reform to the LSPEE? According to Mercer (2005a) and 
Taliaferro (2004), if a country’s position is in relative decline, then an aspiration 
becomes a reference point. During the De la Madrid administration, the country 
experienced one of the worst economic crises. For instance, oil prices collapsed, the 
inflation rate was more than 150% and there was an unpayable foreign debt of US$100 
billion; these were some of the factors that negatively affected the economy. As we 
have stated, De la Madrid implemented neo-liberal market policies to control the crisis. 
 
When President Salinas took office, he continued with these adjustment policies. Under 
these conditions, Salinas’ reference point was an aspiration. In particular, he had the 
objective to continue with De la Madrid’s neo-liberal agenda. It was very clear that his 
aspiration was to carry on with the Washington Consensus policies designed by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The Salinas administration’s 
objective was to position Mexico as one of the leading economies in Latin America. In 
terms of the electricity sector, the government did not have a detailed plan to privatise 
the industry. Salinas mainly focused on selling other SOEs. 
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In Latin America, there were different reasons that led governments to carry out 
structural changes in their electricity sectors. For instance, some economies changed 
their electricity systems because they were experiencing adverse economic conditions. 
Other countries implemented these market reforms because they were inspired by the 
neo-liberal experiments applied in developed economies. Moreover, the international 
financial institutions (IFIs) played a key role in persuading developing countries to apply 
these measures. The IFIs offered to renegotiate countries’ foreign debts subject to the 
application of the energy market policies of the Washington Consensus. Under these 
conditions, we consider that Salinas knew that countries were adopting these market 
reforms and decided to reform the LSPEE. 
 
The reform to the LSPEE was a very risky decision. There was not enough information 
about the impacts of these market policies on economies. Moreover, Mexico did not 
have adequate institutions to regulate private investors. Although the Energy 
Regulatory Commission was created in 1993 (one year later than the LSPEE reform), it 
lacked the legal instruments to control private companies. In other words, the LSPEE 
represented a risky choice because there was uncertainty about the effects of the 
reform on the Mexican economy. Our analysis of the IPPs in Chapter 5 confirms that 
the choice made by Salinas was extremely risky. Private sector participation in 
electricity generation has been very costly for the country’s public finances. Inadequate 
planning and corrupt practices are the main reasons behind this serious problem. In 
conclusion, Salinas could carry out the LSPEE reform because he still had the support 
of the PRI’s hegemonic power. Salinas’ aspiration put him in the domain of losses and 
therefore he took a risky choice.  
 
6.3.2. President Zedillo’s Failure to Implement his Electricity Privatisation 
Proposal 
The first part of this section analyses the key historical factors that influenced the 
behaviour of Mexican society. It provides the general context of the PRI regime’s 
deterioration during different periods. The following section then studies how the 
majority of the citizens framed their choices and how this situation influenced the 
decisions made by the PAN. In particular, we explain under the PT perspective why the 
PAN did not support the government’s privatisation project. 
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6.3.2.1. The Deterioration of the PRI Regime and the Perception of a Domain of 
Losses 
During the PRI regime, people were living under a political structure that controlled all 
the institutions in the country. Consequently, it was impossible for society to participate 
in the decision-making process. For instance, and as we observed in Chapter 5, the 
PRI had many corporate groups that were used to rule the country. The PRI’s 
corporatist structure represented all the country’s socio-economic groups (workers, 
peasants, etc.) and transferred their electoral participation to a clientelistic network, 
which was employed to benefit the political elite. This means that the decisions were 
only made by these organisations’ leaders. In this way, people’s socio-economic 
demands were subordinated to such groups’ political interests.  
 
One of the first popular reactions against the PRI regime was the 1968 Tlatelolco 
student massacre. Students from public universities carried out street protests against 
President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964–1970). On 2nd October 1968, the government 
ordered the military to open fire on the students, who were congregated in the Plaza de 
las Tres Culturas – Square of the Three Cultures – within the Tlatelolco 
neighbourhood. The military repression of the students served as a mechanism to 
control people’s aspirations. Society aspired to a change in the political system to end 
the PRI governments’ authoritarianism.  
 
People took a risk-seeking decision, which consisted of carrying out severe street 
demonstrations to put the regime under pressure. It was a risky choice because people 
knew that the government could respond aggressively. However, the government’s 
violent reaction reframed people’s reference point. The student massacre induced fear 
into society and therefore they had to accept their status quo (SQ). In other words, 
people moved from opposing the regime to accepting it again. The feeling of injustice 
led students to take an extremely risky choice that cost many human lives.  
 
On the other hand, the government was also in the domain of losses. The demand for 
more democracy and the fact that the 1968 Olympic Games were about to start “led the 
government to choose the hardline once and for all” (Meyer 2008). The PRI wanted to 
make a good impression with the Olympics. “The whole world would have its eyes on 
Mexico, but behind the screen of the Olympics buildings there would remain extreme 
poverty, the stratification of a society that was hostile to those usually forgotten, the 
cruelty of a government willing to pretend anything” (Poniatowska 2008). 
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According to Loaeza (2005), President Díaz Ordaz was a person who had a very 
impulsive personality. Consequently, he was willing to do anything in order to protect 
his regime. Loaeza states that Díaz Ordaz felt that the American authorities considered 
that the Mexican government had serious political instability problems. The Minister of 
the Interior, Luis Echeverría, also played a key role in influencing Díaz Ordaz’s 
behaviour. Loaeza indicates that there are unclassified documents from the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that confirm 
that Echeverría was strongly connected to the American government.  
 
This situation tells us that President Díaz Ordaz was under enormous pressure. He 
wanted to maintain the PRI government’s status quo (SQ), and at the same time there 
were external forces that urged him to control the social crisis. This scenario put the 
Mexican president deeper into the domain of losses and therefore he opted for the 
risky choice. The tragedy weighed on the key decision-makers (Díaz Ordaz and 
Echeverría) involved in the planning and execution of the massacre. On the other 
hand, people were not able to modify the political system, but this situation 
strengthened people’s perception about the political system’s authoritarianism.  
 
Another key event was the 1988 presidential election, in which there was evidence that 
showed how the PRI committed massive electoral fraud to favour Carlos Salinas 
(Meyer 1997). Consequently, the left-wing candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas rejected 
the election’s results and argued that it had to be annulled. However, Salinas was 
declared Mexico’s new president. Cárdenas founded the Party of the Democratic 
Revolution (PRD) in order to oppose the PRI government and to unify the left in the 
country.  
 
In these elections, Mexicans saw themselves in the domain of losses once more. The 
inadequate operation of the economy under the De la Madrid administration, the 1982 
debt crisis and the application of neo-liberal policies deteriorated people’s socio-
economic conditions. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas was considered to be an alternative and 
risky option. People saw him as a risky choice because they could not predict their 
future behaviour. He was an active political member of the PRI but decided to leave it 
to compete against Salinas. He was the son of President Lázaro Cárdenas and 
therefore this condition was a positive factor that strengthened people’s aspirations. 
Moreover, his political plan had the objective of improving the country’s socio-economic 
conditions and stopping the PRI’s hegemony. These factors were seen by the majority 
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of Mexicans as an opportunity to aspire to a much better SQ, but they could not obtain 
it.  
 
We consider that the PRI regime showed its last signs of weakness in the last year of 
Salinas’ presidency and during the entire Zedillo administration. There were different 
key factors that contributed to the decline of the political system. Chapter 5 and the 
previous section offered information about such elements. For instance, in 1994 the 
Zapatista movement declared war against the Mexican government. In the same year, 
the PRI’s presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio and the PRI’s secretary-general 
José Francisco Ruíz Massieu were assassinated. These events affected the financial 
markets and therefore led to capital outflows. There then followed a strong devaluation 
of the Mexican peso.  
 
The peso devaluation was followed by a financial crisis. It erupted three weeks after 
President Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000) took office and two years after the privatisation 
of the banking sector. The crisis was attributed mainly to the inadequate privatisation of 
this sector. The banks collapsed and the government bailed them out of the crisis, 
which was considered by many socio-economic groups as an illegal and very costly 
action. The cost of the financial rescue was US$125 billion, which also paid all the bad 
loans used to finance the PRI’s 1994 political campaign. The high interest rates 
strongly affected people’s welfare because they were unable to pay their debts. As a 
result, the debtors carried out many street protests to try to persuade the government 
to reduce their debt burdens. Under these conditions, the American government and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided a credit line of more than US$67 billion 
to Mexico to stabilise the economy (BBC Mundo 2009).  
 
There were other corruption scandals in Mexico’s privatisation programme. It is well 
documented that President Salinas’ brother, Raúl Salinas de Gortari, participated in 
privatisations and government concessions. One of the most important scandals was 
the privatisation of the state television station, Instituto Mexicano de la Televisión 
(IMEVISION). The current owner of the privatised company, Raúl Salinas Pliego, 
obtained a loan from the president’s brother at a low interest rate (Gordon 2009). The 
loan was paid by using the privatised company’s profits. Raúl Salinas de Gortari was 
accused of illegal enrichment and money laundering. In February 1995, he was sent to 
jail but was released in 2005. Although there was strong evidence against him, he was 
declared innocent of such offences.  
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In line with the predictions of prospect theory, we can state that all these political and 
economic factors pushed a large proportion of citizens into the domain of losses. 
People were convinced that the PRI was unable to continue to rule the country. During 
the 1995 financial crisis, President Zedillo’s popularity was 43% (ADN Político 2012), 
which is very low. According to Weyland (2002), opinion polls can also be used to 
determine the citizens’ domain.  
 
6.3.2.2. The Rise of the Political Outsiders and the Reasons that Led the PAN to 
not Support President Zedillo’s Electricity Privatisation Proposal 
The decline of Mexico’s political system and the deterioration of people’s welfare 
(described in the above sections) led an interest group to take the opportunity to 
participate in the political dynamics. In particular, a group of people led by Vicente Fox 
aspired to carry out a drastic elite renovation. We consider that the emergence of these 
political outsiders resulted from risk seeking in the domain of losses. In other words, 
since people were suffering from the PRI’s authoritarianism, Fox and his group saw 
that they had an enormous chance to win the presidential elections. People were in the 
domain of losses and therefore they (the outsiders) knew that society was willing to 
take a significant risk. 
 
We consider that they were outsiders for one main reason: they did not directly emerge 
from the PAN. They came from a group of businessmen that convinced other national 
and foreign investors to participate in this political game. This interest group was called 
Amigos de Fox (Fox’s Friends), which was structured mainly by people who financially 
supported Fox’s campaign. It was coordinated by his closest friends who were 
establishing the contacts with different industrial sectors and were in charge of 
designing the campaign’s strategy. The strategy was based mainly on a strong 
manipulation of people’s reference points. Prospect theory calls this phenomenon 
“strategic framing” (see Chapter 3).  
 
One of the key elements of Fox’s political campaign was based mainly on his particular 
personality. He was a folkloric politician who mocked his adversaries (Meyer 2003). 
People really liked this behaviour because they felt that he was challenging traditional 
politics. Another aspect of his strategic framing had the objective to make people 
believe that Mexico required a “real political change”. The plan155 consisted of creating 
an adequate political environment in which voters could have hope in only one 
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candidate (Granados-Chapa 2003). The PAN and Amigos de Fox presented him as the 
only opposition politician able to defeat the PRI, a typical Mexican rancher who 
“promised to kick the PRI out of Los Pinos” (Aguayo 2002; Granados-Chapa 2000).  
  
The most important and interesting element in Fox’s campaign programme was his 
economic platform. He publicly offered to modify the way the economy operated. 
However, his economic strategy was extremely similar to Zedillo’s economic policy 
(Nadal 2000). Consequently, he proposed the identical project offered by the 
incumbent administration’s candidate. For instance, he offered to continue with the 
application of different neo-liberal policies, including the complete liberalisation of the 
electricity industry, which could not be implemented during the Zedillo administration. In 
other words, Fox was going to use the same economic policies that were strongly 
criticised by the majority of people. This demonstrates that the PAN was not willing to 
leave the status quo. 
 
All these strategies generated extraordinary results. From 1998 156  to 2000, Fox’s 
popularity reached 70% (Parametría 2006). This strong support from the people put 
him in the domain of gains. At the same time, this positive scenario allowed him to view 
the PRI’s political system as unacceptable. As a result, Vicente Fox started to offer 
very ambitious political proposals, which strongly increased people’s expectations. For 
example, he promised to end the Zapatista uprising in “fifteen minutes” and to 
completely end the corruption in the country. 
 
Mexicans had three political options. Francisco Labastida was the candidate of the 
incumbent government. Vicente Fox was the PAN candidate, who was the outsider of 
the elections and the riskiest option. The third option was Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, who 
was the PRD candidate. He constituted a realistic alternative that offered a political 
change at lower risk than Vicente Fox. Why was Fox a risky option? According to the 
factors we have discussed, Fox was a risky choice because he had a vague, unclear 
and contradictory political platform. He offered little indication of a new economic 
project for solving the complex situation in Mexico. Voters see incumbents as “less 
risky than the challengers who are unknown and whose proposals could drastically 
modify the current trends, for better or for worse” (Quattrone and Tversky 1988, p. 
724). 
 
                                                          
156
 In July 1998, Fox publicly announced that he was going to participate in the 2000 presidential 
elections. 
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Risk seeking in the domain of losses induced Mexicans to reject the incumbent 
government’s candidate and the left-wing candidate. In other words, the combination of 
all the negative events we have discussed and the manipulation of people’s reference 
points led 45% of the people (El Universal 2000) to choose Fox as the next president of 
Mexico. Labastida lost the elections because he represented the continuation of the 
PRI regime. Although Cárdenas offered a promising option with much lower risk than 
Fox, voters decided to ignore this alternative.  
 
Why did the PAN not support the PRI’s electricity privatisation programme? The above 
analysis leads us to state that the PAN members rejected cooperating with the PRI 
because they saw themselves in the domain of gains and therefore they were risk 
averse. In 1999, Zedillo presented his electricity privatisation project and expected to 
have the support of the PAN in congress. However, the PAN knew that a large 
proportion of citizens were in the domain of losses and were willing to opt for a 
newcomer. By not supporting the PRI, the PAN obtained the opportunity to develop 
and present its own privatisation strategy for the next presidential term. The president 
of the energy commission in the Chamber of Deputies, Francisco Salazar, stated 
“President Zedillo’s electricity privatisation strategy was postponed because we were 
convinced that Fox was about to become the next president of Mexico. We had the 
chance to present our own proposal” (Interview with Salazar 2005). 
 
If the majority of the people had not seen themselves in the domain of losses, the PAN 
would not have received political support from such a significant portion of the citizenry 
to win the elections. It also implies that the PAN would have cooperated with the 
government to approve the privatisation. This is because it was going to be difficult for 
the PAN to obtain the presidency and therefore its best choice was to support the PRI. 
The PAN always supported the very important economic policies that President Zedillo 
proposed, including the approval of the costly bailout of the banking sector and the 
value added tax (VAT) rise from 10% to 15%. This demonstrates that the PAN could be 
able to support the electricity privatisation strategy but its position in the domain of 
gains gave it the luxury to postpone this project.  
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6.4. CASE 2: WHY WAS PRESIDENT FOX UNABLE TO PRIVATISE THE 
ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY? 
6.4.1. Analysis of the Explanatory Variables 
In this section we develop the six variables of our second model. In particular, we 
analyse the key information that is connected to the two techniques used by the 
decision-makers during the electricity privatisation debate: the status quo as the 
reference point and analogies as the reference point. The section studies the financial 
information of the CFE and other important factors that are strongly connected with the 
MEI performance; for instance, the natural gas price fluctuations and the interviews 
with the key decision-makers. 
 
6.4.1.1. The MEI’s Performance: the Status Quo as the Reference Point  
(i) Explanatory Variable 1 (EV1): financial conditions 
Balance Sheets (1999–2006) 
The current financial structure of the MEI was the first and most notable element 
perceived by the key decision-makers. The structure of the CFE’s assets is as follows: 
from 1999 to 2006, the value of total assets increased from US$43.0 billion to US$66.0 
billion, which represents an average annual growth rate of 6%. The CFE’s current 
assets rose from US$3.0 billion to US$7.1 billion, which constitutes an average annual 
growth rate of 11%. The physical investment’s value increased from US$38.0 billion to 
US$56.0 billion at a growth rate of 5% per year. Intangible assets moved from US$0.5 
billion to US$1.0 billion at a growth rate of 15% per year. 
 
During the same period, the company’s liabilities had the following behaviour: current 
liabilities increased from US$2.0 billion to US$3.9 billion at an average annual rate of 
8%; long-term liabilities moved from US$3.0 billion to US$6.9 billion at an annual 
growth rate of 11%; the retirement reserve fund increased from US$4.0 billion to 
US$19.1 billion at an annual rate of 22%; and the total equities increased from 
US$32.0 billion to US$35.2 billion. 
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Table 6.1: CFE’s balance sheets for 2006 and 2005 
(Billion USD) 
Elements                2006                      2005 
      value        (%)          value        (%) 
Assets 
Total current assets 
Long-term employee loans 
Plants, Infrastructure, equipment, net 
Financial instruments  
Other assets 
Unamortised intangible assets  
 
Liabilities  
Total current liabilities 
Long-term liabilities  
Financial instruments 
Employee retirement obligations 
 
Equity 
 
Assets = Liabilities 
 
 
       7.14         11             6.14         9.6 
       0.27        0.4             0.27         0.4 
       56.0         85            55.57         87 
       0.51        0.7             0.55           1 
       0.58        0.8             0.53           1 
       1.40           2             0.52           1 
    
 
        3.96           6             4.14          6 
        6.96         10             7.05         11 
        0.61           1             0.61          1 
       19.18         29           17.32        27 
 
        35.21        53           34.45        54 
 
        65.95                       63.59 
            
          Source: Elaborated with information from CFE-Estados Financieros Dictaminados 
                       2005–2006 
 
 
From Table 6.1 we can report the following analysis: 
1. The CFE’s physical investment represented 85% of total assets. 
2. The relationship, total liabilities/liabilities and equity indicates that the CFE owns 
resources that account for just 54% of its total resources.  
3. Dividing current assets over current liabilities, we obtain a result of US$1.8, 
which indicates that for each dollar in current liabilities the company has $1.8 to 
pay towards this debt. This represented a good advantage for the CFE, 
because it has eighty cents extra to compensate each dollar in current liabilities. 
In other words, the company has a strong liquidity position to meet financial 
contingencies within one year. 
4. Similarly, if we divide the physical investment over long-term liabilities, we find 
that the CFE has US$8 to pay one dollar from long-term liabilities. This means 
that in the event of a long-term financial crisis, the utility has $8 to respond for 
each dollar in long-term liabilities.  
5. The result of dividing total assets over total liabilities is US$2. This value 
indicates that for each dollar of total liabilities, the CFE has two dollars to 
compensate it. In the event of an emergency, the company has a strong 
contingency fund to face it. 
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6. However, the company has a weak financial independence of 53%. In other 
words, for each dollar the firm has 53 cents belonging to it. This percentage is 
obtained by dividing its equity over its total resources. 
 
Profit and Loss Statements (1999–2006) 
From 1999 to 2006, the profit and loss statements show that revenue from electricity 
sales increased from US$7.5 billion to US$19.42 billion at an average annual growth 
rate of 14%. The operating expenses increased from US$6.87 billion to US$19.16 
billion. In particular, in 2006 depreciations corresponded to 11%, the yearly employee 
retirement obligations decreased 11% and exploitations and administrative expenses 
declined 76% and 2% respectively. The operating expense growth was mainly caused 
by increases in exploitation and retirement obligations. 
 
During the same period, the financial cost decreased from US$0.42 billion to US$0.33 
billion at an annual rate of 3%. In particular, in 2006 the operating profit reached 
US$0.26 billion and non-cash transfers from the federal government to supplement 
deficient rates increased from US$2.92 billion to US$4.76 billion. In this case, subsidies 
were greater than duties, leading to a shortfall of duties over non-cash transfers of 
US$0.11 billion. Similarly, from 1999 to 2006, net profit decreased from US$0.84 billion 
to US$0.19 billion. 
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Table 6.2: CFE’s profit and loss statements for 2006 and 2005 
(Billion USD) 
 
Elements 2006 2005 
Revenue from electricity sales 
 
Costs and expenses: 
Operating costs 
Depreciation 
Administrative expenses 
Actuarial costs of employee retirement 
obligations 
 
Operating loss (or profit) 
 
Other income (expenses), net 
 
Net comprehensive financing cost: 
Interest expense, net 
Foreign exchange loss, net 
Monetary position gain 
 
Income tax on distributable remnant   
 
Loss before duties and transfers  
 
Duties
157
 
Non-cash transfers from the 
government to supplement deficient
158
 
rates 
 
Shortfall of duties over non-cash 
transfers from the government to 
supplement deficient rates  
Income (loss) before extraordinary item 
 
Extraordinary item  
 
Net loss 
 
19.42 
 
 
14.59 
2.07 
0.42 
 
2.06 
 
0.26 
 
0.33 
 
 
(0.42) 
(0.10) 
0.19 
 
(0.80) 
 
179.51 
 
(4.75) 
 
 
4.76 
 
 
 
0.11 
0.19 
 
- 
 
0.19 
 
17.53 
 
 
14.21 
2.08 
0.36 
 
1.79 
 
(0.93) 
 
0.13 
 
 
(0.49) 
0.33 
0.20 
 
(0.75) 
 
(1.09) 
 
(4.82) 
 
 
6.42 
 
 
 
1.59 
0.50 
 
(0.38) 
 
0.46 
 
                  
                  Source: Elaborated with information from CFE-Estados Financieros Dictaminados 
                               2005–2006 
 
From Table 6.2, we can report the following analysis: 
                                                          
157
 “In accordance with Article 46 of the Mexican Electric Utility Public Service Law, effective 
December23, 1992, CFE is required to pay a fee to the federal government for the assets it uses to render 
electric utility public service” (Deloitte, 2007, p. 12). 
158
 “This item refers to resources that the federal government grants to users of the electric power service 
through CFE by applying by applying subsidized rates for energy sales. A significant part of these 
transfers is treated as non-cash transactions, because under the current Mexican Electric Power Public 
Service Law such transactions are credited against the duties payable by the entity. During 2006, CFE 
recorded only virtual transfers. These transfers are credited to results of the year in which they are 
presented and are shown in the statements of operations” (Deloitte, 2007, p. 12). 
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1. The accounts receivable represent 14% of total revenue from electricity sales. 
According to data from the company, we can state that it is a reasonable level, 
because this percentage corresponds to more than a month of billing. 
2. Total revenue represents 26% of the value of physical investments, which can 
be considered a good level. However, if we divide total revenue minus 
operating expenses over total revenue, the result obtained is a loss of -6%. This 
negative result is caused by the huge amount of government non-cash transfers 
(US$4.76 billion), which represents 24% of total revenue from electricity 
revenue. Since tariffs are subsidised, it is correct to expect a low level of 
profitability. 
3. The administrative expenses and employee retirement obligations represent 2% 
and 11% of total operating costs respectively. Compared to exploitation costs of 
76%, their levels can be considered as stable. Although the employee 
retirement obligations have been increasing at an annual rate of 18% since 
1999, they do not represent a problem for the company because of its adequate 
liquidity position. 
4. Income tax on the distributable remnant has been increasing at a rate of 16%, 
reaching US$0.80 billion in 2006. It is not a problem for the company because it 
represents 0.4% of total revenue. 
5. Another key element that the data show is that from 1999 to 2006, the amount 
of monetary resources used to pay interest has been increasing moderately. 
However, it does not negatively affect the company. This indicates that the CFE 
still has a long-term debt and it has not required more financing from external 
sources. Also, it shows that the utility has been financing its investments with its 
own resources during these seven years. The current value of the company’s 
interests represents only 2% of total revenue.  
6. If we divide the depreciation of the physical investment over physical 
investment, it is observed that the physical investment (e.g. plants, generators, 
etc.) depreciates at an average annual rate of 4%. This guarantees that under 
the current conditions, the CFE’s installed capacity can continue to generate 
electricity for the next 17.3 years. 
 
The analysis we carried out shows that since 1999, the CFE has been operating under 
normal financial conditions. In other words, the company’s financial structure allows it 
to guarantee the country electricity in the short and long-term. Even the employee 
retirement obligations, which are considerably high, do not represent an important 
problem for the company, assuming current conditions continue.  
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Our study coincides with the information published by the Congress Federal Audit 
Office – Auditoría Federal de la Federación (ASF). The report “Análisis al Informe del 
Resultado de la Revisión y Fiscalización Superior 2002” states that the MEI has a good 
financial structure. Consequently, it does not require private investment to carry out its 
operations. Moreover, the analysis considers that the employee retirement obligations 
are not a problem for it in the short or long-term. 
(ii) Explanatory Variable 2 (EV2): electricity tariffs 
The tariff structure is another element that key political leaders consider to be an 
important subject surrounding the MEI and its reform. The MEI tariffs are high and, 
according to energy experts, this is due to the current private investor participation in 
electricity generation, particularly investors operating under the Independent Power 
Producers (IPPs) scheme. According to the Energy Regulatory Commission, ERC 
(2005), there are 271 permits for individuals to generate electricity; from this total, 21 
contracts are for independent producers. Such IPPs generate 39% of the total 
electricity produced in the economy (see Chapter 5). 
 
According to a report published by Observatorio Ciudadano de la Energía OCE (2005), 
which encompasses policymakers, scholars and former and current CFE executives, 
IPPs have been increasing the MEI costs, leading to higher electricity tariffs. For 
instance, they consider that in the last six years, the real average price of a kilowatt 
hour (kWh) has increased by around 37%. In 2000 (when the first IPP just started its 
operations), electricity prices in Mexico were 8% cheaper than in the US. However, in 
2005, Mexican tariffs (average) were 15% higher than American tariffs. 
 
One of the key factors behind the higher electricity prices is natural gas (NG). IPPs 
need it to generate electricity by using combined cycle plants. At the moment, Mexico 
produces no more than 5 billion cubic feet per day (Bcfd) of natural gas, and since 
2000 this trend has not changed. The lack of investment in infrastructure has 
dramatically increased natural gas (NG) imports (see Figure 6.3).  
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                         Source: OCE 2005                                  PEMEX 
                                                 Private Sector 
Figure 6.3: Natural gas imports in Mexico 
(Millions of Cubic Feet per Day) 
 
According to Salazar (2004), the cumulative consumption of natural gas from 2005 to 
2012 for electricity generation is 40% of the total national supply. The rest of the 
demand is distributed in the following sectors: Petróleos Mexicanos, PEMEX, (Mexico’s 
state-owned oil company) 35%, industry 22%, residential 2%, services 1% and 
transport sector 0.1%. The OCE’s report states that NG prices (national and import 
prices) are extremely unstable and therefore tend to increase due to any external 
shock.  
 
 
     
  Source: ERC 2006 
  MMBtu = Million of British Thermal Units 
 
Figure 6.4: Effects of external shocks on natural gas prices 
(USD/MMBTU) 
  
Figure 6.4 shows how external shocks have affected different energy variables. For 
instance, we can see how prices of the Southern California Gas Company (SoCal) 
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were considerably affected by the 2000 California electricity crisis. The crisis had a 
stronger effect on NG prices than in the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), the 
world’s largest trading forum for energy. In 2005, NG prices increased 54% more than 
fuel oil compared to 2004 prices (OCE 2005). 
 
 
                                   
 
    
    Source: ERC 2006 
    MMBtu= Million of British Thermal Units 
 
Figure 6.5: Fluctuations in the American natural gas market’s: TETCO South Texas 
(USD/MMBTU) 
                 
     
     Source: Own projections with data from the Mexican Petroleum Institute (IMP) 
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Figure 6.6: Mexican natural gas price fluctuations 
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Mexican NG prices are high because they are mainly based on NG price fluctuations 
from the South of Texas (ERC 2006). In particular, these prices are defined by the 
Houston Ship Channel (e.g. TETCO) 159 . According to ERC (2006), one of the 
advantages of such a price structure is to prevent Mexico from entering into conflicts 
with its main commercial partner, the US. Also, it promotes the rationalisation of energy 
consumption. On the other hand, one of its disadvantages is that it transfers the 
negative fluctuations of the American market onto Mexican consumers. NG import 
prices are not regulated and are completely determined by the American market. 
Figure 6.5 shows TETCO’s price movements from 2000 to May 2006, and Figure 6.6 
shows the Mexican NG price fluctuations during the same period. Both price variations 
follow a similar trend. 
 
 
         
         Source: Own projections with data from the IMP.      
                    
 
According to information from the Mexican Petroleum Institute (IMP), NG prices are 
expected to be high in the long term. More specifically, they could fluctuate at a level 
above 6.20 USD/MMBTU. This means that NG prices will continue to be at levels 
reached during 2005, which is high according to energy experts (see Figure 6.7). 
                                                          
159
 TETCO is a San Antonio company which deals with the distribution of petrochemicals. 
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Figure 6.7: Natural gas price forecast (2008-2035) 
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For these reasons, analysts consider that electricity generation should not be focused 
primarily on combined cycle plants. They suggest that the CFE should take advantage 
of their steam-electric power plants based on cheap fuel oil. Moreover, they state that 
since 2000, the CFE has not been achieving the installed capacity of their plants. This 
situation increased electricity costs to US$280 million in 2005. Similarly, if the CFE had 
used their coal-powered plants instead of opting for the combined cycle generators, it 
would have saved US$650 million in the same year (OCE 2005). 
 
Experts consider that energy expansion projects were not adequately analysed. For 
instance, the project amortisation of some IPP contracts granted to Iberdrola had a 
discount rate of 12.5% per year. This is double what the CFE would have obtained 
from the international financial market. In other words, the international market would 
have been a better option than receiving financial support from such contractors. If the 
government had carried out the projects under a direct investment programme (with the 
international financial market), it would have saved US$280 billion160. Moreover, the 
international unitary cost of combined cycle plants is $500 per installed kilowatt, 
whereas the Mexican IPP programme’s unitary costs are 20% higher161. This situation 
is generating considerable economic losses for the public finances. For instance, for 
the 8,251 installed megawatts at December 2005, the CFE lost US$930 million. 
 
 
                                                          
160
 Ibid. 
161
 Ibid. 
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        Source: Own projections with data from INEGI and the President’s Report 2006 
                    
 
Figure 6.8 shows the evolution of the CFE’s average prices. We can see that the 
commercial sector has the highest electricity tariffs, followed by public service tariffs. 
We can observe how prices start to increase after 2000, when IPPs began to 
participate in electricity generation. Figure 6.9 shows the evolution of LyFC’s tariffs, 
which cover the states of Puebla, Hidalgo, Morelos, Estado de México and Mexico City. 
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Figure 6.8: Evolution of prices in the CFE 
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        Source: Own projections with data from INEGI and the President’s Report 2006 
                     
 
Finally, it is important to state that the Ministry of Finance and the Energy Regulatory 
Commission (ERC) form a committee to define the MEI tariffs (WEC 1998). By 
considering industry costs, hydrocarbon prices and inflation, these public institutions 
determine the tariff levels each month. The government has not published the method 
of setting electricity prices and it remains confidential. 
 
In 2005, ERC carried out a detailed analysis of the utilities’ real cost structure. 
However, and according to Reforma (2005), ERC has declared that the results of the 
study will be kept confidential for fifteen years. It is confidential because it determines 
why consumers pay high electricity prices and why they are not competitive compared 
to international levels. Also, it provides a new proposal for tariff structure, which 
recommends that current electricity prices need to be modified. 
 
(iii) Explanatory Variable 3 (EV3): the MEI’s current regulatory framework 
What are the current conditions of the MEI’s regulatory framework? This section 
presents direct quotations from the people responsible for Mexico’s energy policy. 
Recall that for our PT model, this kind of information is extremely important to directly 
know how people choose their domains. According to interviews carried out during our 
fieldwork, Mexico does not have adequate conditions to regulate the current private 
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Figure 6.9: Evolution of prices in the LyFC 
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participation in the electricity sector. The position of the main actors in this situation is 
as follows: 
 
Francisco Salazar  
(The former President of the Chamber of Deputies’ Energy Commission 2003–2005 
and the current president of the Energy Regulatory Commission) 
 
He stated that: “the economy does not have an adequate regulatory body that can 
guarantee the privatisation’s success. In particular, CFE regulates itself, the Energy 
Regulatory Commission (ERC) lacks power, and the current regulatory framework must 
be correctly re-designed since the independent power producers (IPPs) regulate 
themselves. What is more, their contracts give them too much authority.” 
 
“The electricity demand did not increase as the federal government expected because 
of the lack of a strong economic growth.” 
 
Alfredo Elías-Ayúb  
(The CFE’s Executive Director since 1999)  
 
“Regulation does not exist. In other words, Mexico does not have a regulatory 
framework nor the institutions that can guarantee the sector’s adequate operation.” 
 
Eduardo Pérez-Motta  
(Federal Competition Commission’s President) 
 
“The Federal Competition Commission (FCC) has not been participating in the energy 
agenda. We have not been invited by the Ministry of Energy to express our position ... 
electricity concessions have not been rigorously studied. In fact, projects have not been 
correctly licensed.” 
 
“Electricity producers must be separated from CFE. In other words, CFE must not work 
as a regulator … contracts allow producers to self-regulate; however, the FCC is 
unable to intervene in this failure. What is more, the ERC and the FCC are not 
coordinated to work together in energy issues.” 
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“For Mexican authorities, regulation is not considered an important issue … the FCC is 
not strong. So authorities should give it more powers and an adequate regulatory 
framework.” 
 
(iv) Explanatory Variable 4 (EV4): Mexico’s oil bonanza 
Contrary to the negative effects of high NG prices on the electricity tariffs, Mexico’s oil 
industry has been considered the key determinant of the economy’s growth. In 
particular, oil export revenues have been the main financing source of all the 
government’s socio-economic programmes, including the energy sector. 
 
              
              Source: Own projections with data from the President’s Report 2006 
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              Source: Own projections with data from the President’s Report 2006 
                     
                   
Figure 6.10 shows how Mexican oil prices have been behaving during the last sixteen 
years. We can see that prices for the three oil export varieties, Maya, Istmo and 
Olmeca, have followed a similar trend. In particular, it indicates that from 1990 to 1994, 
prices decreased at an average of 30%. From 1994 to 1996, prices slightly increased, 
but then in 1998 had a considerable fall. Also, from 1996 to 1998, the pattern was 
repeated. However, since 2001, the three oil prices have been strongly increasing at an 
annual average rate of 20%. In other words, Maya, Istmo and Olmeca crude oil prices 
have increased from US$17, US$22 and US$24 to US$46, US$51 and US$59 
respectively. 
 
Figure 6.11 shows PEMEX’s oil exports. We can see how, after 2000, Maya oil 
production started to increase considerably at an average rate of 5% per year. This 
represents an increase from 1,096 to 1,492 million barrels per day. Conversely, Istmo 
oil exports just increased from 110 to 130 thousand barrels per day. In 2006, total oil 
production reached 1,850 million barrels. 
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Figure 6.11: Oil exports 
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Table 6.3: Oil price differences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             Source: SHCP-CGPE (1998–2006) 
                              * Prices for Mezcla Mexicana de Exportación 
                                             
                     
                                                         
Table 6.3 shows the difference between the estimated and the real market oil prices 
from 1998 to 2005. Since 2000, actual prices have been higher, providing the 
government with extra financial resources. For instance, the official estimated oil price 
in the 2005 national budget was US$23. However, Mezcla Mexicana’s market price 
reached US$42. As a result, the economy received US$19 more for each barrel sold. 
Moreover, if we consider that the real cost of producing a barrel of oil is between $2.50 
and $3, we can conclude that the country has been receiving a substantial amount of 
economic resources. 
 
 
              
 
Source: Own projections with data from the Mexican Petroleum Institute (IMP) 
2007 
 WTI: West Texas Intermediate  
                     WTS: West Texas Sour 
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Figure 6.12: Oil price forecast (2008-2035) 
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* Price 
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1999 
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2001 
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2005 
2006 
10 
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15 
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20 
23 
31 
10 
15 
24 
19 
21 
25 
31 
42 
47 
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According to information from the Mexican Petroleum Institute, oil prices will continue 
to be high in the long term (see Figure 6.12). It is predicted that the minimum price 
range may be between $30 and $40 for the next eight years. Prices are not expected to 
drop below $20, unlike the levels reached during the 1990s when the Mexican 
government was forced to carry out budget plan cuts due to low oil prices. 
 
 
                
                    
                   Source: Own projections with data from the President’s Report 2006 
                     
 
Figure 6.13 shows the oil and non-oil revenues. From 2000 to 2005, non-oil revenue 
increased from US$70 to US$109 billion. During the same period, oil revenue 
increased from $38 to $72 billion at an annual average rate of 13%. Thus, in 2005, oil 
sales represented 40% of total government revenue. These figures demonstrate how 
the economy is highly dependent on PEMEX oil exports. 
                                                            
6.4.1.2. Past Privatisations: Analogies as the Reference Point 
(i) Explanatory Variable 5 (EV5): California’s energy crisis 
The case of California’s electricity supply industry has been considered as the world’s 
main catastrophe in the field of international energy reforms. It provides a sound 
example when regulation is not well developed (Joskow 2001). During this crisis, 
wholesale prices increased by 500% between the second half of 1999 and 2000; 
customers were required to reduce their electricity consumption; California’s two 
largest electricity utilities (Pacific Gas & Electric PG&E and Southern California Edison 
SCE) had to pay higher prices for wholesale power; and by 2001, PG&E stopped 
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paying its bills and other financial instruments, ending this situation with its declaration 
of bankruptcy. 
 
In the early 1990s, the Californian economy was buying electricity at tariffs 50% higher 
than the national average (Brand and Scheffran 2005; Joskow 2001). Higher prices 
were attributed to the considerable costs of nuclear plant construction. This situation, 
as well as the lower prices offered by Independent Power Producers (IPPs), led large 
consumers such as the steel industry, cement manufacturers and the mining sector to 
persuade the government to initiate a structural change in the electricity industry162. In 
1998, the reform went into effect by allowing large users to buy electricity from IPPs. 
One of the main characteristics of the programme was that retail prices were fixed, 
whereas wholesale prices could fluctuate freely.  
 
By 1999, difficulties started to arise. Electricity demand increased rapidly due to 
industrial consumption and the digital revolution (The Economist 2001a). Moreover, 
wholesale prices increased dramatically, which led the two utilities (PG&E and SCE) to 
buy electricity at a higher price than they were able to resell it for (Joskow 2001)163.  
 
This situation forced the utilities to stop paying their bills and start buying electricity on 
credit. Since the utilities’ financial situation had worsened, the unregulated wholesale 
suppliers stopped selling electricity to them. In June 2000 and January and May 2001, 
the electricity services were interrupted due to the limited generation capacity. To solve 
this problem, the state government had to intervene and pay US$7 billion to electricity 
suppliers (The Economist 2001b).  
 
The unsuccessful reform was attributed to different elements. On one hand, and 
according to Joskow (2001), the main problem was caused by the retail prices and the 
liberated wholesale prices. Instead, retail rates could be determined by the demand 
fluctuations. Also, he states that electricity suppliers were not regulated, so they could 
stop supplying electricity to utilities whenever they wanted. Finally, California adopted 
the UK model without considering the specific conditions of the local economy.   
On the other hand, Brand and Scheffran (2005) consider that there were irregularities 
from the regulators. First, the fixed customer rates were artificially high in order to 
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 Ibid. 
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 Both utilities generated a specific amount of electricity. The rest was imported from suppliers located 
in other states such as Arizona, Nevada, Oregon and Washington. Since these states were also 
experiencing higher demands, the amount of electricity supplied to California was restricted. 
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guarantee investors a higher rate of return. Secondly, local authorities did not force 
utilities to invest in electricity generators. What is more, the regulations allowed PG&E 
and SCE to sell part of their existing electricity generators without considering the 
negative effects on the economy’s electricity demand. These situations show that the 
authorities protected private investors and therefore behaved in a corrupt manner. 
 
(ii) Explanatory Variable 6 (EV6): Argentina’s electricity crisis 
Mexican political leaders consider that the Argentinean case could be reflected in 
Mexico for two main reasons: 1) the country lacks a strong regulatory framework; and 
2) if the MEI is more open to private investors, the country’s bad economic structure 
could trigger an energy crisis. 
 
In 1999, President de la Rúa took office with support from a political coalition that 
succeeded in removing Menem’s164 Peronist party from the Argentinean presidency 
(Núñez-Luna and Woodhouse 2005). In December 2001, de la Rúa was forced to 
leave the presidency because of his inability to control the country’s bad economic 
situation.165 
 
After the economic and financial crisis, the economy also started to develop an energy 
crisis. Substantially privatised in 1992, the Argentinean electricity industry166 did not 
have sufficient installed capacity to meet the electricity demand. Since the industrial 
sector started to recover, it required higher amounts of electricity to maintain production 
levels. However, private electric utilities were unable to satisfy that demand (La 
Jornada 2004). Consequently, the government forced large electricity consumers to 
reduce their electricity consumption. Thirty electricity users, including carmakers such 
as Peugeot and Citroën, and petrochemical-chemical companies (e.g. Total and 
Praxair) were forced to reduce their electricity demand by 20%.167  
During the Menem administration, private utilities were not forced to expand their 
installed capacity. As a result, from 2003 to 2005, electricity tariffs were frozen to 
compensate this situation. This action and other measures, such as the review of 
contracts, pushed some private investors to leave the country. For instance, National 
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 President Carlos Menem (1989–1999). 
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 Under Eduardo Duhalde, the interim president (January 2002 to May 2003), the government 
eliminated the artificial pegging of the Argentinean peso to the American dollar. Also, he devaluated the 
peso, which lost 200% of its value against the USD. He then stabilised it at about 3:1 (Núñez-Luna and 
Woodhouse 2005). 
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  See Pollitt (2004) for a complete analysis of the electricity project in Argentina. 
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Grid, a British electricity company that owned Transener, was the last firm to leave 
Argentina after investing US$100 million in electricity transmission168.  
 
In April 2005, utilities could increase their tariffs again. President Kirchner’s 
administration allowed companies to raise their prices only if they were willing to carry 
out investment programmes to expand electricity generation and improve the quality of 
their services. This situation showed that privatisations were implemented without 
structuring an adequate regulatory framework. Daniel Montamat, a former Argentinean 
Minister of Energy (2000 to 2001) stated “You cannot play a football match without first 
constructing an adequate pitch and the game’s rules”.169 
 
6.4.2. Defining the Domains of the Key Decision-Makers 
In this section we analyse how the key decision-makers from the three political parties 
framed their choices under the PT perspective. The information we discussed in the 
last section provided a background that helps us to understand how these players saw 
themselves in PT’s value function. Moreover, this analysis finds evidence of the 
endowment effect in one of the political parties.  
 
6.4.2.1. The Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) 
(i) Effects of EV1 and EV2 on the behaviour of decision-makers 
Since President Zedillo (1994–2000) announced the MEI’s privatisation programme, 
the PRD declared its strong opposition to it. In fact, it has been the only player that has 
showed complete satisfaction with the MEI’s status quo (SQ). In other words, they are 
convinced that the industry should be maintained as a public structure. 
 
In terms of the MEI’s financial structure, the PRD considered that the industry is in very 
good condition. For instance, some PRD key economic advisers faced positive 
prospects when they carried out a financial analysis of the MEI. In a document 
presented during a debate on the reform in October 2002, Deputy María del Rosario 
Tapia, the secretary of the Chamber of Deputies’ Energy Commission, and Ifigenia 
Martínez, a PRD economic advisor, stated that the company was profitable, stable and 
had enough physical capacity to satisfy the country’s electricity demand in the long 
term. Particularly, they indicated that the utility generates more than US$2 billion 
annually that can be used for its investment programmes (La Jornada 2002a). These 
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arguments clearly correspond to our own financial analysis (Explanatory Variable 1) in 
which we demonstrate the company’s sound economic bases. 
 
Martínez and Tapia did not see any critical situation in the industry that could place 
them in the domain of losses. For instance, a rise in the country’s growth level would 
have triggered electricity demand. One of the federal government’s arguments for MEI 
reform was that the economy was going to grow at 7% in the following six years. 
Consequently, the authorities considered that the MEI needed to be completely open to 
private investors to satisfy these requirements generated by such economic growth. 
 
The PRD advisors rejected this assumption because the American economy was 
slowing down at that time. Consequently, it was impossible to increase Mexico’s GDP 
at that level due the country’s strong dependence on the US. This situation made the 
PRD economic advisors see Mexico’s status quo as acceptable by using the US 
economy as their reference point. This means that the decline in the American 
economy was a good reason not to take a risky decision, such as the MEI’s 
privatisation. 
 
Oil exports were also a reference point for Mexico’s left-wing party. As we pointed out 
in EV4, 40% of the country’s total revenue comes from oil sales. Since 2000, oil prices 
have been very high, providing the market with extra economic resources that have 
been channelled into various sectors including the energy industry. The PRD considers 
that employing these resources can strengthen the electricity sector. This is another 
reason why the PRD economic advisors were not willing to accept the privatisation as 
an alternative capitalisation programme for guaranteeing the economy’s electricity 
supply.  
 
Finally, high natural gas prices led the PRD to be unsatisfied with the IPPs’ SQ. 
According to Antonio Rojas-Nieto (the CFE’s Director of Economic Analysis and the 
PRD’s advisor), the PRD knew that the natural gas prices were going to be a problem 
for the electricity tariffs in the long term. He considers that if the privatisation were 
carried out, there would be no control over the tariff structure, because IPPs have 
already invested in very sophisticated power plants that utilise expensive natural gas. 
Rojas-Nieto states “The only actors that obtain benefits from this situation are the 
private investors because they are natural gas producers as well ... I consider that we 
can use the money from oil export sales to expand the installed capacity in partnership 
with the private sector ... there is no need to privatise it”. Similar to Martínez and Tapia, 
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Rojas-Nieto’s dissatisfaction with the IPPs status quo is a consequence of being in a 
domain of gains170. 
 
(ii) The endowment effect 
According to Antonio Soto, a PRD senator and member of the Senate’s Energy 
Commission, the electricity industry cannot be privatised because it has been a key 
element in Mexico’s development. He stated the following: “the electricity industry is 
part of the country’s legacy, it is part of the strategic resources we have been using to 
transform the economy ... if it changes from public to private ownership the society’s 
socio-economic welfare will be severely damaged ... the Mexican society is very 
attached to the energy sector, people feel they have the right to decide what is best for 
it ... the Constitution gives us the right to keep it as a public sector ... we have been 
educated under a strong nationalistic perspective ... we cannot get rid of the industry 
too easily. We are the only party that can protect what other historical leaders have 
reached”. 
 
Under this situation, we consider that PRD’s position towards the energy sector is 
connected strongly to certain historical events that helped to build the nation-state. As 
we discussed in the previous chapter, President Lázaro Cárdenas’ role in expropriating 
the oil industry in 1938 and starting the nationalisation of the electricity sector by 
creating the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) in 1937 was particularly important. 
These events have led the PRD and most of the social sectors to overvalue the MEI 
and, as a result, they are not willing to lose it.  
 
We consider this to be a clear example of the endowment effect (Thaler 1980). This 
occurs when people tend to value their possessions at higher prices than objects they 
do not own. In other words, people overvalue goods or services once they obtain the 
property rights to such assets. In Chapter 3, we stated that people’s choices depend on 
the state of their current endowments. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990) carried 
out different experiments that proved it (see Section 3.3.2.1).  
 
After the oil expropriation, the whole energy sector (including the electricity industry) 
became a symbol that represents Mexico’s economic progress, its social unity via 
labour unions and a victory of nationalism over foreign interests. These were the 
elements that the PRI regime employed to build part of its hegemony. In some way, 
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 Recall that in Chapter 3 we discuss that dissatisfaction with the SQ may have been a result of being in 
a domain of gains. 
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people saw that the energy sector was a real factor that contributed to the improvement 
of society’s economic structure. For instance, many social programmes that depend on 
oil resources and access to rural electrification have been important factors that made 
people feel comfortable with the energy industry’s benefits. Moreover, the strong 
promotion of pro-nationalist information in society strengthened a common feeling of 
property rights. 
 
Huesca (1988) provides examples of how the Mexican government and the National 
Revolutionary Party, which later became the PRI, implemented a strong pro-nationalist 
campaign against foreign interests after the oil expropriation to shape public opinion. 
Books, public pronouncements, the press and radio reports reflected feelings of anti-
imperialism and national sovereignty. Also, social events were used to promote such 
sentiments. During the expropriation celebrations, “messages of economic health and 
freedom accompanied anti-imperialist themes … the masses paraded through the 
streets with cheers and music and with banners that proclaimed: The Wealth of Mexico 
Must Be Possessed by Mexico!” (Huesca 1988, p. 6). 
 
The above elements have reinforced people’s emotional attachment to the electricity 
industry and therefore they refuse to lose something they posses. Consequently, if the 
status quo is modified, it will be severely damaged by the losses caused by such an 
alteration. Levy (2003) states that an “endowment effect’s implication” suggests that 
gaining something and then losing it does not put people in the same place in terms of 
the psychological value of their assets.  
 
According to Kahneman et al. (1986), fairness can be determined with respect to some 
“reference transaction”. In terms of companies and consumers, the market price is the 
reference point. So people tend to believe that companies behave in an unfair way 
when they raise prices during a sudden increase in demand. “Price increases are 
considered legitimate only if they are necessary to offset new costs for the seller, firm, 
or landlord” (Levy 2003, p. 229). It explains why the PRD, represented by deputy María 
del Rosario Tapia and Ifigenia Martínez, is not willing to accept the privatisation, 
because the industry is in good condition, as confirmed by our analysis of EV1. In other 
words, the PRD considers that it is illegitimate to expand the electricity supply when 
there are no real reasons to do it.  
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Atiyah (1979)171 states “to deprive somebody of something which he merely expects to 
receive is a less serious wrong, deserving of less protection, than to deprive somebody 
of the expectation of continuing to hold something which he already possesses”. Levy 
(2003) considers that when somebody breaks a contract to obtain gains, he is more 
likely to be held to the contract’s original terms. In this sense, if we assume that the 
Mexican Constitution, which considers the energy sector as a strategic activity strictly 
reserved to the state, is the contract that establishes the terms and conditions of the 
MEI’s structure, we can see that the PRD does not accept the privatisation, as it 
contradicts the Constitution. People will experience a deprivation of property as a 
reduction of their wealth. Consequently, their new status quo will be a loss, whereas 
the new possessor will increase his wealth. 
 
According to some surveys from Parametría (2002) and Consulta Mitofsky (2003), 
between 2002 and 2006, more than 60% of the population in Mexico opposed the MEI 
privatisation because they considered that it would only benefit foreign private 
investors. Similarly, more than 60% consider that prices will dramatically increase if the 
privatisation is carried out. This evidence demonstrates a strong consumer 
unwillingness to accept the economic losses of this policy. So, at what price can the 
PRD allow a change of ownership in the electricity industry? PRD Senator Antonio 
Soto states that the energy sector is not subject to any negotiation. He argued that “if 
the government expects to increase the private investment level, there are determined 
conditions that it has to guarantee. For example, the industry’s public ownership has to 
be maintained, electricity tariffs have to decrease, and the labour force’s rights have to 
be respected”. This shows that PRD’s acceptable selling price exceeds any private 
company’s expectations in terms of the project contract conditions of an energy 
investment. 
 
(iii) Effects of EV5 on the behaviour of decision-makers 
PRD leaders also used analogies to choose their domain. While the different actors 
were debating the MEI reform, California was severely affected by an electricity crisis. 
This situation strengthened the PRD’s opposition of the electricity industry privatisation 
and therefore accepted the CFE’s current SQ – to maintain it under public ownership. 
 
During different political discussions in 2002, key PRD leaders showed their aversion to 
losses. Particularly, the three-times presidential candidate and the party’s founder, 
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 He provides a survey of the history of the contract. He is cited in Cohen and Knetsch (2000).  
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Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, and party coordinator in the Chamber of Deputies, Deputy 
Martí Batres, opposed the reform because they considered that Mexico could 
experience a problem similar to California’s. The direct events that occurred in 
California influenced Cárdenas and Batres’ perceptions, but there were other factors 
that helped define their domain’s position. For instance, they had a private meeting with 
California’s democrat congressman, Robert Filner, who recommended that the PRD 
should not support the MEI privatisation (La Jornada 2002b).  
 
In an interview with La Jornada, Filner stated “The California crisis demonstrated that 
privatised electricity companies cannot entirely guarantee the supply of electricity to 
any economy … Mexico is trying to increase its installed capacity but it does not need 
to privatise …Moreover, Mexican authorities must regulate private companies’ 
operations because it was the lack of regulation in California that caused the current 
crisis”172. 
 
In the same way, Antonio Rojas-Nieto reflected the MEI’s current conditions in the 
California case. In La Jornada (2002c), he stated that leading scholars in the field of 
electricity economics such as Paul Joskow and David Newbery173 severely criticised 
California’s inefficient regulatory framework (Explanatory Variable 5). Rojas-Nieto used 
the well-respected arguments from these two scholars as availability heuristics174 to 
define the risks of Mexico’s weak regulatory framework, drawing immediately on the 
California analogy. Since Enron175 had a relevant role in the California crisis and some 
of its subsidiaries were interested in the MEI, it pushed Rojas-Nieto deeper into the 
domain of gains. 
California was not the only case that strengthened the PRD’s perception of a domain of 
gains. The Argentinean energy crisis had exactly the same effect as the one we 
described above. Particularly, Antonio Rojas-Nieto employed Argentina’s corruption 
levels to reflect the Mexican case. They framed this situation as a relative scenario of 
gains. What prospect theory tells us is that the above energy experts saw Mexico’s 
current SQ as acceptable in terms of its corruption level. In other words, they 
recognised that combining Mexico’s corruption problems with a possible reform in a 
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 Paul Joskow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and Paul Newbery, University of 
Cambridge.  
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 See Chapter 3 (Section 3.3.3.1). 
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 Enron was the world’s largest energy-trading company. In 2001, it got involved in different corruption 
and financial scandals. For instance, Enron had problems in terms of a lack of transparency in its financial 
statements, which was one of the reasons behind its bankruptcy on 2
nd
 December the same year. See The 
Economist (2001c) for more information about this case. 
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strategic sector such as the energy industry could lead to a worse scenario. This 
means that they preferred the current SQ rather than a stronger crisis created by the 
combination of corruption and a poorly regulated industry176.   
 
Although PT is not concerned whether analogies explain domain or domain explains 
analogies, the interesting point is that all these actors directly used analogies as a 
means to locate their domain. If California and Argentina had not experienced such 
crises, the PRD would be unable to strongly frame its domain. In the interviews, each 
PRD adviser, including Rojas-Nieto, made reference to these circumstances. 
 
6.4.2.2. The National Action Party (PAN) and the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI) 
(i) Effects of EV1 and EV3 on the behaviour of decision-makers  
What was the PAN’s domain in the PT’s value function? The people responsible for 
designing and carrying out the electricity reform found themselves in a position of 
satisfaction with the SQ in the MEI. In fact, the elements that located the PRD in the 
value function’s right latitude are almost the same as those that placed the PAN in the 
domain of gains. 
 
In terms of the MEI’s financial and economic structure, the PAN accepted that the 
industry is in very good condition. The CFE’s executive director, Alfredo Elías-Ayúb, 
stated during an interview that the company had not been privatised because it was in 
an excellent financial and economic situation. Thus, his position immediately led the 
PAN to frame the situation as a positive prospect. Also, it coincided with our arguments 
defined in EV1. 
 
The CFE’s executive director was not the only decision-maker to accept that he was in 
the domain of gains. Francisco Salazar, former president of the Chamber of Deputies’ 
Energy Commission and current president of the Energy Regulatory Commission 
(ERC), also accepted it. In the interview, he stated that the industry was not privatised 
because it is in good condition and also because they used a “wrong strategy”. He said 
that the reform was based on making people believe that electricity demand was going 
to increase in the long term.  
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 Recall that during the Menem administration, private utilities were not forced to expand their installed 
capacity, which later obligated large electricity consumers to reduce their demand. See Section 6.4.1.2. 
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It was a “strategic framing action” (Levy 2003) that tried to manipulate people’s 
reference points about the country’s economic condition. In particular, they tried to 
convince people that the economy needed to strengthen the country’s electricity 
generation capacity because the industry was growing. According to Vis (2009), under 
the PT perspective, politicians use strategic framing to obtain people’s support for very 
risky policies by inducing fear as a convincing factor (see Section 3.3.2.2). The PAN’s 
argument was that without privatisation, the country was going to experience a severe 
energy crisis. 
 
However, he stated that the strategy was not successful for three main reasons. First, 
they overestimated the forecast of electricity demand. Secondly, the Mexican economy 
slowed down due to different internal and external factors, including a decrease in the 
economic growth of the US, which reduced the electricity demand. The third reason is 
common to the arguments that the PRD advisors stated in the last section. 
 
Francisco Salazar stated that “the reform was not adequately sold. Now, the strategy is 
to make people believe we need a very competitive industry which can provide lower 
tariffs.” This is a very interesting situation because the government tried to artificially 
create the conditions of an adverse scenario about the MEI’s SQ. Recall that 
Weyland’s (2002) condition for Latin American countries to implement drastic economic 
reforms is that people have to be in the domain of losses and therefore behave in risky 
way (see Section 3.3.4.2). This was characteristic of the PAN’s strategy to privatise the 
electricity industry.  
 
Also, Elías-Ayúb and Salazar recognised that the MEI lacks a regulatory framework177. 
In particular, Salazar stated “IPPs regulate themselves and have almost the complete 
authority in this matter … We need to strengthen the Energy Regulatory Commission 
(ERC) because it does not have any faculties for controlling investors”. This comment 
shows that there is something wrong with the industry and it needs to be adjusted. This 
situation put Salazar deeper into the domain of gains, because he knew that a 
privatisation programme requires an adequate regulatory structure before it is 
implemented. He preferred the current SQ rather than moving ahead to the next phase, 
privatisation. 
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The president of the Federal Competition Commission (FCC) supported Salazar and 
Elías-Ayúb’s views. As was pointed out in (EV3), the head of this institution directly 
admitted that the participation of private investors in the MEI is not regulated. 
Moreover, he stated that the FCC had been excluded from the debate and was not 
collaborating with the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) to analyse the reform. 
The PRI’s key leaders saw themselves in the domain of gains as well. It is important to 
highlight that the policy-makers behind the MEI’s reform are PRI members, including 
Elías-Ayúb, who has been the CFE’s executive director since the Zedillo administration 
(1994–2000). In this way, the PRI’s perception of the MEI’s SQ coincides with the 
PAN’s position.  
 
Other key decision-makers such as former Senators Manuel Bartlett-Díaz and Laura 
Garza-Galindo were some of the PRI’s main players in the reform debate. During the 
privatisation programme analysis, these politicians considered that the regulatory 
framework is a big issue that requires special attention before any action is taken (La 
Jornada 2002d and 2003b). Similar to Elías-Ayúb and Salazar, they showed their 
satisfaction with the industry’s SQ. PRD Senator Antonio Soto stated that key PRI 
members agreed with the PRD’s views about the MEI’s SQ. He said: “many PRI 
colleagues support our views about the MEI’s current conditions”. 
 
6.5. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter demonstrated that PT can be applied in political science. More 
specifically, it can explain the political dynamics of Mexico’s energy sector. In our first 
case, we explained why President Zedillo was unable to implement his privatisation 
proposal. According to the president of the Energy Regulatory Commission and PAN 
member Xavier Salazar, the reason that his political party decided to postpone the 
debate on the electricity sector privatisation was because of Vicente Fox’s popularity. 
Consequently, the PAN opted to analyse the proposal in the next presidential term. The 
explanation provided by Salazar was very simple and did not offer additional details. 
 
This study used PT to clearly understand what factors led the PAN to make that 
decision. Our methodological approach showed how the adverse political and socio-
economic conditions generated by the PRI regime dramatically deteriorated Mexican 
society. All these events, which occurred during different periods, put people in the 
domain of losses, which led them to make risky choices. More specifically, the 
decisions taken mainly at the end of the 1960s and 1980s had the objective of ending 
the PRI’s hegemonic power. However, these actions failed and as a result society 
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continued to suffer from the bad PRI governments. At the end of the 1990s, an outsider 
emerged who was seen by the majority of the citizenry as a person who could change 
the status quo. As part of his political campaign, this newcomer strongly manipulated 
people’s perceptions and promised to “save” the country from the PRI’s 
authoritarianism.  
 
The scenario presented during the 2000 presidential elections constituted a historical 
event for Mexican society. People observed that they had an exceptional opportunity to 
put Mexico on the path to democracy. The PAN and its candidate were the players who 
could reach that aspiration. These positive conditions gave the PAN the luxury to make 
important decisions that could only be carried out because they were in the domain of 
gains. What would have happened if the scenario presented in this analysis had been 
different? One of the key characteristics of prospect theory is the dynamic nature of its 
predictions. In other words, PT predictions can change over time if the explanatory 
variables also change (McDermott 2001). 
 
If we modify the context in which the different players were acting, we can obtain other 
results. For instance, if we exclude the role of the outsider from the 2000 presidential 
campaign, it would be difficult for the people to reach a new status quo. Similarly, if 
President Zedillo had managed the economy adequately, Mexicans would have felt 
satisfied with the PRI regime. These factors could have led the PAN to support the 
PRI’s electricity privatisation project. 
 
In the case of the second research question, this chapter demonstrated that PT’s core 
findings coincide with the behaviour of leading decision-makers. In particular, official 
information, economic data and interviews suggest that risk avoiding in the domain of 
gains justifies why the MEI has not been completely opened to private investors. 
Mercer’s (2005a) framework led us to structure the data and information in a way that 
enabled us to logically explain the reform’s decision-making process under PT’s 
perspective.  
 
The three political parties were in the domain of gains. The CFE’s executive director 
stated that the MEI is in good economic condition and it has not been privatised for that 
reason. Also, official authorities in regulation and competition stated that the industry’s 
regulatory framework has to be strengthened before more private investment is 
allowed. In the case of the PRD and the PRI, both parties were also extremely 
concerned about this issue. They used the cases of Argentina and California as 
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analogies to show their dissatisfaction with the regulatory framework’s weaknesses. 
Moreover, they used the high oil export prices as a reference point, so they considered 
that such resources could be employed to capitalise the industry instead of allowing 
more private investment.  
 
The privatisation could not be implemented because Weyland’s PT/crisis argument 
was not present in the MEI. In other words, the industry’s SQ was not deteriorating and 
therefore it did not allow the decision-makers to make a risky choice. During Fox’s 
administration, the strategy to manipulate people’s reference points, known as strategic 
framing, was employed. The strategy of making society believe that the electricity 
demand was going to increase in the long term did not work as they planned. We 
consider it was not successful because the positive conditions that surrounded the MEI 
placed the political leaders (who opposed the privatisation) deeper in the domain of 
gains. Consequently, the PRI, the PAN and the PRD could not reach any agreement 
about the electricity project.  
 
The endowment effect was another interesting element in our PT analysis. The energy 
sector has been considered by Mexican society as part of the national legacy. It is a 
very strong feeling that was the result of the actions carried out mainly by President 
Cárdenas. He declared the oil and electricity industry as strategic sectors which can 
only be controlled and owned by the Mexican state. These particular elements of such 
industries were established in the Constitution. Since then, these sectors have 
historically played a key part in the country’s economic development.  
These conditions led people, including political leaders, to refuse the privatisation of the 
energy sector. The importance of oil expropriation and electricity nationalisation for 
Mexico has been passed down through generations. Consequently, this feeling is 
positioned strongly in Mexican society. According to Harbaugh et al. (2001), the 
endowment effect does not decrease with the passing of time. What does this mean in 
terms of our particular case? It indicates that people’s unwillingness to part from assets 
that belong to them will not decrease. As a result, it will be difficult for the policy-makers 
to change the energy sector’s structure from public to private ownership. People will 
defend it against any threat, because “losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979, p. 279).  
 
In Chapter 5, we analysed the private sector’s partial participation in the MEI. The 
study found that the Ley del Servicio Público de Energía Eléctrica (LSPEE) – Electricity 
Act – has severely damaged the country’s public finances. In particular, the electricity 
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generated by the Independent Power Producers (IPPs) has been very costly for the 
economy. Moreover, there is evidence that the CFE has intentionally awarded a very 
costly contract to a private company for the supply of natural gas. According to an 
analysis carried out by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), Mexico is the only country in Latin America that has a very high electricity 
generation capacity, which has been underused by the government. The organisation 
states that the Mexican authorities greatly overestimated the electricity demand. 
Moreover, ECLAC indicates that the private companies that supply natural gas to the 
CFE are not affected by the high natural gas prices (González 2012). In other words, 
the CFE absorbs gas price increases. All these elements coincide completely with our 
study of the IPPs in Chapter 5. 
 
Under these circumstances, is it possible to privatise the MEI? We consider that the 
different irregularities in the MEI can lead decision-makers to accept the SQ. In other 
words, they will not be willing to accept privatisation because it can be very costly for 
the economy. Moreover, the MEI is in good condition and has a very high electricity 
generation capacity. The endowment effect is another variable that plays an important 
role in the political dynamics. People will not easily accept a change of the SQ. So, if 
people consider the electricity sector to be part of their assets, why have they accepted 
the partial participation of the private investors in the MEI?  
 
As we explained, the LSPEE could be changed because the PRI still had a hegemonic 
control over the political system. This means that there was a lack of debate between 
different political players and therefore that decision was directly imposed. Under the 
PT perspective, we found that Salinas’ aspiration was the factor that led him to reform 
the LSPEE. Although the IPPs participate strongly in the MEI, the Constitution still 
considers the CFE as a state-owned company. This condition makes people feel that 
this industry is still part of their assets.  
 
Finally, the two models presented in this chapter offered different ways to 
operationalise prospect theory. In the first model, we used a structure that did not have 
a detailed analysis of the explanatory variables. Conversely, the second model 
developed these variables in more detail. The reason that we could carry out that 
operation is because one of the key characteristics of PT is that it does not have a 
standard structure for its application in political science. This condition allows the 
researcher to design her own structure to determine people’s domains. Moreover, to 
apply PT we only need to identify individuals’ domains but not the source of those 
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domains. In the following chapter, we offer an analysis of further alternative 
approaches that explain the delay of the MEI’s privatisation.  
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CHAPTER 7: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE NON-
PRIVATISATION OF MEXICO’S ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
What are the alternative arguments behind the delay in the Mexican Electricity 
Industry’s (MEI) privatisation project proposed by President Vicente Fox? This chapter 
offers an analysis of selected approaches based mainly on expected-utility models that 
attempt to explain this question. The selection of these alternative explanations is 
based on their important role in political science literature and in terms of the political 
dynamics’ decision-making processes. These models contrast well with prospect 
theory and offer a different perspective from the analysis developed in the previous 
chapter. 
 
The chapter is divided into six main sections. Section 7.2 discusses the political 
fragmentation model. We consider this model to be a very interesting approach that 
challenges our PT analysis. It states that political parties have not been able to reach 
agreements about the reform because the country has a political structure based on a 
consensus system. Section 7.3 provides an analysis of the interest groups. It considers 
that the MEI privatisation project has not been realised, as political groups, particularly 
the PRI, are waiting to privatise it once they recover the presidency. As a result they 
alone will reap the political benefits. Also, it proposes that the industry’s two unions are 
mainly responsible for the proposal’s lack of progress.  
 
Section 7.4 provides a political game theory approach. Section 7.5 discusses an 
analysis that considers that political parties are not entirely willing to support the 
privatisation because it will affect the middle classes. Thus, political parties will have 
less support from this segment. Section 7.6 discusses people’s attitudes to the 
privatisation project. Finally, section 7.7 offers an interesting analysis of prospect 
theory and the approaches presented in this chapter. 
 
7.2. POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION 
An interesting and alternative perspective that can explain why the federal government 
could not implement the privatisation is based on the country’s political fragmentation. 
“It has been established that democracy somehow constitutes an obstacle for the 
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country’s development” (interview with Rojas-Nieto 2005)178. According to Rojas-Nieto, 
Mexico’s democracy is a factor that does not allow political actors to reach technical 
and political agreements.  
 
In particular, he considers that the economy’s political system is young, lacks political 
maturity and is not interested in big issues such as the energy sector. Consequently, 
he considers that such elements have delayed the MEI privatisation. Moreover, he 
states that when the PRI was in power, the political system was more organised and 
much better prepared. Agreements were easier to reach when the PRI governed the 
country. 
 
As we have already mentioned, the PRI governed Mexico for seventy years. In terms of 
the legislative power before the 1997 elections, the economy had a majoritarian 
congress. In other words, PRI governments had absolute control with the largest 
number of seats in the lower and upper house. So the federal government had the 
support of the legislative branch to approve any kind of initiative.  
  
However, in 1997, the political structure dramatically changed. According to Carreón et 
al. (2003), the bad economic conditions generated by the 1995 financial crisis under a 
PRI government modified the electorate preferences. People decided to punish the PRI 
because of the bad economic situation and therefore gave their votes to other political 
parties. See Table 7.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
178
 Recall that Rojas-Nieto is a PRD’s economic advisor and chief of the CFE’s Economic Studies 
Department. 
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Table 7.1: Mexico’s political structure 
(%) 
  Deputies Senators   
Elections PRI PAN  PRD Others PRI PAN PRD Others 
1964 83 10 0 7 100 0 0 0 
1967 83 9 0 8 100 0 0 0 
1970 84 9 0 7 100 0 0 0 
1973 82 11 0 7 100 0 0 0 
1976 82 8 0 10 100 0 0 0 
1979 74 11 0 15 100 0 0 0 
1982 75 13 0 12 100 0 0 0 
1985 72 10 0 18 100 0 0 0 
1988 52 20 0 38 94 0 6 0 
1991 64 18 8 10 95 2 3 0 
1994 60 24 14 2 74 20 6 0 
1997 48 24 25 3 60 26 12 2 
2000 42 42 10 6 47 36 12 5 
2003 45 31 19 5 47 36 12 5 
2006 21 41 25 12 26 41 20 13 
 
  Source: Carreón et al. (2003) and Chamber of Deputies and Senators’ website. 
 
Table 7.1 shows the country’s political structure. It illustrates the political fragmentation 
generated since the 1997 elections. Particularly, it indicates how the economy moved 
from a majoritarian, or cabinet system, structure to a fragmented political system, or 
consensus system, in which no political party has sufficient power to approve their own 
reform proposals. Moreover, the number of small parties, which has increased in the 
last few years, has made the decision-making process more difficult. At the moment, 
there are five small parties: Convergencia, Partido Verde Ecologista de México (PVE), 
Partido del Trabajo (PT), Nueva Alianza and Alternativa. They all tend to collude with 
the big parties according to their political interests.  
 
The Economist (2005) states: “anyone who complains of the lack of civility in public 
discourse in the United States or Europe should visit the lower house of Mexico's 
Congress”. The article indicates how Mexican political parties have not been able to 
reach agreement about reforms, even when all these organisations believe that they 
are required. Moreover, it states that former President Vicente Fox (2000–2006) and 
the PAN were unable to build a consensus with either the PRI or the PRD because 
they blamed congress for obstructing any of their proposals without any reason. Under 
these circumstances, the PRI, the PAN and the PRD had to negotiate any decision 
according to their own interests.   
 
 
 
196 
 
Table 7.2: The legislative dynamics in the Chamber of Deputies  
under a cabinet system 1991–1997
a 
    Bills introduced     Bills approved    Contribution
b 
   Success rate
c 
Source 1991-94 1994-97 1991-94 1994-97 1991-94 1994-97 1991-94 1994-97 
Executive 124 84 122 83 81.9 76.9 98.4 98.8 
PRI 30 19 11 7 7.4 6.5 36.7 36.8 
PAN 26 79 4 8 2.7 7.4 15.4 10.1 
PRD 32 45 2 3 1.3 2.8 6.3 6.7 
PT - 8 - 3 - 2.8 - 37.5 
PARM 9 - 1 - 0.7 - 11.1 - 
PPS 5 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 
PFCRN 4 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 
Independent 1 12 0 2 0 1.9 0 16.7 
State 
legislatures
d 
2 2 1 1 0.7 0.9 50 50 
Other 10 2 8 1 5.4 0.9 80 50 
TOTAL 243 251 149 108 100 100 61.3 43 
 
Source: Lehoucq et al. (2005) 
 
a
The information includes legislative bills originated in the Chamber of Deputies, such as 
permits, and symbolic legislation. Senate’s bills are not included. 
b
(bills approved by source/total of bills approved) x 100. 
c
(bills approved/bills introduced) x 100. 
d
Includes Mexico City’s Representatives Assembly. 
 
 
Table 7.2 shows very interesting information on the legislature dynamics during the 55th 
(1991–1993) and the 56th legislatures (1994–1997) in which the country still had a 
cabinet system. According to Lehoucq et al. (2005), the first two columns provide data 
on the bills introduced by the different political parties and approved by the Chamber of 
Deputies179. The other columns provide two indicators: the first shows the proportion of 
each source in relation to the total volume of legislation approved by the Chamber; and 
the last column indicates the success rate of each source180. 
 
The table indicates that the president had the highest success rate, 98% and 99% 
respectively. This means that almost all the bills introduced by the country’s executive 
branch during these legislatures were successfully approved. In other words, the 
Congress supported 82% and 77% of the executive’s proposed bills (see fourth 
column). Even the executive’s legislative contribution was higher than the contribution 
made by the PRI itself. This demonstrates how the executive had absolute control over 
                                                          
179
 The Senate analysed and approved such bills.  
“The data includes the bills involving changes in law and constitutional amendments, but excludes 
permits and symbolic legislation. They also treat each bill as if they were equal value and do not contain 
the number of amendments to which bills were subject during the process of legislation in the Chamber of 
Deputies. Despite these limitations, the data reveal important outcomes of executive-legislative relations 
in the last two legislatures under single party rule” (Lehoucq et al. 2005, p. 30).  
180
 Ibid. 
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Congress, and therefore no political party was able to delay or block the president’s 
bills. 
 
Also, Table 7.2 demonstrates the opposition’s legislative dynamics. According to the 
data, the opposition contributed 32% and 57%181 of the total volume of bills during 
these legislatures. However, the vast majority of their bills were not approved; only 5% 
and 15% 182  of such bills were successful. This information indicates that the PRI 
delegated lawmaking duties to the executive because only 19% of the PRI 
government’s bills came from PRI legislators. 
 
 
Table 7.3: The legislative dynamics in the Chamber of Deputies 
under a consensus system 1997–2003
a 
    Bills introduced     Bills approved    Contribution
b 
   Success rate
c 
Source 1997-00 2000-03 1997-00 2000-03 1997-00 2000-03 1997-00 2000-03 
Executive 32 61 28 50 20.4 18.2 87.5 82 
PRI 86 306 15 54 10.9 19.6 17.4 17.6 
PAN 168 265 31 65 22.6 23.6 18.5 24.5 
PRD 157 294 20 45 14.6 16.4 12.7 15.3 
PT 23 41 7 6 5.1 2.2 30.4 14.6 
PVEM 44 74 8 14 5.8 5.1 18.2 18.9 
State 
legislatures
d 
25 86 1 15 0.7 5.5 4 17.4 
Independent 10 11 2 1 1.5 0.4 20 9.1 
PAS - 13 - 0 - 0 - 0 
PSN - 8 - 0 - 0 - 0 
CDPPN - 6 - 0 - 0 - 0 
Joint - 42 - 25 - 9.1 - 59.2 
Other 61 - 25 - 18.3 - 40.9 - 
TOTAL 606 1207 137 275 100 100 22.6 22.8 
 
Source: Lehoucq et al. (2005) 
 
a
The information includes legislative bills originated in the Chamber of Deputies, such as 
permits, and symbolic legislation. Senate’s bills are not included. 
b
(bills approved by source/total of bills approved) x 100. 
c
(bills approved/bills introduced) x 100. 
d
Includes Mexico City’s Representatives Assembly. 
 
Table 7.3 reports information regarding the initial fragmentation of the political system. 
In particular, it shows that there has been a considerable increase in the number of the 
opposition’s bills and a significant decrease in the executive’s bills since the mid 1990s. 
                                                          
181
 These figures are obtained by adding all the bills (expressed as percentages) introduced by each 
opposition party (PAN, PRD, PT, PARM, PVEM, PPS, PFCRN and independent). Then, the result is 
divided by the total. 
182
 These figures are obtained by adding all the opposition parties’ bills (expressed as percentages) 
approved by Congress. Then, the result is divided by the total. 
198 
 
For example, President Ernesto Zedillo’s bills (1994–2000) decreased from 84 to 32 
(see Tables 7.2 and 7.3) and he had a success rate of 87%. 
 
When conservative President Fox assumed the presidency, the legislative process 
became more dynamic. The executive’s bills increased from 32 to 61. However, the 
executive’s contribution to the legislative process decreased from 77% to 18% during 
the 56th and the 58th legislatures. This clearly shows that the president had lost his 
absolute power in Congress. 
 
According to Lehoucq et al. (2005), the legislative outcome did not decrease even 
though the political structure became a consensus system. Even though the political 
actors did not reach any agreements regarding structural reforms, the number of bills 
approved by Congress was higher than the number of bills during the last two 
legislatures in which the PRI controlled Congress and the executive power.  
 
Lehoucq et al. (2005) establishes that in addition to the growth of opposition parties, 
there are other elements that lead the Mexican consensus system to prevent the 
realisation of agreements. For instance, the various committee chairs and 
secretaryships, which are allocated on a proportional bases, are multi-committee 
structures. This means that all deputies must work on at least three legislative groups. 
This situation prohibits deputies from specialisation in determined policy areas, such as 
energy. The Chamber of Deputies has 44 basic commissions such as science and 
technology, social development, etc. The energy commission comprises 29 deputies: 
one president, eight secretaries, and twenty members. Most of the deputies from this 
commission are members of two other committees.  
 
Another interesting piece of information provided by Lehoucq et al. (2005) is their Rice 
index analysis183. According to their study, this indicator of party unity shows that 
political parties in Congress vote en bloc because it gives a result of 90% for all parties. 
This index suggests that Mexican congressmen are not independent in terms of the 
decision and policy-making process. In other words, deputies and senators cannot 
individually make decisions, because their veto power is controlled by their coordinates 
in the Senate and Chambers of Deputies and by their parties’ presidents. If a PRD 
                                                          
183
 “The Rice index is a simple indicator of party unity that consists of the difference between the 
percentage of party members voting against and for a specific motion. The maximum value of 100% 
means that the total party membership votes the same way. The minimum value of zero means that the 
party membership split into halves on a specific bill. The Rice index takes account of absentees nor those 
who abstain” (Lehoucq et al.2005, p. 40). 
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deputy agrees with the privatisation, he cannot vote in favour because the party’s 
coordinator instructs them to accept or reject bills. In this way, from March 1998 to April 
2000, the PRI had an index of 99.7%. After the PAN obtained the presidency, its Rice 
index increased from 92.8% to 97.6%. However, after the PRI lost its political power 
the index decreased to 94.8% on average (Casar 2000; Weldon 2004). 
 
The above information suggests that the privatisation appears to be delayed by the 
country’s political fragmentation. As the theory predicts, this situation occurs when the 
political system is a consensus structure, which tends to disperse decision-making 
power among various actors (Bortolotti and Pinotti 2004). 
 
7.3. INTEREST GROUPS 
The privatisation delays may also have been due to electoral considerations. Political 
leaders played with the prospect of an electricity privatisation in order to obtain 
marginal gains in the intense period that Mexico experienced during the 2000 
presidential elections. Castañeda (2006) considers that the federal government could 
not implement this policy due to the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI) electoral 
interests.  
 
According to him, the PRI has a strong sector, led by former Senator Manuel Bartlett, 
who considers that the PRI must wait until it gets the presidency to privatise the MEI. 
He considers that if President Fox had approved the MEI privatisation with the PRI’s 
support, the political gains would have been for Fox and the PAN, whereas the costs of 
that action would have been distributed between the PAN and the PRI. 
 
There is truth in Castañeda’s comments. In fact, we can establish that Mexico’s 
political-electoral dynamics have a very strong influence on the way the economic 
policy is conducted. In this sense, Mexico’s electoral cycle occurs every six and three 
years. Every six years the economy renews its senators, state governors and 
president. Every three years it renews deputies and local governments. None of them 
have the right to be re-elected. 
 
Gonzalez (2002) demonstrates that Mexican politicians exhibit opportunistic behaviour 
every time elections occur. Her analysis details how PRI federal governments have 
manipulated the fiscal policy to get political benefits before elections take place and it 
clearly captures the idea expressed by Castañeda. Even if the presidency did not 
belong to the PRI during the privatisation debate, it has a strong presence in Congress 
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and is the only party that rules more state governments in the country. What is more, 
PRI members occupy different key posts in the economic policy area in the former and 
current PAN federal government.  
 
For instance, President Fox’s Minister of Finance, Francisco Gil-Díaz, and the current 
Minister of Finance, Agustín Carstens, are PRI members. Also, the Bank of Mexico’s 
governor, Guillermo Ortíz, is an active member of the same political organisation. This 
situation has led the PRI to have a very strong influence on the economy’s policy-
making process, a strong bargaining power, and therefore the power to manipulate any 
kind of decision, such as the federal budget structure, without holding the presidency. 
 
Gonzalez’s (2002) political business cycle analysis considers that before important 
elections are held, the government implements a considerable number of investment 
programmes to influence people’s perceptions and consequently induce their votes 
toward the incumbent government. She establishes that, in theory, the more 
democratic the elections, the more transparent the electoral process. However, in the 
case of Mexico, when the incumbent political party feels that its interests are in danger, 
it tends to manipulate the budget and consequently influence, or increase, the 
spending level. 
 
The most relevant finding of this study that can be adapted to Casteñeda’s (2006) 
argument regarding Senator Bartlett’s electoral strategy is that the PRI tends to play 
with the country’s important decisions to get political benefits. In terms of the electricity 
privatisation project’s political dynamics, the PRI could take advantage of it and 
therefore try to manipulate the outcome of the reform’s bargaining process as they are 
used to doing it, especially because of the very competitive 2006 presidential elections 
in which the PRI wanted to resume power. In other words, the PRI is waiting until it 
obtains the presidency to carry out the privatisation, understood as a key investment 
programme in which a party would gain the preference of middle-class voters. Thus, 
they will be able to protect and strengthen their political capital (Castañeda 2006; 
Gonzalez 2002). This behaviour is typical of an imperfect democracy in which political 
parties opportunistically manipulate the economic policy (Gonzalez 2002). 
 
Also, Castañeda (2006) states that political parties, including the PRI and the PRD, 
blocked the MEI privatisation because they did not want to be the potential “losers” of 
this process. Particularly, he considers that the industry’s workers, who are grouped in 
the sector’s two unions, the Mexican Electrical Workers Union – Sindicato Mexicano de 
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Electricistas SME (LyFC’s union) – and the Sole Union of Electrical Workers of the 
Mexican Republic – Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores Electricistas de la República 
Mexicana SUTERM (CFE’s union) – obtain very good economic privileges from the 
MEI. Moreover, both organisations play a key role in these political parties: the SME is 
strongly linked to the PRD and the SUTERM is part of the PRI’s political bases. 
 
According to Castañeda (2006), there are two main reasons behind their opposition to 
the electricity privatisation. The first is related to the political benefits that can be lost if 
the sector is privatised. In other words, the PRD and the PRI could stop receiving 
electoral support from union workers. The second motive, which he considers the most 
important, is about worker pensions. His analysis suggests that the worker pension 
scheme provides the workers with greater economic resources than an average worker 
in the country. 
 
The benefits they obtain are as follows. According to the employment contract between 
the CFE and its union, workers have the right to get a pension equal to 100% of the 
last salary they received before retirement. Such a pension is dynamic, in that it 
automatically adjusts in respect to a worker’s current active salary. In this sense, 
workers can retire after 25 years of service, provided that they are 55 years old. What 
is more, they can retire if they have been working with the company for 30 years, 
regardless of age. Another benefit is free electricity for all the workers. 
 
 
Table 7.4: Rate of repositioning 
 
25 years of 
Service 
LyFC            CFE Average 
                                            Worker 
  
  2.1                 1                      0.6 
                              
 Source: Castañeda (2006). 
 
Table 7.4 shows the rate of repositioning. It compares an MEI worker’s rate of 
repositioning with respect to an average worker’s rate, which is calculated by obtaining 
the pension’s quotient with respect to the worker’s salary when they were active. A rate 
of 100% signifies that workers get the same income as the salary they received when 
they were active. 
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According to Table 7.4, a LyFC worker has the right to get a pension of 210%. On the 
other hand, an ordinary worker who contributes 4.5% of her salary to the pension 
fund184 for 25 years obtains just 60% of her salary when she retires. A CFE worker gets 
a pension of 100% with respect to her last salary. In other words, an average pension 
from LyFC is approximately US$1,589 per month, whereas a normal worker gets 
US$205 monthly. These data highlight the extremely high benefits the MEI workers get 
and therefore constitute the reason they have blocked the reform.185 
 
 
Table 7.5: Contingent liabilities: LyFC and CFE (Million USD) 
        
Projected 
employee     
    Current employee
a 
Obligations    
Company 
Assets 
(A) 
Debt 
(B) 
retirement obligations 
(C) Status quo
b c 
B+C/A B+D/A 
CFE 57,696 2,365 13,603 28,504 0.277 0.535 
LyFC 8,272 n.a 3,700 9,869 0.447 1.19 
 
Source: Castañeda (2006). 
a
The retirement obligations including all the benefits that workers deserve. 
b
The projections are calculated to fifty years at a discount rate of 6%. 
d
The projected retirement obligations give the total debt that a company generates if the status 
quo is not modified in the future. 
 
 
Table 7.5 shows how the MEI’s high worker benefits have led the two utilities to be 
extremely indebted. During this period, the information indicates that the CFE’s 
retirement obligations represent 54% of the company’s total assets. The case of the 
LyFC is ridiculous.186 The value of the company’s obligations is higher than its own 
assets. 
 
By using a political economy framework, Carreón et al. (2003) coincide with Castañeda 
(2006) concerning the role of the unions in the reform debate. They state that these 
organisations have worked together to block any change in the industry’s structure that 
can damage their interests. Moreover, they consider that the SME and the SUTERM 
are well-structured unions. So, they have enough means to get the support and, more 
                                                          
184
 The pension scheme has two systems. In the first system, the worker gets a pension which is generated 
by the economic resources she saved while she was working. In the second system, the workers who 
retire receive the funds generated by the active young workers. The first system is called Administradoras 
de Fondos para el Retiro (AFORES). The worker, the company where she works and the government 
contribute 4.5% of the worker’s salary to the AFORE. 
185
 Ibid. 
186
 Ibid. 
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importantly, the votes of the working class. It concerns all of the political parties, 
because no one wants to face the political costs of changing the sector’s status quo.  
 
Although the above information has been captured under a political economy 
framework, we consider that prospect theory can also explain union behaviour. If we 
use Castañeda’s arguments we can establish that the two unions are satisfied with 
their SQ. The benefits they get from the industry lead them to be in the domain of 
gains. Consequently, since the MEI workers obtain extremely high pensions and other 
economic benefits, such as free electricity, they are unwilling to accept a change in 
their SQ. 
 
7.4. POLITICAL GAME THEORY 
Castañeda (2006) also considers that the federal government failed to privatise the 
MEI because there was a strategic game between the ruling party and the opposition. 
He states that political parties tend not to cooperate before elections. On the other 
hand, he states that they tend to collude when there are no political campaigns ahead. 
 
Castañeda states that by using a game theory approach we can explain why the three 
main political parties (the PRI, the PAN and the PRD) could not reach an agreement 
about the electricity reform. According to him, the PRI and the PAN have periodically 
cooperated and not cooperated with each other over the last seventeen years. For 
instance, the PAN supported the 1988 presidential election, which has been strongly 
questioned. In these elections, the PRI prevailed, with Carlos Salinas de Gortari as the 
presidential candidate. During his mandate, the PAN supported and colluded with the 
PRI in order to approve all the structural reforms proposed by Salinas.  
 
Then, in 1994, the PRI won the elections with Ernesto Zedillo. During the Zedillo 
administration, the PAN supported the PRI’s main bills in Congress. For instance, both 
parties approved a pension reform and the Fondo Bancario de Protección al Ahorro 
(FOBAPROA) – the Banking Fund for the Protection of Savings. It was a very 
controversial fund with the objective of recapitalising the banking system after the 1995 
financial crisis, using public economic resources. The PRD always opposed such 
measures. 
 
The PRI and the PAN have the same economic platform; both political organisations 
consider the MEI privatisation to be one of the economy’s main issues. During Zedillo’s 
last year (1999), a proposal to privatise the MEI was presented in Congress. However, 
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the PAN and the PRD rejected the project. Publicly, the PRD stated that private 
investor participation in the sector was acceptable without changing the industry’s 
current structure187. In other words, the PRD is not willing to accept a change in the 
Constitution, so the industry can be completely maintained under public control. 
 
Although the proposal included positive conditions that the PAN had already accepted, 
it was rejected and both parties opted to discuss it during the Fox administration, 
Vicente Fox being the PAN’s winning candidate. It is important to indicate that the 
privatisation project was not presented and discussed in any official session in 
Congress. The PAN and the PRD simply decided not to discuss it; in other words, there 
were no sessions to even vote against it. During the Fox administration the reform 
project was discussed several times; however, it was again rejected. This time, the 
PRD and the PRI colluded to oppose the reform. In this case, the PRI took the place 
the PAN had when Zedillo presented his proposal. Since then, the MEI privatisation 
has not been successfully approved. 
 
According to Castañeda (2006), the above situation can also be attributed to the fact 
that political parties behave like firms when they face determined conditions. In other 
words, he states that companies’ collusive behaviour is more common when market 
growth rates are higher, whereas they do not cooperate when the economic cycle is in 
its contraction phase. In terms of the political dynamics, the economic cycle’s 
expansion and contraction phase can be understood as the political cycle’s electoral 
periods. The changes in the parties’ collusive behaviour depend on the upcoming 
electoral campaigns. The closer the elections are, the more the dynamic the political 
game. 
 
If voters perceive reforms as costly measures, the political losses of approving them in 
electoral periods will be costly as well because of the discount factor188. Consequently, 
political parties do not cooperate much during electoral campaigns if the reform costs 
are high. 
 
The Austen-Smith and Bank’s (1988) model of coalition formation illustrates how 
political dynamics can be developed in Congress. This model provides the framework 
in which determined political parties try to build a coalition in order to define a policy. 
Each party wants its own policy to be approved in Congress. Since no one has the 
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majority in the Chamber of Deputies, they have to form a coalition, but there is a 
bargaining process in which all parties have to negotiate the final outcome or the 
policy. 
 
 
 
Table 7.6: Political dynamics of electricity privatisation 
Reform proposed by: Colluding parties: Outcome 
PRI (1999) 
PAN (2000-2006) 
PAN      PRD 
PRI       PRD 
 
Not approved 
Not approved 
 
 
 
 
 
                  Table 7.7: The Austen-Smith and Bank’s model applied in the MEI 
 
Cases Governing 
coalition 
Policy 
PRI (formateur) > PAN > PRD 
 
 
PAN (formateur) > PRI > PRD 
PRI    PRD 
 
 
PAN   PRD 
2
prdpri pp 
 
panp  
  
 
Table 7.6 shows how the three political parties behaved during the debate on electricity 
privatisation. Table 7.7 indicates the ideal outcomes under the Austen-Smith and 
Bank’s (ASB) model. In particular, it states that had the PRI negotiated part of the 
benefits from the reform with the PRD, the reform would have been approved but it 
would have shared the reform’s structure, 
2
prdpri pp 
, with the PRD. On the other 
hand, during the Fox administration, the best strategy for the PAN was to form a 
coalition with the PRD as well. In this situation, the reform’s design is carried out by the 
PAN, Ppan. In the first case, the PRI was the formateur (the Zedillo administration); in 
other words, it was the party with the capacity to elect its coalition party because it was 
in power and had the majority of votes in Congress (see Table 7.1; year 1994 and 
1997)189. The PRI’s best choice was the PRD because it was the smallest party in the 
Chamber of Deputies. To consolidate a potential coalition with the PRD, the PRI had to 
share part of the privatisation’s political gains. According to the theory, a small party 
demands a lower level of political gains than a larger party.  
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In the second case, the PAN became the formateur under the Fox administration, and 
its best choice was the PRD. However, the PAN had to provide more of its political 
gains to the PRD because it was the second largest party in Congress (see Table 7.1; 
year 2003). In exchange for receiving a larger proportion of political gains, the PRD had 
to let the PAN be the only player in the decision-making process. The benefits offered 
by the PAN to the PRD are less than the proportion the PRI is willing to provide to it. 
The key point of this game is that all three parties want to maximise their utility 
functions by obtaining political gains from each other. 
 
According to the model, the above can be avoided if the coalition partner just accepts 
the conditions proposed by the party that holds the largest vote share, the formateur. 
There are two conditions for this: 1) the coalition partner has to accept the policy, such 
as electricity reform; and 2) it has to reach an agreement with the formateur in terms of 
the political benefits they are both willing to accept. If the coalition partner accepts, the 
game ends. Although the model does not reflect the real situation of the MEI’s political 
dynamics, it offers good elements for understanding them.  
 
Carreón et al. (2003) considers two strategies to solve the above game. The first would 
be to wait until the Congress composition can allow a change in the Mexican 
constitution. However, this strategy depends on external variables, such as voter 
preference, which energy reformers cannot control. The second strategy is a coalition 
between the PRI and the PAN. However, both parties need to reach a mutual 
agreement in which the costs and political gains are distributed adequately.  
 
In this sense, Carreón et al. (2003), believe that the PRI is perhaps overestimating the 
electoral costs of approving the privatisation, which are not very significant, particularly 
because the PAN would be seen as the most responsible if the project were to fail. 
Moreover, if the PRI really wants the electricity privatisation, it must forget about its 
political relationship with the CFE’s union, the SUTERM. They must build a strong 
coalition to block the union objectives of maintaining their interests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
207 
 
7.5. DISTRIBUTIONAL APPROACH 
López-Calva and Rosellón (2002) state that public opinion surveys show that people’s 
perception about privatisations is negative. They consider that this is because 
privatisation can affect the middle urban classes’ interests, particularly if generalised 
subsidies are eliminated, as it can have a negative distributional impact on this sector 
of society. They consider that since the middle classes have much better 
representation than any other social group in the public and legislative circle, they will 
provide less support for the privatisation’s approval. 
 
 
         Table 7.8: Number of tariffs in the MEI 
User Tariffs 
Residential 
Commercial 
Public service 
Agriculture 
Industrial 
 
6 
2 
4 
2 
17 
  
                                            Source: López-Calva and Rosellón (2002) 
 
 
Table 7.8 shows the MEI tariff levels. The tariff system is divided into five categories: 
residential, commercial, public services, agriculture and industrial. According to López-
Calva and Rosellón (2002), domestic tariffs are below the industry’s production costs 
and they include a subsidy, which covers more than 97% of users.   
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                     Source: Own projections with data from the President’s report 2006 (Sexto  
                     Informe de Gobierno 2006) 
 
            
 
            
                     Source: Own projections with data from the President’s report 2006 (Sexto 
   Informe de Gobierno 2006) 
 
Figure 7.1 shows the evolution of subsidies. Particularly, it indicates that from 1994 to 
2006, subsidies for the residential sector increased at an annual average rate of 23%. 
In other words, they increased from US$541 million to US$6,277 million; commercial 
sector 17%; public services 69%; agriculture 21%; and the industrial sector 32% (Sexto 
Informe de Gobierno 2006). In 2006, the total amount of subsidies paid by the 
government was US$9,811 million, of which 64% went to the domestic sector, 19% to 
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the industrial sector, 10% to agriculture, 5% to commercial services, and public 
services received 3% (see Graph 7.1)190. 
 
According to López-Calva and Rosellón (2002), subsidies have a regressive structure. 
This is because they are established by considering the country’s temperature. They 
consider that poorer people do not consume much electricity even in areas where 
temperatures are higher. The prices for the industrial and commercial sector reflect 
electricity generation’s real costs. López-Calva and Rosellón consider that this 
regressive structure is reflected in agriculture, where poor electricity users do not have 
irrigation systems that can lead them to consume large amounts of power. Large 
industrial producers employ this kind of technology, so they benefit the most from the 
structure of the electricity tariffs. 
 
The price-to-cost ratio in the CFE for the five sectors is as follows: in 2006, the 
agriculture sector received the highest level of subsidies, because it paid just 25% of 
the actual cost of electricity; medium and large industries got the lowest subsidy level, 
since they paid 93% and 92% of the costs respectively; the only sector that completely 
covered these costs was the commercial sector (see Table 7.9). 
 
 
Table 7.9: The price/cost ratio in the CFE 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Residential 0.41 0.42 0.5 0.45 0.44 0.42 0.4 
Commercial 1.07 1.07 1.05 1.01 1.09 1.11 1.09 
Public 
services 0.88 0.9 0.96 0.86 0.84 0.82 0.79 
Agriculture 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.25 
Medium 
industry 0.85 0.87 0.91 0.88 0.93 0.93 0.93 
Large industry 0.85 0.83 0.89 0.86 0.92 0.91 0.92 
 
Source: The President’s report 2006 
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Table 7.10: The price/cost ratio in LyFC 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Residential 0.24 0.26 0.31 0.33 0.29 0.28 0.32 
Commercial 0.6 0.58 0.55 0.59 0.57 0.59 0.6 
Public 
services 0.82 0.74 0.78 0.78 0.7 0.69 0.81 
Agriculture 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.2 0.14 
Medium 
industry 0.67 0.57 0.57 0.65 0.65 0.67 0.66 
Large industry 0.74 0.63 0.59 0.67 0.68 0.71 0.66 
 
Source: The President’s report 2006 
 
In the case of the LyFC, which supplies electricity to the states of Hidalgo, Mexico, 
Morelos, Puebla and Mexico City, subsidies are even higher. For instance, the 
agricultural and residential sector paid just 14% and 32% of the actual cost of 
electricity. Medium and large industry covered 66% of the costs (see Table 7.10).  
 
To explain why the middle class is the sector most affected by the MEI privatisation 
and consequently more protected by the legislative power, López-Calva and Rosellón 
(2002) employ a distributional model developed by Newbery (1995). Their model 
essentially focuses on an analysis of the domestic sector. First of all, they used the 
Lorenz curve approach to study electricity consumption. So, they obtained the Gini 
coefficients and dominance tests for two years, 1992 and 2000. They used data from 
the National Income-Expenditure Survey and divided their sample into three 
categories: rural, urban and total electricity consumption. The results established that 
the subsidy structure is strongly regressive. For instance, they found that the poorest 
decile receives 6% of total subsidies. Conversely, the richest 30% of the population 
obtains 35% of the subsidies.  
 
When they applied Newbery’s methodology to determine the welfare effects of the 
price changes, they found that subsidised tariffs lack distributional characteristics. 
Particularly, they observed that the prices of drinking water and telephone services 
have much better distributional characteristics than electricity. They attributed this to 
the subsidies’ distortion. The current subsidy structure leads to three distortions: 1) 
locational distortions; 2) regressivity in the allocation of expenditure; and 3) inefficient 
use of energy due to the fact that prices do not consider the economic cost.191 For 
these reasons, López-Calva and Rosellón consider that urban middle classes will be 
the most affected social groups if the privatisation is approved and that it will lead to the 
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elimination of generalised subsidies. This situation causes a negative perception about 
privatisations.  
 
Their analysis is interesting in terms of the perspective of prospect theory. This is 
because they discuss how public surveys show that people see privatisations as a 
negative action against their interests. In particular, they employed the Latin 
Barometer-Latinobarómetro 2002 survey 192 , which provided evidence on people’s 
tendency to associate privatisations with massive layoffs and price increases. In other 
words, people feel comfortable with their status quo and therefore they are in the 
domain of gains.   
 
7.6. PEOPLE’S ATTITUDES 
Becerra and Fernández (2004) propose another alternative political economy analysis 
of people’s perceptions of the MEI privatisation. Particularly, they tested the following 
hypotheses: 1) party identification should play an important role in citizens’ preferences 
toward privatisation. PAN members and PRI members will support privatisation while 
PRD members will oppose it; 2) individuals who present high levels of presidential 
approval will tend to support the MEI privatisation; 3) individuals from the north will be 
more likely to support the privatisation in contrast to those in the south; 4) individuals 
that have positive retrospective evaluations of national economy will be more 
supportive of the MEI privatisation; 5) higher-income individuals will be more likely to 
support the MEI privatisation; 6) older individuals will oppose privatisation; 7) females 
will be more likely to oppose the privatisation; and 8) individuals with higher education 
levels will tend to support the MEI privatisation193 . To test these hypotheses they 
conducted a series of logistic regressions. They employed information from three 
different public opinion surveys carried out in 1995, 1999, 2003 and 2004194. 
 
Their results are interesting. In the case of the first hypothesis, they establish that the 
PRI and the PAN share the same economic ideology. People identified with these 
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 This is annual survey that involves 19,000 interviews in 18 Latin American countries. Latinobarómetro 
Corporation is an NGO based in Santiago, Chile. 
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 The first survey’s question was “Do you agree or disagree with the privatisation of the following 
enterprises: Comisión Federal de Electricidad?” For the 1999 survey the question was “Are you in favour 
or against the privatisation of the electricity?” In 2000, the formulated question was “Please tell us 
whether you agree or disagree with the following statement, and how much: Private investment should be 
allowed in the energy sector” (Becerra and Fernández 2004, p. 10). 
They used the term “privatisation” in the interviews. People perceive this term in a different way from the 
term “private investment’s participation”. In particular, they see privatisation as a very radical economic 
measure. 
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organisations’ support of the privatisation. Particularly, people who identified with the 
PAN have a higher level of support for the MEI privatisation than the PRI. Individuals 
who identified with the PRD oppose the participation of private investment in the 
electricity sector.  
 
The second hypothesis was rejected. They found evidence that presidential approval is 
not related to the privatisation programme. This is because such policies have been 
implemented by different federal administrations, which leads to the fact that none of 
the presidents can claim exclusiveness of the privatisations. For instance, they found 
no connection between President Zedillo’s195 approval and this economic programme.  
 
In this sense, they determined that people from northern states oppose this policy as 
much as people from southern states. “This issue is more a national concern than a 
regional divide” (Becerra and Fernández 2004, p. 17). However, they found that 
people’s support of privatisation is stronger in the north than in the south. They 
attributed this to the fact that northern states are more economically developed. 
 
Individuals who consider that the economy is in good condition do not necessarily 
support the MEI privatisation. In 2000, the economy’s positive condition did not 
influence them to support this policy. In 2003 and 2004, this feeling got stronger. 
Becerra and Fernández consider that this is because the political debate became 
stronger as well. In the case of people’s age, it is not a determinant of their attitudes, 
because opposition toward privatisation is distributed throughout the population. 
 
People’s income levels had a positive impact on the support of privatisation. 
Particularly, they found that in 1995, an increase in income levels in certain groups of 
people with minimum wages (from groups 3–5 to 7–10)196 strengthened support for 
privatisation by 15%. In 1999 and 2000, the same increase led to a support level of 7% 
and 18% respectively.  
 
Mexicans with higher education levels tend to support this policy. In 1999, when a 
person’s educational level moved from elementary school to college, their support of 
privatisation increased by 12%. The trend was similar in 1999 and 2000. Finally, the 
study states that women are 8% more likely to oppose the MEI privatisation than men. 
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Becerra and Fernández’s model concludes that previous privatisations had a strong 
effect on people’s perceptions. The banking system, which offers very expensive 
financial services to the public and was financially supported by the government during 
the 1995 financial crisis, has strongly affected public perception of a possible 
privatisation in the MEI. Also, it states that 60% of Mexican legislators use public 
opinion surveys as a means of gaining insight about people’s positions on Mexico’s key 
issues197. They state, “this demonstrates that the study of public opinion has turned and 
will remain increasingly relevant in the study of Mexican politics” (Becerra and 
Fernández 2004, p. 20). 
 
Their study is interesting because it offers answers to different questions about the MEI 
privatisation from the citizenry perspective. Although it was a political economy model, 
its structure is based on people’s perceptions. They employed psychological elements, 
including people’s perceptions, as a departing point, as López-Calva and Rosellón 
(2002) did to construct their model. One of the model’s key results is that people see 
the MEI privatisation programme as a negative measure. This is because past 
privatisations have negatively influenced them. 
 
7.7. CONCLUSIONS: PROSPECT THEORY VS OTHER APPROACHES  
Although the approaches presented in this chapter offer different ways to analyse the 
situation in the electricity industry, PT (Chapter 6) addresses key issues that are not 
tackled by such methodologies or better explains the same situations. For instance, the 
interest group approach can be better studied by using the PT’s status quo effect. In 
the analysis of the two unions, we can state that their benefits scheme, such as the 
retirement fund, leads electricity workers (insiders) to see themselves in a much more 
favourable position with respect to the average level of worker welfare.  
 
A good way to survive the negative effects of a country that has been experiencing 
serious economic chaos198 is to work for key employment sources that offer excellent 
benefits, such as the energy industry. CAPEM-Oxford Economic Forecasting (2005) 
states that during the Fox administration (2000–2007), more than six million people 
became unemployed and the country had an economic growth of only 2%; the lowest 
level in the last four presidential terms.  
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In this way, under bad economic conditions, the objective of unemployed people, also 
referred to as outsiders, is to return to stability; that is, the re-establishment of the 
status quo ante. Weyland (2002) considers that outsiders focus their attention on 
reversing recent losses and preventing future losses. Consequently, outsiders tend to 
imitate insider behaviour (employed people), which means that people will try to get 
stable jobs.  
 
According to La Jornada (2004b and 2005), hundreds of unemployed people try to buy 
permanent jobs in the electricity utilities. These positions are sold by the union leaders, 
who have been publicly accused of power abuse such as illicit enrichment, sexual 
harassment against women and vote buying199 (La Jornada 2007a). The prices they 
charge for the job vacancies depend on the kind of work people require, whether it be 
permanent or short-term positions. The minimum price for a vacancy for joining the 
Mexican Electrical Workers Union (SME) is at least US$5,000200.  
 
Although this illicit behaviour has been denounced, no legal action has been taken 
against the union leaders: they state that the accusations are simply a lie (La Jornada 
2004b). Among other benefits, the leaders receive a huge amount of union fees from 
their workers. For example, each year, the Sole Union of Electrical Workers of the 
Mexican Republic (SUTERM) receives more than 17 million pesos and the SME 
obtains over 12 million pesos in union fees, which are automatically deducted from the 
workers’ accounts (Reforma 2007).  
 
Under these conditions, it is difficult for the insiders to be willing to accept the loss of 
their economic stability, which is considered to be an increasingly scarce asset for 
society. The workers are not the only ones satisfied with this situation; the union 
leaders, who also enjoy the advantages, are convinced that the cost of renouncing 
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Similar to the electricity industry, union leaders in the country’s state-owned oil company, PEMEX, have 
been publicly accused of illicit enrichment and sexual harassment; no serious legal action has been taken 
against them (La Jornada 2007b). In the case of the sale of job positions, they sell them at prices between 
US$9,200 and US$11,500.  
It is publicly known that the union’s main leader, Carlos Romero-Deschamps, is a person who has been 
involved in many corrupt acts. In 2008, the Mexican Oil Workers’ Union – Sindicato de Trabajadores 
Petroleros de la República Mexicana (STPRM) – received from PEMEX more than $10 million just to 
“celebrate” the anniversary of the oil expropriation and Labour Day (La Jornada 2008b). Although the 
union gives him a net salary of $762 per month, he wears expensive watches such as a Rolex Oyster 
Perpetual, which can retail US$200,000. Also, he is the owner of a yacht that costs one and a half million 
USD. (La Jornada 2008b; Reforma 2008).  
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such privileges is extremely high201. The money and influence led union leaders to 
have a very special position in the country’s decision-making process, specifically in 
labour market policies. They have been taking advantage of this power for decades202 
and the power has turned into an obsession. For instance, Leonardo Rodríguez-
Alcaine was the SUTERM’s leader for 30 years. In 1997, he appointed his nephew as 
the new union’s leader without any previous election.  
 
As we can see, the difference between the interest group approach discussed in this 
chapter and our brief prospect theory interpretation is that we are taking into 
consideration other key explanatory variables that lead us to have a better 
understanding of union behaviour in the economy. First, we discussed the behaviour of 
the insiders and outsiders by considering external scenarios that influence their 
decisions, such as the country’s economic conditions. Secondly, for PT, the analysis of 
union leader behaviour is a very important factor; this is because they are the 
organisations’ main decision-makers. Castañeda (2006) only focuses his attention on 
the workers’ benefits.  
 
In other words, he ignores the leaders’ status quo and how it can affect a privatisation 
plan for the electricity industry. Since they are obsessed with power, they are well 
positioned in the domain of gains (recall that in prospect theory, emotions play a 
fundamental part in any the decision-making process). So, if the government wants to 
carry out the privatisation, not only does it have to deal with the workers, but also 
primarily with the players who control them. The government has to think about 
complementary measures to reduce the insiders’ feeling of loss. For instance, in 
Chapter 3, Mullainathan (2006) states that one of the policy implications of considering 
psychological variables is that policy makers can implement mechanisms that can 
make insiders believe that the government cares and protects their status quo against 
deterioration. Consequently, these mechanisms can trigger positive attitudes toward 
privatisation in the workers.   
The other methodologies such as the distributional approach, people’s attitudes and 
the electoral interests can be better analysed or complemented by using PT’s structure. 
While these approaches make important contributions to clarifying the established 
patterns of regular politics, they lack innovative and flexible resources for analysing the 
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political dynamics of market reforms, particularly in the Mexican electricity industry. 
Prospect theory offers a novel and empirical micro foundation for political analysis that 
diverges from conventional methods (e.g. rational-choice approaches).  
 
In this way, it is an alternative to the model that has been employed in political science, 
including the subfield of comparative politics (Weyland 2002). For example, the 
difference between the political game theory model presented in this chapter, the 
Austen-Smith and Bank model and our PT analysis is that the former excels in 
parsimony, strong rigidity and proper elaboration. On the other hand, behavioural 
decision theories are complex and lack a well-structured model.  
 
However, this disadvantage is one of PT’s main strengths. This is because it depends 
on empirical bases that allow us to understand the complicated systems in which 
people in fact behave. In other words, PT’s empirical structure leads research projects 
to have more accurate results, because it considers people’s behaviour in terms of 
gains and losses. For example, our PT analysis in Chapter 6 pays attention to how 
people used analogies such as California’s electricity crisis to determine what kind of 
risks can be involved if the privatisation is carried out without a strong regulatory 
framework. Since the players saw the Mexican electricity industry reflected in the 
American case, they behaved in a risk-averse way. 
 
Rational choice employs impractical assumptions about human problem solving or from 
simplifying ideal-typical postulates (Tversky and Kahneman 1986). The Austen-Smith 
and Bank model does not consider how the players frame their decisions by 
considering other variables that can affect such options, including analogies or the 
status quo as a reference point. In this particular case, the model only focuses its 
attention on how the formateur203 can build a coalition to successfully approve the 
privatisation in Congress. This means that the model’s centre of attention is on the 
outcome of the bargaining process. The model does not allow the researcher to get 
more information about the players. This situation cannot lead her to obtain robust 
results. 
 
These kinds of theoretical frameworks are in fact realistic and accurate (Tsebelis 1990; 
Weyland 2002). However, they depend on stable settings, meaning that actors’ 
behaviour and their interests are always fixed, which limits the models’ results in terms 
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of predictability, time horizon, etc. In political science, empirical accuracy over 
parsimony is a crucial priority (Weyland 2002). In conclusion, we consider that the 
approaches analysed in this chapter offer alternative theoretical frameworks to 
understand the reasons behind the delay of the MEI privatisation.  
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter offers summaries of the key aspects of the thesis, an analysis of the 
possible factors that can lead to a change in the MEI’s status quo (SQ) and a 
discussion of the application of prospect theory to different organisations. In particular, 
in Section 8.2.1 we provide the Mexican context, which helps us to define possible 
scenarios for the MEI. Then, in Section 8.2.2 we discuss the factors that can maintain 
the MEI under public ownership and those that can lead the government to privatise 
this industry. Moreover, we speculate how people and political actors could react if the 
government proposes to privatise the MEI. Section 8.3 discusses the applicability of PT 
to group behaviour. 
 
8.1. CHAPTER SUMMARIES  
Chapter 2 offered a discussion of the key elements related to public and private 
ownership. Particularly, it considers that one of the advantages of public ownership is 
that problems of incomplete contracts can be addressed effectively. This is because 
governments have the mechanism to interfere with contract irregularities and therefore 
prevent opportunistic benefits for one of the parties involved in the economic 
transactions. On the other hand, Chapter 2 considers potential benefits from changing 
from public to private ownership. For instance, under private ownership the economy 
can become more efficient.  
 
Another important discussion in Chapter 2 is that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
respond to political objectives. More specifically, political players tend to use the 
economic resources of SOEs to favour interest groups. This is caused by the weak 
organisational structure of the SOEs and the non-transparent operations within these 
companies. These situations commonly occur in countries with high corruption levels 
as in Latin America. In addition, we discussed the use of SOEs as mechanisms for 
influencing the electoral system. Projects (e.g. white elephants) that help politicians to 
attract more voters to remain in power are cases in point.  
 
Chapter 2 then pays special attention to the role of regulation in privatisation. To 
maximise the benefits of privatisation, governments should set up a regulatory 
framework before companies start operating under a private ownership structure. The 
regulatory framework for an industry has to be structured by mechanisms that can 
regulate prices, investments, advertising, product quality, etc. In addition, regulation 
has to protect consumers from monopoly abuse and promote efficiency and 
competition. 
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Chapter 3 offered a review of PT and its application to political dynamics. Firstly, the 
chapter placed particular emphasis on how prospect theory was developed. It showed 
that the principles of the EUT proposed by Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) can be 
violated. The violation of such axioms constitutes important findings, as most decision-
making models in economics and political science are based on these assumptions. 
Kahneman and Tversky developed prospect theory as an alternative approach to 
understanding human behaviour. 
 
Prospect theory can help explain risk behaviour in politics. Identifying the domain of a 
specific situation helps predict what kind of behaviour to expect from decision-makers. 
If people are in the domain of gains, they will be risk-averse. Conversely, if people are 
in the domain of losses, they will be risk-takers. PT suggests a simple framework to 
understand people’s risk behaviour. Defining risk behaviour requires knowing in which 
domain people are located. 
 
Chapter 3 discussed some important component parts of PT such as the endowment 
effect, loss aversion and strategic framing and discusses critics of PT. The chapter also 
discusses the empirical implementation of the PT suggested by Mercer (2005a). The 
status quo, aspirations, heuristics, analogies and emotions can help us to understand 
decision-makers’ domains.  
 
Chapter 4 offered a review of the different motives that led developed and developing 
countries to carry out structural reforms in their electricity industries. Some 
determinants of electricity reforms in developed economies had ideological bases. In 
the case of developing economies, the international financial institutions (IFIs) such as 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund played a key role in promoting 
these policies. These organisations offered financial support to governments to 
renegotiate their debts. This was conditional on the application of economic measures 
as suggested by the Washington Consensus.  
 
However, there were other particular reasons that led governments to reform their 
electricity sectors. The Chilean electricity industry is under private control because 
Augusto Pinochet imposed radical neoliberal policies that favoured private sector 
participation in the economy. Other Latin American governments implemented these 
policies because their electricity sectors were experiencing adverse conditions and also 
because they followed the electricity reform in Europe. Developed and developing 
countries applied similar models of reforming the electricity sector. Some economies 
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imitated the British and Chilean electricity models, adapting them to their specific 
conditions.  
 
Finally, Chapter 4 reviewed the Ley del Servicio Público de Energía Electrica (LSPEE) 
– Electricity Act – and the electricity privatisation proposals developed by two different 
federal administrations. The LSPEE was created in 1975 to confirm that the MEI can 
only be operated by the government. However, it was modified by President Salinas to 
allow the partial participation of private investors in Mexico’s electricity generation 
system. The reform of this law allowed Independent Power Producers (IPPs) into the 
sector but it did not introduce privatisation.  
 
President Zedillo suggested the first proposal to privatise the MEI. It focused on 
modifying the Constitution so the government could change the MEI’s structure from 
public to private ownership, considering private sector involvement in electricity 
generation, transmission and distribution. President Fox presented a second 
privatisation project, which also had the objective of modifying the Constitution. 
Although the project was similar to Zedillo’s proposal, it had some technical differences 
that were not made clear and led to severe criticism by energy experts and the public. 
According to our interviews, the government’s main objective was to modify the 
Constitution to have power to facilitate privatisation of the MEI.  
 
It is important to state that the LSPEE was considered a partial liberalisation of the 
MEI. This law did not consider a change in the sector’s ownership structure. In other 
words, private companies would be able to generate electricity and sell it to CFE. 
Although the LSPPE was modified, the whole industry was maintained under public 
ownership. Conversely, the proposals presented by Zedillo and Fox considered 
reforming constitutional articles 27 and 28. These articles grant the nation exclusive 
control over the energy sector. So, to privatise the MEI, these articles would have to be 
changed.  
  
Chapter 5 presented an analysis of the privatisation programme in Mexico and the 
partial participation of the private sector in the MEI. As an introductory discussion, the 
chapter offered a historical review of the key economic events during President 
Cárdenas’ administration. In terms of energy policy, it was one of the most important 
periods in the country. Oil expropriation and the nationalisation of electricity were part 
of the strategy to initiate the country’s industrialisation process. The public ownership of 
the energy sector became constitutional. During the Cardenismo and the following 
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presidential periods, many SOEs were created to strengthen the economy, and at the 
same time the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) developed its political structure.   
 
Chapter 5 presented two important privatisation cases: the privatisation of the banking 
system and Telmex. Corruption, political interests and an inadequate planning process 
were some of the factors that influenced the sale of these companies. As part of our 
analysis we showed that the private sector’s participation in the MEI under the LSPEE 
has not led to positive results. Although the electricity industry has not been privatised, 
the chapter showed that the operation of the IPPs and their financial scheme 
(Pidiregas) have been very costly to public finances. Moreover, the analysis of a 
contract between CFE and a private company states that the government is paying a 
very high price for its natural gas supply. 
 
In Chapter 6, we proposed PT to understand why the electricity privatisation proposals 
were not carried out. Our research found that President Zedillo’s MEI privatisation 
proposal could not be implemented because the PAN was in the domain of gains. The 
economic, social and political conditions of the country led people to support a political 
outsider. This scenario put the PAN in the domain of gains and therefore it decided not 
to support the PRI. Similarly, the Fox administration was unable to implement its 
privatisation project because the three key political parties in the country were risk-
averse. Moreover, the industry was not in crisis and therefore this factor deterred 
decision-makers from implementing this policy.  
 
Another interesting finding was that decision-makers tried to manipulate people’s 
perceptions to make them believe that the MEI was in a severe crisis, and use this 
factor as a key reason to privatise the sector. This situation confirmed one of PT’s 
predictions applied to political science: strategic framing. In other words, the 
government tried to artificially place people in the domain of losses by influencing their 
perceptions with the crisis argument. Our research found evidence of the endowment 
effect. The historical discussion in Chapter 5 showed that the energy sector represents 
a valuable asset for Mexican society. If the Constitution is modified and the sector 
privatised, people will feel they are losing something that belongs to them.  
 
Chapter 7 discussed other approaches to analysing the second research question. It 
showed that the political fragmentation perspective implies that since the 1997 election, 
Mexico’s political system moved from a majoritarian to a fragmented structure. In other 
words, it became a political system in which no political party had enough power to 
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approve any kind of reform. According to this perspective, when the PRI had absolute 
power in Congress it was easier to satisfy the president’s demands. For example, 
during the fifty-fifth (1991–1993) and fifty-sixth (1994-1997) legislatures, the bills 
proposed to congress by the president had a success rate of 98% and 99% 
respectively. This shows that almost all the policies introduced by the federal 
administrations were approved.  
 
Another interesting analysis discussed in Chapter 7 was the distributional approach, 
which stated that politicians are not willing to privatise the MEI because the middle 
classes will be severely affected by it. In particular, it concludes that in the central part 
of Mexico, people pay 32% of the actual cost of electricity. According to this research, 
people expect that if privatisation is carried out, generalised subsidies will be 
eliminated. Consequently, they will not support MEI privatisation.  
 
In conclusion, this study has sought to explain why the privatisation programme of 
Mexico’s electricity industry has not been carried out. By exploring different theoretical 
models of decision-making as applied to political science, we found that prospect 
theory (PT) offers a non-traditional way to understand the political dynamics of 
privatisation. We find that PT can be considered as an alternative to traditional theories 
of choice, particularly expected utility theory (EUT). Drawing on psychology, PT 
observes that EUT does not properly describe the way people make decisions under 
risky scenarios. Consequently, this situation does not allow researchers to predict 
adequately a decision-maker’s choices. For instance, PT shows that EUT does not give 
any explanation of how the framing process can influence people’s options. Moreover, 
it does not clarify why people exhibit risk-seeking behaviour under some situations and 
risk-averse behaviour in others. 
 
We consider that this thesis has made an important contribution to the empirical 
application of prospect theory. As was shown mainly in Chapter 6, we developed a 
methodological framework that helps to understand the political dynamics of the MEI 
privatisation in terms of decision-making processes. We employed a set of 
mechanisms that allowed us to know how the actors involved in the energy policy 
visualised the different factors that influenced their decisions. The thesis offered two 
different models based on specific explanatory variables relevant to the Mexican case. 
   
The thesis also made a significant contribution to understanding decision-making by 
governments. The theoretical framework proposed in this study can help policymakers 
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understand the nature of policy decision-making processes. For example, by using PT 
and Mercer’s techniques, policymakers can anticipate how people will frame their 
options. Another use of this behavioural theory of choice can help other organisations 
(e.g. NGOs) to detect when and how governments are influencing people’s perceptions 
to achieve specific objectives. For instance, a potential threat to survival can lead 
groups of people to support risky policies.  
 
8.2. WHAT FACTORS CAN LEAD TO CHANGES IN THE MEI’S SQ? 
8.2.1. The Mexican Context 
As was stated in Chapter 6, the 2000 presidential election represented an opportunity 
for Mexicans to change the SQ. People’s risky behaviour led them to put all their 
“hopes” in one man, Vicente Fox. However, once Vicente Fox took office he changed 
his political behaviour completely. Not all his campaign promises were carried out. 
Under Calderón’s government, the country’s economic and social conditions continued 
to deteriorate. Even the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, was extremely 
concerned about the situation in Mexico. According to a confidential cable published by 
WikiLeaks, Clinton was very worried about Calderón’s behaviour and his leadership 
style. In this report, Clinton states: “F-H have indicated that Calderón and his 
administration are currently under great stress from the drug war, economic collapse, 
and his party’s midterm election losses ... we are still interested in how these current 
stresses are affecting his personality and management style and how that style is 
affecting the running of the government” (El País, 2010a). 
 
The Secretary of State sent the US embassy in Mexico City the following questions: “1) 
How does President Calderón react to viewpoints that are different from his own? 
(Does he like to get into debates with people who disagree with him? Does he prefer to 
listen to their viewpoint, think on it for a while, and come back with a response?); 2) 
What are the effects of his management style on those who work for him?; 3) How 
would you describe Calderón’s personality? What values/beliefs/behaviours does 
Calderón hold most dearly, and respect most in others (truthfulness, loyalty, respect, 
etc.); and 4) Has job stress affected any of the security and economic sections of his 
cabinet members’ health?” (El País, 2010a). 
 
The US Ambassador to Mexico, Carlos Pascual, reported to the Secretary of State the 
key information about Calderón’s government. In terms of the political and economic 
context, the classified cable states that “President Calderón has entered the last three 
years of his six-year term facing a complicated political and economic environment ... 
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Calderón’s bold plan for ten ambitious areas for reform has yet to translate into 
politically viable initiatives ... his personal popularity numbers have dropped, driven 
largely by massive economic contraction and a public sense that there is little strategy 
to create new and sustainable jobs ... PRI insiders indicate that the party is unlikely to 
support any major reform efforts over the next several years – no matter how 
necessary – that could be publicly controversial” (El País, 2010b). Moreover, the report 
indicates that Calderón’s drug war, in which 100,000 people have died in drug-related 
violence (Tuckman 2012), has failed.  
 
In the 2000 presidential election, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas was the left-wing candidate 
from the PRD. Then, in the 2006 presidential election, Andrés Manuel López Obrador 
(AMLO) represented the same political party. Both politicians promised to end the 
social and economic crisis. Similar to Fox, they were risky choices but in a different 
way. Their political promises were more radical because they called for a “profound 
transformation” of the country. Although the programmes presented by Cárdenas and 
AMLO were radical, they represented realistic alternatives at a lower risk than their 
political opponents.  
 
These politicians rejected the application of neoliberal policies. They offered economic 
strategies that had the objective of protecting the energy sector. In particular, they 
opposed the privatisation of the oil and electricity industries. They stated that this 
sector had to be strategic factor to trigger economic growth and therefore had to be 
kept under public ownership (López-Obrador, 2004). They considered that the energy 
sector must continue as part of the country’s legacy. In this way, a PRD government 
could have generated conflict, particularly with key political and economic interest 
groups. Cárdenas was defeated because risk-seeking in the domain of losses 
influenced people’s electoral behaviour towards Fox. On the other hand, AMLO lost the 
election by just 0.56% of the vote to Felipe Calderón of the National Action Party 
(PAN)204.  
 
These two Mexican elections resemble the case of Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula 
da Silva (2003–2010), “Lula”. According to Weyland (2002), in the late 1980s Brazil 
was experiencing diverse economic problems. For instance, inflation reached 44.3% at 
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the end of 1989. In the same year, opinion polls in different cities, such as Niterói, 
showed that 84% of people stated that the economic situation in the country had not 
changed during the last four years. This adverse scenario pushed a large proportion of 
people into the domain of losses and therefore they chose Fernando Collor de Mello as 
Brazil’s president. Collor de Mello represented a very risky option because his 
economic programme was highly doubtful. Moreover, he had an unpredictable 
personality which worried his own supporters205.  
 
Similar to AMLO and Cárdenas, Lula had a radical economic programme. His objective 
was to carry out a deep transformation of society. However, Brazilians discarded Lula 
and opted for Collor. Popular and less educated sectors supported Collor, whereas 
Lula was supported by educated sectors that paid attention to political programmes. 
People focused on Collor’s personality and rejected Lula’s ideological radicalism. In the 
case of Mexico, young and better educated people support AMLO (ADN Político, 
2012b). Conversely, less educated individuals prefer PAN and PRI candidates.  
 
The 2000 political alteration did not change the SQ in the country. The PAN 
governments continued carrying out the same corrupt practices promoted by the PRI 
regime. The PAN was unable to improve the socioeconomic conditions in Mexico and 
therefore the economy is in a very critical situation. For instance, there are 57 million 
people in poverty, 13 million people live in extreme poverty and 20 million people are 
unemployed (Turner, 2012). The diplomatic cable confirms that the government has 
failed to solve the country’s problems. In terms of prospect theory, the document shows 
that Calderón has been in the domain of losses. Consequently, he has been taking 
risky choices which have negatively influenced the running of the government. In other 
words, Calderón’s behaviour can be considered to be one of the factors responsible for 
the crisis in the country.  
 
8.2.2. The Possible Scenarios 
Under these circumstances, there is evidence that a large number of people are 
disappointed with PRI and PAN governments and therefore do not accept the country’s 
SQ. They are willing to support a political programme that carries out a profound 
transformation of the economy. Since the 2006 controversial presidential election, 
people have strongly supported the economic programmes proposed by left-wing 
politicians. This also means that a significant segment of society is willing to choose a 
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political option that protects the energy sector. If people decide to support these 
economic strategies, the MEI will be maintained under public ownership.  
 
If the PRI and the PAN continue to rule the country, will they be able to privatise the 
MEI? In Chapter 6 we stated that the absence of the crisis argument in the MEI did not 
lead decision-makers to privatise this industry. The key players in the energy debate 
considered that the electricity sector was in good condition, so there were no real 
reasons to make that important choice. If the government proposes to privatise the MEI 
by again using the crisis argument, it will be very difficult to reach that objective. 
Political players know well that the electricity sector is still in good condition. They know 
that the country has an adequate electricity generation system, which can completely 
satisfy demand.  
 
What might lead these two political parties to carry out the privatisation? In Chapter 5 
we analysed how the Mexican government allowed partial private sector participation in 
the electricity industry under the LSPEE. Companies such as Mitsubishi Corporation, 
Électricité de France, Union Fenosa, and Transalta Energy Corporation have spent a 
lot of different resources to participate in the MEI. As a result, these corporations have 
reached a total market share of almost 40% and will receive US$111 billion from 
electricity sales to CFE (see Chapter 3). To get these economic benefits, the 
government generated adequate and positive conditions for the companies’ 
investments such as the Pidiregas financial scheme. These conditions allow energy 
companies to avoid the “escalation commitment phenomenon”206.   
 
This phenomenon occurs when people adhere to a course of action (e.g. an investment 
programme) that is considered unsuccessful. Thus, decision-makers tend to invest 
more resources to recoup their sunk costs. The concept of sunk costs is an interesting 
factor that has been discussed in our research. As stated in Section 3.3.2.2, sunk costs 
are all the resources that have been spent on an investment by individuals or 
organisations. These resources are considered as irrecoverable. Under PT’s 
perspective, these costs are very important in people’s decision-making processes. 
The positive economic scenario in the energy sector will not make private companies 
frame their investments as a loss, and therefore they will not make very risky choices 
such as spending more economic resources to recover such costs. This means that 
private investors are satisfied with the SQ because they are obtaining very important 
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benefits from the Mexican electricity market. As a result, they are in the domain of 
gains. 
 
Although private companies are satisfied with the MEI’s SQ, they can aspire to have 
complete participation in the industry. This aspiration will move investors from the 
domain of gains to the domain of losses. According to Mercer (2005a), when private 
interests aspire to improve their market conditions, these groups always frame their 
market disputes as losses. This means that the decision to privatise the MEI is a risky 
choice for these companies and the political parties that support this policy. The 
adverse economic, social and political scenario in Mexico makes privatisation a risky 
choice. Moreover, the strong political opposition to these policies and the endowment 
effect207 will complicate the situation.  
 
People’s emotional attachment to the MEI will be an obstacle for political parties that 
propose privatisation. People will be unwilling to lose the electricity industry because 
they feel it is part of their possessions. As stated in Chapter 6, the Mexican Constitution 
represents the “contract” that states that this sector is a strategic activity strictly 
reserved for the state. If the PRI and the PAN propose privatising the electricity sector, 
this will trigger people’s negative emotions. Under the current critical situation in the 
country, these feelings can lead people to behave in a violent way to stop the 
privatisation. Since people will frame the privatisation as a loss, they can take risky 
options. According to Zhang and Fishbach (2005), the endowment effect can be 
amplified by negative emotions. More specifically, feelings such as anger will deter 
people from trading the MEI. This means that these emotions will considerably 
increase the price that Mexicans will be willing to accept in exchange for privatisation. 
 
Vis (2009) states that there are specific conditions that can lead governments to carry 
out unpopular policies (see Section 3.3.4.1). She indicates that under PT’s perspective, 
a deteriorating socioeconomic condition combined with one or two other factors, for 
example a deteriorating political position or a right-wing government, can put politicians 
in the domain of losses. Vis considers that the stronger the political opposition, the less 
the government has to lose when promoting unpopular economic strategies. 
Consequently, the government is willing to take the risk involved in an unpopular policy 
in a desperate attempt to try to recoup some of the losses experienced (Vis, 2010).  
 
                                                          
207
 See Section 3.3.2.1. 
228 
 
By proposing and approving the privatisation of the MEI, the PRI and the PAN have 
nothing to lose. Their political opponents are strong and people are disillusioned with 
them. As a result, they can carry out a very risky decision that will allow them to 
implement part of their neoliberal agenda in the energy sector. Evidently, these parties 
will try to privatise the MEI under a very chaotic scenario and will ignore all the 
irregularities that have been found in that industry. This situation will strengthen 
people’s negative emotions against such political organisations. When the Fox 
administration proposed the privatisation of the MEI, the PAN was still in the domain of 
gains because they had just defeated the PRI regime. The typical argument is that the 
better the political position, the better the prospect for carrying out unpopular policies 
(Vis, 2009). However, PT predicts that under a deteriorating political position, 
governments are able to implement such risky and costly strategies.  
 
As was stated by Vis (2009), there are specific factors that can put leaders in the 
domain of losses. Is there another possible scenario that can lead decision-makers to 
privatise the MEI? In Chapters 5 and 6 we discussed important aspects of the country’s 
unique authoritarian system which defined the development of the country for seventy 
years. The PRI regime allowed Miguel de la Madrid (1982 – 1988) and Carlos Salinas 
(1988 – 1994) to implement the neoliberal agenda in Mexico.  
 
The excessive concentration of power, severe media censorship and absence of 
freedom of expression were some of the mechanisms that the government used to rule 
the country. Moreover, political repression was common practice to stop opponents 
who were against the president’s strategies. These measures facilitated the application 
of very risky policies such as the reform to the LSPEE (see Section 6.3.1) and the 
privatisation of important SOEs. Then, in 2000 the continuation of the PRI regime was 
interrupted by an outsider who won the presidential elections because people were 
risk-seeking in the domain of losses (see Section 6.3.2.2). 
 
If this political group returns to the presidency, the new PRI government can make 
important economic decisions. The PRI can take this opportunity to continue with the 
electricity privatisation strategy which could not be implemented by the last PRI 
president, Ernesto Zedillo (see Section 6.3.2). Once the PRI assumes power, it can 
start controlling the Congress together with the PAN and other political groups. As a 
result, they can modify the Mexican Constitution to allow the complete participation of 
private investors in the electricity sector. We consider that a PRI government can be 
willing to use some authoritarian measures to facilitate the privatisation of the MEI. 
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Only the PRI has enough power to carry out severe measures to reach its objectives. 
Since the PRI was founded, many economic, political and social organisations became 
part of this party (see Section 5.2.4). The PRI still has strong support from such interest 
groups, including the military.  
 
The government can be prepared to respond against large-scale protests and other 
types of action that can put the MEI’s privatisation at risk. For instance, the government 
can send the federal security forces to the streets to intimidate and control protesters. 
The adoption of authoritarian behaviour can push decision-makers to brave the 
dangers of popular rejection. This situation leads both citizens and leaders to display 
risk-seeking in the domain of losses.  
 
Is there another factor that can trigger this authoritarian behaviour? We consider that 
decision-makers can see that there is a considerable amount of sunk costs involved in 
the political dynamics of the MEI’s privatisation process. They can attempt to recoup 
such costs, hoping to attain the privatisation strategy’s initial goals and therefore 
engage in riskier behaviour. In other words, they can stick to the original plan “cueste lo 
que cueste”, “whatever the cost may be”. However, under the current adverse 
socioeconomic situation in the country and the strong opposition to the privatisation of 
the electricity sector, that decision can put them into an escalating commitment 
scenario. This means that the government’s actions, including coercive mechanisms, 
will be unable to achieve privatisation. 
 
The new PRI government and its political allies in the Chamber of Deputies can change 
constitutional articles 27 and 28. If the opposition and protest against privatisation 
become stronger, the Senate can be forced to block the modification of these articles to 
control such a chaotic scenario. Prospect theory indicates that when there are sunk 
costs incurred in a project that can be considered a failing decision, and such costs still 
have economic value, subsequent decisions about whether to continue the project are 
likely to be framed as a decision between losses (Whyte, 1993). 
 
We consider that Mexico has very serious problems caused by the governments’ bad 
risky decisions. One of these choices was the incorrect privatisation of key SOEs, 
which did not generate positive results for the economy. So this scenario could be 
repeated if the MEI is privatised under the country’s current situation. This will have a 
strong negative impact on society. Moreover, the extremely high corruption levels, the 
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lack of a regulatory framework and the strong political interests in the electricity sector 
are some of the factors that will not lead to a successful privatisation.  
 
In the international context, some energy experts have criticised the British electricity 
model (see Section 4.3.1). Thomas (2006b) states that in 2001, different problems 
started arising in this electricity system that could put at risk developed and developing 
countries. Since many countries have applied the British model to their national 
electricity systems, they could also be in a very critical situation. Some of the main 
problems of this model, which has been promoted by organisations such as the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and private companies (e.g. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers), are connected with regulation and the design of the 
wholesale market 208 . Thomas states that some of the good results in the British 
electricity industry were not connected with the privatisation. Such results were 
generated by external factors (see Section 4.3.1). “The industry is now dominated by a 
handful of many foreign-owned integrated generator/retailers with no incentive to 
compete against each other” (Thomas, 2006b, p. 1982).  
 
These problems can be solved in developed economies because they have the 
financial resources. Conversely, developing countries which have carried out electricity 
privatisation will have a difficult scenario, because they have to follow the policies of 
the International Financial Institutions (IFIs)209 to maintain the financial support of these 
organisations. So these countries will be unable to choose other options. Once 
developing economies commit to privatisation in exchange for financial aid, the policy 
has to continue “no matter how badly it goes” (Thomas 2006b, p. 1975). Thomas states 
that even the World Bank has recognised that the privatisation of electricity industries is 
an unpopular measure that has a disapproval rate of more than 80% in Latin American 
economies. He indicates that IFIs must acknowledge that these policies have failed. 
Moreover, IFIs must help countries to fix the mistakes generated by these economic 
measures. 
 
The MEI’s privatisation proposals were considered very risky policies for different 
reasons. For instance, they were mainly based on the British electricity model (See 
Section 4.4.2) and there were concerns about the regulatory framework. In Chapter 6 
we stated that key decision-makers considered that Vicente Fox’s privatisation strategy 
was a risky policy because there was no regulatory framework. The heads of the 
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Energy Regulatory Commission, the Federal Competition Commission and the Federal 
Electricity Commission recognised that the lack of regulation represented a critical 
problem in the privatisation strategy. Moreover, the California and Argentina electricity 
crises were used by PRD leaders as reference points (see Sections 6.4.1.2 and 
6.4.2.1). Thus, the riskiness of the privatisation strategies was always perceived to be 
very high by the political players. 
 
The Pidiregas financial scheme is another problem in the electricity industry. The 
private sector participation in the MEI has been extremely costly for the public finances. 
As was analysed in Chapter 5, the Pidiregas projects are generating a huge debt that 
will be paid by increasing taxes or by reallocating resources from other sectors’ 
programmable budgets. What is more, there is an oversupply of electricity that has not 
been used and it is generating high costs for the economy. According to a report 
prepared by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC)210, the Pidiregas projects could have a strong effect on CFE’s 
financial structure. In particular, this organisation states that the debt generated by the 
Pidiregas contracts could be financially unsustainable. ECLAC indicates that the 
government is absorbing the investment risks and that these projects will be 
maintained by reducing significantly the resources of other government programmes.  
 
Under these conditions, we recommend that the government focuses its attention on 
solving the economy’s critical problems such as the high poverty levels and the 
different problems in the MEI. Before planning an increase in private sector 
participation in the MEI, the government should work on improving the conditions in this 
sector. Moreover, this industry is in adequate condition and therefore can completely 
satisfy the economy’s electricity demand. Thus, there is no urgency to propose a 
radical change in the MEI’s ownership structure. By solving the problems in the 
electricity sector, the government could reduce people’s negative emotions. In 
particular, people will see that the government is interested in strengthening the 
electricity industry. This action could reduce the endowment effect, which is an 
important factor that does not allow people to trade the MEI.    
 
8.3. THE APPLICABILITY OF PROSPECT THEORY TO GROUP BEHAVIOUR 
In 1979, psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky published their research 
entitled “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk” in the journal 
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Econometrica. It has been more than 30 years since PT was developed as an 
alternative to the expected utility approach. Since then, PT has been cited many times 
in different journals and books. Moreover, the theory has been applied in a diverse 
range of disciplines.  
   
 
        Source: Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge (2011) 
 
Figure 8.1: The influence of prospect theory 
 
 
The above figure shows part of the influence of PT in different disciplines. We can 
observe that political science is one of the areas in which PT has been used in a limited 
way. In Chapter 3 we discussed why researchers have shown little interest in using PT 
as a methodological framework. We stated that the reasons behind the lack of interest 
in PT are connected with the theory’s specific limitations: 1) it lacks a specific 
framework that can fit reality with theory; and 2) it lacks applicability to group 
behaviour. However, our research offered a discussion about the solutions to these 
problems. In addition, Chapter 3 indicated that the real problem lies in the resistance to 
the field of psychology rather than to problems inherent with the theory. There is an 
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“aggressive uncuriosity” (Rabin 1998, p. 41) which will decrease as economists and 
political scientists get used to psychology.   
 
In Section 3.3.3.2 we stated that prospect theory was originally developed as a theory 
of individual decision-making. Consequently, one of the criticisms of this psychological 
theory is that it cannot be applied to collective decision-making. A simple way to 
circumvent this problem is to apply PT to individual decision-making. For instance, two 
of the political studies discussed in Chapter 3 applied PT at the individual level. Part of 
Weyland’s (2002) PT analysis focuses on individual behaviour. He found that 
presidents from some Latin American economies implemented drastic neoliberal 
policies because they had a risk-seeking behaviour in the domain of losses. Similarly, 
part of McDermott’s (1998) PT application focused on the individual behaviour of 
Presidents Eisenhower and Carter to understand why they made very risky decisions in 
the field of international politics.  
 
Another way to directly to reconcile individual and collective decisions is when a person 
is extremely dominant, group decision can be considered as an individual decision. A 
highly concentrated political system constitutes a very good example of this situation 
(Vis 2009). In Chapter 5 we offered a discussion of how key privatisations were carried 
out during the PRI regime. During this period, the president had absolute control of the 
government and therefore we consider that the president himself had a dominant role 
in the decisions about the sale of SOEs. For instance, some banks were sold to 
investors who were closely related to President Salinas (see Section 5.3.1.2). This 
evidence indicates that the decision was highly influenced by Salinas’ individual 
considerations. It is likely that a direct order went from the president to his 
subordinates. In this particular case, the application of PT to understand part of the 
decision-making process behind the banking system’s privatisation agenda is focused 
on individual behaviour. However, only rarely are key political decisions made by 
people acting alone. We consider that the group decision-making process is a very 
important factor in political science. The term collective decision-making refers to any 
consensual decision that is generated by a previous discussion of the alternatives and 
other factors that are connected with a particular problem (Whyte, 1993). 
 
Our research mainly studied the decisions and behaviours of different groups of 
people. The discussion of the privatisation programme offers a good example of how 
policies were the product of group decision-making. The privatisation of Teléfonos de 
México (Telmex) clearly shows how different interest groups were involved in that 
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process. These groups had different opinions about the sale of that 
telecommunications company. Salinas’ government was assisted by external 
consultants who disagreed with the way Telmex was sold to Grupo Carso. More 
specifically, they considered that this company had to be split into other new 
companies. Similarly, the World Bank participated in the decision-making process and 
supported the idea of a more competitive telecommunications sector rather than selling 
Telmex as a monopoly (see Section 5.3.1.1). However, the World Bank changed its 
position and supported the government’s final decision to privatise the company 
without modifying its monopolistic structure.  
 
Although part of the decision to sell some banks to President Salinas’ friends was 
based on his own personal position, collective decision-making also played a key role 
in the process. People from the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Mexico and private 
consulting groups such as Merrill Lynch and Goldman Sachs were involved in the sale 
of the banks (see Section 5.3.1.2). In the case of the electricity sector, the decision to 
block Zedillo’s electricity privatisation proposal was not made by Vicente Fox. That 
choice was the result of a discussion between actors who closely participated in Fox’s 
political strategy. 
 
The political dynamics during the debate about Fox’s electricity privatisation proposal 
occurred at a collective decision-making level. Fox’s administration used the crisis 
argument as the initial strategy to influence people’s perceptions. Subsequently, this 
plan changed to focus on promoting a more competitive electricity sector. In our 
interviews, the heads of the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) and the Energy 
Regulatory Commission (ERC) agreed with both arguments. This shows that these 
decision-makers had a consensual position about the MEI. As we can observe, 
important economic and political decisions were the product of collective decision-
making processes.  
 
The above cases share a common factor. The discussion of different alternatives is the 
element that is behind these group decision-making processes. The people who were 
involved in the privatisation of Telmex and banks discussed different choices, 
scenarios, etc., before they reach an agreement about the sale of these organisations. 
It is possible that experts from the World Bank, consulting firms and Mexican 
authorities engaged in a debate in which everybody stated their point of views about 
these privatisations. We consider that before the PAN decided not to support Zedillo’s 
electricity privatisation project, there was a discussion in which the PAN members 
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analysed the advantages and disadvantages of that choice. Similarly, the radical 
change of strategy by Fox’s administration during the political debate about his 
electricity privatisation proposal shows that there was a reassessment of that plan. The 
re-evaluation and modification of the original plan was probably the result of an internal 
discussion between key decision-makers. 
 
Can PT be applied to these kinds of decision-making processes? In this thesis we 
offered interesting experimental and empirical evidence that demonstrates that PT 
helps to understand group decision-making. In particular, Chapter 3 stated that 
companies tend to make very risky decisions when they face losses. This behaviour is 
similar to individuals who make risky choices when they experience a deteriorating 
situation. Moreover, the chapter discussed evidence that confirms that individual and 
collective decision-making share the same framing effects. In other words, insights 
from individual behaviour help us to understand some aspects of the behaviour of 
groups. As a result, the application of PT to a collective decision-making process is 
valuable. For instance, our research used PT to analyse the decisions made by political 
parties, regulatory agencies, governments, political players and the Federal Electricity 
Commission (CFE). 
 
The escalating commitment phenomenon is another factor that shows that PT can help 
to understand group decision making. In Section 3.3.3.2, we discussed Whyte’s (1993) 
research which states that escalating commitment can lead people to make very risky 
choices. Whyte states that there is a lot of evidence that demonstrates that groups tend 
to make more extreme decisions than individuals. His research also considers that 
groups exacerbate individual level biases. Consequently, he concludes that group 
decision-making has two key effects: 1) escalation can occur more frequently at the 
collective level; and 2) escalation is more severe in group than in individual decision-
making. Similarly, He and Feng (2013) offer an interesting PT application at the 
collective decision-making level. They use this theory as their key methodological 
framework to explore Asian foreign policy. Their research finds that political leaders 
tend to make risky choices when they face a deficit of domestic and international 
political legitimacy.  
 
He and Feng (2013) recognise that PT was initially designed to be applied at the 
individual decision-making level. However, they agree with the arguments proposed by 
Taliaferro (2004), who also applies PT to aggregated, government-level behaviour. 
According to Taliaferro (2004, p. 231), “the growing experimental literature on 
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escalating commitment and investment behavior shows that prospect theory provides a 
descriptive model for organizational and group decision making”. His research explains 
why powerful governments tend to continue participate in international conflicts that 
generate huge losses for them. He finds that governments are willing to carry out such 
risky strategies in order to avoid relative losses (e.g. loss of international status and 
prestige).  
 
He and Feng (2013) use Taliaferro’s arguments to state that the aggregation problem 
does not represent a limitation for their PT application. So, in their research, 
governments are considered as the units of analysis just as they are in rational choice 
theories. Moreover, their methodological framework employed decision-makers’ 
statements and speeches and different official reports as information sources to 
understand how the governments’ choices were made. This means that these scholars 
treat political players or decision-makers as the agent that represents the governments’ 
interests. Their analysis is similar to ours in Chapter 6.  
 
One of the possible scenarios discussed in Section 8.2.2 is connected with the 
escalating commitment phenomenon at the collective level. We considered that if the 
PRI returns to power, it may adopt authoritarian behaviour to impose its economic 
policy. Evidently, the PRI will have to discuss this strategy with its political allies and 
then reach a collective position. In other words, the application of authoritarian 
mechanisms will be a result of group decision-making. Since the PRI and the PAN 
have failed to privatise the MEI, they can try to recoup part of the sunk costs incurred 
by taking bold decisions, and therefore display risk-seeking behaviour. These two 
political parties have invested a lot of resources in the political dynamics, so they can 
aspire to radically change the current SQ in the MEI. The aspirations of these 
organisations will push them deeper into a domain of losses. As a result, the escalation 
commitment will be stronger than at an individual-decision level. In other words, group 
behaviour amplifies what PT predicts. 
 
To sum up, this research has empirically shown that PT can help explain some aspects 
of the political decision-making related to the privatisation of MEI. There is strong 
evidence from experiments and real-world data that demonstrate that group and 
individual decision-making share many elements. So, PT can be used effectively to 
study the political behaviour of governments, political parties and other kinds of 
organisation. This makes PT a very powerful methodology and future research should 
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explore the possibility of using PT to study other types of decision-making process in 
politics. 
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AMLO 
ASB 
Bcfd 
EUT 
FAP 
FEC 
FOBAPROA 
GDP 
IFI 
ISI 
LDE 
LSPEE 
MEI 
MgC 
MgR 
MMBtu 
NAFTA 
NG 
NOC 
PT 
PW-Co 
RPI 
SOEs 
SQ 
W-Co 
X-I 
 
 
Andres Manuel López Obrador 
Austen-Smith and Bank’s model 
Billion Cubic feet per day 
Expected utility theory 
A political movement (Mexico) 
Foreign energy companies 
Banking Fund for the Protection of Savings 
Gross domestic product 
International financial institutions 
Import-substitution industrialisation strategy 
Less developed economies 
Electricity Act 
Mexican electricity industry 
Marginal cost 
Marginal revenue 
Million of British thermal units 
The North American Free Trade Agreement 
Natural gas 
National oil companies  
Prospect theory 
Post-Washington Consensus 
Retail price index 
State owned enterprises 
Status quo 
Washington Consensus 
X – inefficiency  
 
 
ORGANISATIONS 
Amigos de Fox A presidential campaign organization 
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CFE 
CNC 
CNOP 
COLMEX 
CTM 
DTI 
El Barzón 
ERC -CRE 
EZLN 
FCC 
GLM 
IFAI 
IMF 
IMP 
INEGI 
IPPs 
La Jornada 
LyFC 
MMC 
NHS 
NYMEX 
NYSE 
OCE 
OECD 
OFGAS 
OFT 
OFTEL 
OFWAT 
OPEC 
PAN 
PEMEX 
PG&E 
PNR 
PRD 
PRI 
PRM 
A public electricity utility  (Mexico) 
The National Peasants’ Confederation  
The National Confederation of Popular Organisations 
A Mexican university 
The Confederation of Mexican Workers 
The Department of Trade and Industry 
A non-governmental organization 
The Energy Regulatory Commission (Mexico) 
The Zapatista Army of National Liberation 
The Federal Competition Commission  
A political organisation (Mexico) 
The Federal Institute of Access to Information 
The International Monetary Fund 
The Mexican Petroleum Institute  
The National Institute of Statistics, and Geography 
Independent power producers 
A Mexico City’s leading newspaper 
A public electricity utility in Mexico 
The Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
The National Health System (UK) 
The New York Mercantile Exchange 
The New York Stock Exchange 
A Non-governmental organisation 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
The Office of Gas Supply 
The Office of Fair Trading 
The Office of Telecommunications (UK)  
The Office of Water Services 
The Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries  
A political party (Mexico) 
Mexico’s state-owned oil company 
Pacific Gas & Electric  
A political party (Mexico) 
A political party (Mexico) 
A political party (Mexico) 
A political party (Mexico) 
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Proceso 
Reforma 
Repsol 
SCE 
Serco 
SME 
SoCal 
STPRM 
SUTERM 
TELMEX 
TETCO 
 
 
A political analysis magazine (Mexico) 
A Mexico City’s newspaper 
A Spanish oil and gas company 
Southern California Edison 
A  British government services company 
A Mexican electrical workers’ union 
The Southern California Gas Company 
The Mexican oil workers’ union 
A Mexican electrical workers’ union 
A telecommunications company (Mexico) 
A petrochemical company 
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ANNEX 1: CHAPTER 6  
 
Questionnaire  
Title: Why Did Mexico Not Privatise the Electricity Sector?  
PhD Student: Jesús G. Reséndiz-Silva  
Supervisors: Prof. Peter Lloyd-Sherlock and Dr. Bereket Kebede  
 
Questions:  
1. General aspects of the Mexican economy and the Mexican electricity industry (MEI)  
2. What is your evaluation of the MEI?  
3. What is the structure of the MEI?   
4. What were the factors that led the government to propose a privatisation 
programme?  
6. What is the privatisation model proposed by the government?  
7. What were the factors that affected the implementation of the government’s 
privatisation programme?  
8. What was the role of the political players during the debate of the MEI’s privatisation 
proposal?  
9. What is your opinion about the Independent Power Producers (IPPs)?  
10. Conclusions 
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